Philosophy of mind's new lease on life: Autopoietic enactivism meets teleosemiotics

Journal of Consciousness Studies

Volumn 18, Issue 5-6, 2011, Pages 44-64

  Hutto, Daniel D ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HERTFORDSHIRE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 79960406284     PISSN: 13558250     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Note

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