Philosophical issues about concepts

Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science

Volumn 3, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 265-279

  Mccaffrey, Joseph ^a   Machery, Edouard ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84857086281     PISSN: 19395078     EISSN: 19395086     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/wcs.1166     Document Type: Article

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