Quality-Aware and Fine-Grained Incentive Mechanisms for Mobile Crowdsensing

Proceedings - International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems

Volumn 2016-August, Issue , 2016, Pages 354-363

  Wang, Jing ^a   Tang, Jian ^a   Yang, Dejun ^b   Wang, Erica ^c   Xue, Guoliang ^d  

^a Syracuse University   (United States)

^b Department of Metallurgical and Materials Engineering   (United States)

^c Hershey High School   (United States)

^d ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Auction; Incentive Mechanism; Mobile Crowdsensing; Quality of Crowd; Smartphones

Indexed keywords

COMPUTATIONAL EFFICIENCY; SMARTPHONES;

AUCTION; EXTENSIVE SIMULATIONS; INCENTIVE MECHANISM; INDIVIDUAL RATIONALITY; MOBILE CROWDSENSING; QUALITY REQUIREMENTS; SENSING APPLICATIONS; TRACE DRIVEN SIMULATION;

DISTRIBUTED COMPUTER SYSTEMS;

EID: 84985952123     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1109/ICDCS.2016.30     Document Type: Conference Paper

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