The amodal brain and the offloading hypothesis

Psychonomic Bulletin and Review

Volumn 23, Issue 4, 2016, Pages 1090-1095

  Machery, Edouard ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH   (United States)

Author keywords

Concepts and categories; Semantics

Indexed keywords

BRAIN; CONCEPT FORMATION; HUMAN; PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY; SEMANTICS;

BRAIN; CONCEPT FORMATION; HUMANS; PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY; SEMANTICS;

EID: 84974845866     PISSN: 10699384     EISSN: 15315320     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3758/s13423-015-0878-4     Document Type: Article

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