Is investment-cash flow sensitivity caused by agency costs or asymmetric information? evidence from the UK

European Financial Management

Volumn 11, Issue 4, 2005, Pages 483-513

  Pawlina, Grzegorz ^a   Renneboog, Luc ^b  

^a LANCASTER UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

^b TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Agency costs of free cash flow; Asymmetric information; D92; G31; G32; Investment cash flow sensitivity; Large shareholder monitoring; Liquidity constraints; Ownership and control; Shapley values

Indexed keywords

EID: 84987906816     PISSN: 13547798     EISSN: 1468036X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1354-7798.2005.00294.x     Document Type: Article

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