Affordances and the normativity of emotions

Synthese

Volumn 194, Issue 11, 2017, Pages 4455-4476

  Hufendiek, Rebekka ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BASEL   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

Affordances; Embodied cognition; Emotions; Enactivism; Externalism; Naturalism; Normativity

Indexed keywords

EID: 84976406917     PISSN: 00397857     EISSN: 15730964     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-016-1144-7     Document Type: Article

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