Truthful Scheduling Mechanisms for Powering Mobile Crowdsensing

IEEE Transactions on Computers

Volumn 65, Issue 1, 2016, Pages 294-307

  Han, Kai ^a   Zhang, Chi ^b   Luo, Jun ^b   Hu, Menglan ^b   Veeravalli, Bharadwaj ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY OF CHINA   (China)

^b NANYANG TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY   (Singapore)

^c NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE   (Singapore)

Author keywords

approximation algorithms; mechanism design; Mobile crowdsensing

Indexed keywords

BUDGET CONTROL; GAME THEORY; MACHINE DESIGN; MOBILE DEVICES; POLYNOMIAL APPROXIMATION; SCHEDULING; SMARTPHONES;

EXTENSIVE SIMULATIONS; INDIVIDUAL RATIONALITY; INFORMATION EXPLORATION; MECHANISM DESIGN; MOBILE CROWDSENSING; POLYNOMIAL TIME APPROXIMATION; RESEARCH AND APPLICATION; SCHEDULING MECHANISM;

APPROXIMATION ALGORITHMS;

EID: 84961743102     PISSN: 00189340     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1109/TC.2015.2419658     Document Type: Article

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