You better be honest: Discouraging free-riding and false-reporting in mobile crowdsourcing

Proceedings - IEEE Global Communications Conference, GLOBECOM

Volumn , Issue , 2014, Pages 4971-4976

  Zhang, Xiang ^a   Xue, Guoliang ^a   Yu, Ruozhou ^a   Yang, Dejun ^b   Tang, Jian ^c  

^a ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b Department of Metallurgical and Materials Engineering   (United States)

^c SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

BUDGET CONTROL; CROWDSOURCING; DISTRIBUTED COMPUTER SYSTEMS; MOBILE TELECOMMUNICATION SYSTEMS; SOCIAL NETWORKING (ONLINE); SOCIAL SCIENCES COMPUTING;

BUDGET BALANCE; CLOUD COMPUTING PLATFORMS; CRITICAL PROBLEMS; ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING; FREE-RIDING; MOBILE CROWDSOURCING; MOBILE USERS; SOCIAL-NETWORKING; USER ACTIVITY; WIRELESS NETWORKING;

COMPUTATIONAL EFFICIENCY;

EID: 84949923566     PISSN: 23340983     EISSN: 25766813     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1109/GLOCOM.2014.7037593     Document Type: Conference Paper

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