Conjectural Equilibrium in Multiagent Learning

Machine Learning

Volumn 12, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 179-200

  Wellman, Michael P ^a   Hu, Junling ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

Author keywords

Conjectural equilibrium; Market game; Multiagent learning

Indexed keywords

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE; CONVERGENCE OF NUMERICAL METHODS; GAME THEORY; MATHEMATICAL MODELS;

CONJECTURAL EQUILIBRIUM; MULTIAGENT LEARNING;

LEARNING SYSTEMS;

EID: 0032207451     PISSN: 08856125     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/a:1007514623589     Document Type: Article

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