Congressional polarization: Terminal constitutional dysfunction?

Columbia Law Review

Volumn 115, Issue 7, 2015, Pages 1689-1738

  Farina, Cynthia R ^a  

^a MIT Sloan School of Management   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 84949292768     PISSN: 00101958     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (387)

1. Joshua Huder, Political Parties Are Often Too Convenient an Explanation, Rule 22 (Apr. 28, 2015), http://rule22blog.org/2015/04/28/political-parties-are-often-too-convenientan-explanation/[http://perma.cc/M5N4-T6ZD].
2. Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein, It’s Even Worse than It Looks: How the American Constitutional System Collided with the New Politics of Extremism (2012).
3. It’s Even Worse Than It Looks, Basic Books, http://www.basicbooks.com/fulldetails?isbn=9780465074730 [http://perma.cc/F2N2-4Q42] (last visited Aug. 30, 2015).
4. Willliam A. Galston, Americans Are as Polarized as Washington, Wall St. J. (June 3, 2014, 7:16 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/william-a-galston-americans-are-as-polarized-aswashington-1401837373 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
5. E.g., Red and Blue Nation? Characteristics and Causes of American’s Polarized Politics: Volume One (Pietro S. Nivola and David W. Brady eds., 2006); Red and Blue Nation? Consequences and Correction of America’s Polarized Politics: Volume Two (Pietro S. Nivola and David W. Brady eds., 2008)
6. Michael Barber and Nolan McCarty, Causes and Consequences of Polarization, in Negotiating Agreement in Politics 19 (Jane Mansbridge and Cathie Jo Martin eds., 2013), http://www.apsanet.org/Portals/54/APSA%20Files/publications/MansbridgeTF_FinalDraft.pdf [http://perma.cc/9HCK-WQUB] [hereinafter Barber and McCarty, Causes and Consequences].
7. See Morris P. Fiorina, Gridlock Is Bad. The Alternative Is Worse, Wash. Post: Monkey Cage (Feb. 25, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/02/25/gridlock-is-bad-the-alternative-is-worse/ [http://perma.cc/ASU3-Y2K9].
8. See discussion infra Part IV (reviewing various remedial proposals)
9. See Peter Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 573, 577–80 (1984). 9. Id. at 580.
10. See Gillian E. Metzger, Agencies, Polarization, and the States, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 1739, 1752–57 (2015) (describing nature and impact of presidential unilateralism).
11. David W. Brady and Hahrie C. Han, Polarization Then and Now: A Historical Perspective, in Red and Blue Nation? Characteristics and Causes of American’s Polarized Politics: Volume One, supra note 5, at 119, 119–20 [hereinafter Brady and Han, Then and Now].
12. E.g., Barber and McCarty, Causes and Consequences, supra note 5, at 20;
13. cf. Boris Shor, How U.S. State Legislatures Are Polarized and Getting More Polarized, Wash. Post: Monkey Cage (Jan. 14, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/01/14/how-u-s-state-legislatures-are-polarized-and-getting-more-polarized-in-2-graphs/ [http://perma.cc/4ZPR-RTS7] (using same definition for state legislatures).
14. The Polarization of the Congressional Parties, Voteview, http://voteview.com/political_polarization_2014.htm [http://perma.cc/4UGW-BMB6] [hereinafter Voteview, Polarization of Parties] (last updated Mar. 21, 2015).
15. Nolan McCarty et al., Polarization Is Real (and Asymmetric), Wash. Post: Monkey Cage (May 15, 2012), http://themonkeycage.org/2012/05/15/polarization-is-real-and-asymmetric/[http://perma.cc/36M5-VWDR] [hereinafter McCarty, Polarization is Asymmetric].
16. Voteview, Polarization of Parties, supra note 13.
17. Nathaniel Persily, Introduction, in Solutions to Political Polarization in America 1, 5 (Nathaniel Persily ed., 2015)
18. see also Barber and McCarty, Causes and Consequences, supra note 5, at 22–23 (describing “intraparty cleavages on almost all issues”).
19. See Marc J. Hetherington, Putting Polarization in Perspective, 39 Brit. J. Pol. Sci. 413, 419–22 (2009) (describing factors contributing to “Big Sort”).
20. See id. at 421; see also infra Part II (discussing post–Civil War history of polarization).
21. Hetherington, supra note 17, at 415–19, 446.
22. Chris Cillizza, The Ideological Middle Is Dead in Congress. Really Dead., Wash. Post: The Fix (Apr. 10, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2014/04/10/theideological-middle-is-dead-in-congress-really-dead/ [http://perma.cc/6EYV-NVV3] [hereinafter Cillizza, Ideological Middle]. 21. Id.
23. E.g., Alan I. Abramowitz, The Disappearing Center: Engaged Citizens, Polarization, and American Democracy, 139–42 (2010) [hereinafter Abramowitz, Disappearing Center]
24. Barber and McCarty, Causes and Consequences, supra note 5, at 21
25. McCarty, Polarization Is Asymmetric, supra note 14.
26. See infra section IV.C (assessing explanations and remedies focused on Republican Party).
27. L.J. Zigerell, Are Republicans Really Driving Congressional Polarization? Maybe Not., Wash. Post: Monkey Cage (Sept. 11, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkeycage/wp/2014/09/11/are-republicans-really-driving-congressional-polarization-maybe-not/[http://perma.cc/TJH2-QD5X].
28. Id.
29. John H. Aldrich, Did Hamilton, Jefferson, and Madison “Cause” the U.S. Government Shutdown? The Institutional Path from an Eighteenth Century Republic to a Twenty-First Century Democracy, 13 Persp. on Pol. 7, 16 and fig.4 (2015);
30. see also Hetherington, supra note 17, at 421 (discussing impact of Democrats’ “embrace of civil rights”).
31. See Hetherington, supra note 17, at 421.
32. Keith T. Poole, Howard Rosenthal and Christopher Hare, House and Senate Polarization 1879–2014, Voteview Blog (Dec. 22, 2014), https://voteviewblog.wordpress.com/2014/12/22/house-and-senate-polarization-1879-2014/ [https://perma.cc/HET4-LPA7].
33. Id.
34. Voteview, Polarization of Parties, supra note 13.
35. See, e.g., Zigerell, supra note 24. Zigerell points to Adam Bonica, Mapping the Ideological Marketplace, 58 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 367, 367–70 (2013), which estimates ideology based on campaign donors.
36. See, e.g., Adam Bonica, The Punctuated Origins of Senate Polarization, 39 Legis. Stud. Q. 5, 6 (2014) [hereinafter Bonica, Punctuated Origins] (collecting literature on member replacement driving polarization)
37. Keith T. Poole, Changing Minds? Not in Congress!, 131 Pub. Choice 435, 448–49 (2007) (finding, from roll-call voting, members of Congress do not shift ideological position over time).
38. But see Bonica, Punctuated Origins, supra, at 12–13 (using different methodology to discern two distinct phases in Senate: incumbent replacement through mid–1990s and ideological “adaptation” more recently).
39. Aldrich, supra note 26, at 16 fig.4.
40. See, e.g., Nolan McCarty, What We Know and Do Not Know About Our Polarized Politics, in Political Polarization in American Politics 1, 3 fig.1 (Daniel J. Hopkins and John Sides eds., 2015) (renaming Y-axis “party conflict”)
41. David A. Bateman, Josh Clinton and John Lapinski, A House Divided? Roll Calls, Policy Differences, and Polarization from 1877–2011, at 11 (Feb. 26, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/documents/pe_03_15_Clinton.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“[N]othing in the statistical model ensures that either dimension has any necessary relationship to policy outcomes in an ideological space.”).
42. Frances E. Lee, Beyond Ideology: Politics, Principles, and Partisanship in the U.S. Senate 71–73 (2009) [hereinafter Lee, Beyond Ideology]. Professor Lee concluded that “a littlemore than 40 percent” of Senate roll-call votes from 1981 to 2004 had ideological content. Id. at 65. The 2013 National Journal rankings, discussed in Cillizza, Ideological Middle, supra note 20, which use a subset of roll-call votes thought to “show ideological distinctions between members,” reached a comparable conclusion for the Senate (40%); it found a much lower percentage (17%) of ideological votes in the House. How the Vote Ratings Are Calculated, Nat’l Journal (Feb. 6, 2014), http://www.nationaljournal.com/2013-vote-ratings/how-the-voteratings-are-calculated-20140206 [http://perma.cc/Q4VS-CDBZ].
43. Lee, Beyond Ideology, supra note 35, at 181–93.
44. See discussion infra section IV.C (discussing explanations and remedies focused on party culture and strategic electoral behavior).
45. Bateman, Clinton and Lapinski, supra note 34, at 40.
46. See id. at 31–37.
47. Laurel Harbridge, Is Bipartisanship Dead? Policy Agreement and Agenda-Setting in the House of Representatives 2-3 (2015). 41. Id. at 62.
48. See id. at 62–83.
49. E. Scott Adler and John D. Wilkerson, Congress and the Politics of Problem Solving 4 (2012).
50. Id. at 7.
51. David R. Mayhew, Divided We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking, and Investigations 1946–2002 (2d ed. 2005).
52. David R. Mayhew, Partisan Balance: Why Political Parties Don’t Kill the U.S. Constitutional System (2011) [hereinafter Mayhew, Partisan Balance].
53. See id. at xiv–xvii, xix–xx, 165–67.
54. See id. at 170.
55. Ornstein Says There’s No One Cause for Dysfunctional Government, Claremont Courier (Mar. 23, 2013), https://www.claremont-courier.com/articles/opinion/t6911-ornstein [https://perma.cc/V9U5-SFDR].
56. Joshua Huder, Left or Right? Who’s Further from the Middle?, Rule 22 (May 28, 2015), http://rule22blog.org/2015/05/28/left-or-right-whos-further-from-the-middle/ [http://perma.cc/A9K3-4D7Y].
57. Hahrie Han and David W. Brady, A Delayed Return to Historical Norms: Congressional Party Polarization After the Second World War, 37 Brit. J. Pol. Sci. 505, 531 (2007) [hereinafter Han and Brady, Historical Norms].
58. See Aldrich, supra note 26, at 8–10.
59. See Eric Schickler, Disjointed Pluralism: Institutional Innovation and the Development of the U.S. Congress 220–24 (2001) (describing increase in exploitation of filibuster).
60. See, e.g., Aldrich, supra note 26, at 14
61. Brady and Han, Then and Now, supra note 11, at 130
62. Han and Brady, Historical Norms, supra note 51, at 531
63. Hetherington, supra note 17, at 421.
64. Matthew Yglesias, It’s the Structure, Stupid, Atlantic (Aug. 20, 2007), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2007/08/its-the-structure-stupid/45893/ [http://perma.cc/N7HN-T5U7].
65. See Thomas Carsey and Geoffrey Layman, Our Politics Is Polarized on More Issues than Ever Before, in Political Polarization in American Politics, supra note 34, at 23, 27–28.
66. Brady and Han, Then and Now, supra note 11, at 150–51.
67. Id. at 136.
68. Morris P. Fiorina, America’s Missing Moderates: Hiding in Plain Sight, Am. Int., Mar./Apr. 2013, at 58, 66–67 (2013) [hereinafter Fiorina, Missing Moderates].
69. Brady and Han, Then and Now, supra note 11, at 134.
70. Hetherington, supra note 17, at 427.
71. Aldrich, supra note 26, at 9.
72. See Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein, It’s Even Worse than It Looks: How the American Constitutional System Collided with the New Politics of Extremism 31–43 (2nd prtg. 2013) [hereinafter Mann and Ornstein, Even Worse than It Looks] (discussing impact of Newt Gingrich’s tactics); infra section IV.C (discussing rise in “toxic party culture”).
73. See Mann and Ornstein, Even Worse than It Looks, supra note 63, at 58–67.
74. Brady and Han, Then and Now, supra note 11, at 120–21.
75. Kerwin Swint, Founding Fathers’ Dirty Campaign, CNN: Mental Floss (Aug. 22, 2008, 10:05 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2008/LIVING/wayoflife/08/22/mf.campaignslurs.slogans [http://perma.cc/NM5N-NR4A]
76. see also Kerwin C. Swint, Mudslingers: The Top 25 Negative Political Campaigns of All Time 183–92 (2006) (ranking election of 1800 as fifth most negative campaign in U.S. history).
77. James L. Baughman, The Fall and Rise of Partisan Journalism, U. Wis. Ctr. for Journalism Ethics (Apr. 20, 2011), https://ethics.journalism.wisc.edu/2011/04/20/the-fall-and-rise-of-partisan-journalism/#_edn1 [http://perma.cc/4KSQ-MQ45]
78. William E. Gienapp, “Politics Seem to Enter into Everything”: Political Culture in the North, 1840–1860, in Essays on American Antebellum Politics, 1840–1860, at 14, 41 (Steven E. Maizlish and John J. Kushma eds., 1982).
79. Andrew Gelman, The Exaggeration of Political Polarization in America, Monkey Cage (Feb. 5, 2013), http://themonkeycage.org/2013/02/05/the-exaggeration-of-politicalpolarization-in-america/ [http://perma.cc/PQ64-RL4Q].
80. American National Election Studies, http://www.electionstudies.org/ [http://perma.cc/TG6C-KJ67] (last visited Aug. 12, 2015).
81. Pew Research Ctr., Political Polarization in the American Public: How Increasing Ideological Uniformity and Partisan Antipathy Affect Politics, Compromise and Everyday Life (2014), http://www.people-press.org/files/2014/06/6-12-2014-Political-Polarization-Release.pdf [http://perma.cc/Z9F4-ZFXK] [hereinafter Pew, Polarization in the Public].
82. Id. at 6.
83. Id. at 6–7.
84. Id. at 7.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 8 (emphasis added); see also id. at 77–78 (providing more detailed explanation of differences between majority and polarized minority views).
87. E.g., Chris Cillizza, The 1 Chart that Explains Everything You Need to Know About Partisanship in America, Wash. Post: The Fix (Jan. 7, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/01/07/the-1-chart-that-explains-everything-you-need-to-knowabout-partisanship-in-america/ [http://perma.cc/YKK4-2UAF].
88. Pew Research Ctr., Beyond Red vs. Blue: The Political Typology—Fragmented Center Poses Election Challenges for Both Parties (2014), http://www.people-press.org/files/2014/06/6-26-14-Political-Typology-release1.pdf [http://perma.cc/Q87Z-3MLF] [hereinafter Pew, Beyond Red vs. Blue].
89. Id. at 1.
90. Id. at 15.
91. E.g., D. Sunshine Hillygus and Todd G. Shields, The Persuadable Voter: Wedge Issues in Presidential Campaigns 32–33 (2008) [hereinafter Hillygus and Shields, Persuadable Voter]
92. Morris P. Fiorina, Are Independents Truly “Closet Partisans”? Some Facts About PoliticalIndependents, Centrist Project (Jan. 23, 2014), http://www.centristproject.org/fiorina_independents [http://perma.cc/CM6P-BCS2].
93. See infra section III.B.3.b (describing political science views on extent to which most of electorate is polarized); cf. Morris Fiorina, Americans Have Not Become More Politically Polarized, Wash. Post: Monkey Cage (June 23, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/06/23/americans-have-not-become-more-politically-polarized/ [http://perma.cc/FUB7-SGEN] [hereinafter Fiorina, Americans Not More Polarized] (describing “unsorted and inconsistent middle. [that] has no home in either party”).
94. Pew, Beyond Red vs. Blue, supra note 77, at 1.
95. See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Layman et al., Activists and Conflict Extension in American Party Politics, 104 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 324, 330–34 (2010) (assessing polarization of national party convention delegates since 1972). See generally supra notes 16–19 and accompanying text (explaining the three strands of polarization).
96. See Barber and McCarty, Causes and Consequences, supra note 5, at 24
97. Geoffrey C. Layman, Thomas M. Carsey and Juliana Menasce Horowitz, Party Polarization in American Politics: Characteristics, Causes, and Consequences, 9 Ann. Rev. Pol. Sci. 83, 92–94 (2006).
98. Hillygus and Shields, Persuadable Voter, supra note 80, at 62
99. see also Jeremy C. Pope, Voting vs. Thinking: Unified Partisan Voting Does Not Imply Unified Partisan Beliefs, 10 Forum, no. 3, art. 5, 2012, at 8–10 (finding 30–40% of strong party affiliates and approximately 50% of weak party affiliates disagree with party on at least one issue).
100. Pew, Beyond Red vs. Blue, supra note 77, at 19, 101.
101. See, e.g., Barber and McCarty, Causes and Consequences, supra note 5, at 25–26
102. Hetherington, supra note 17, at 446.
103. See Layman et al., supra note 83, at 340–41
104. Layman, Carsey and Horowitz, supra note 84, at 96–97.
105. See Joseph Bafumi and Michael C. Herron, Leapfrog Representation and Extremism: A Study of American Voters and Their Members in Congress, 104 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 519, 528–29 (2010)
106. Joshua D. Clinton, Representation in Congress: Constituents and Roll Calls in the 106th House, 68 J. Pol. 397, 406–07 (2006).
107. E.g., Carroll Doherty, Seven Things to Know About Polarization in America, Pew Research Ctr.: FactTank (June 12, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/06/12/7-things-to-know-about-polarization-in-america/ [http://perma.cc/6Q42-FGYB]
108. Pew, Polarization in the Public, supra note 70, at 82, 103, 105–06.
109. See David E. Broockman, Approaches to Studying Policy Representation, 40 Legis. Stud. Q. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 18–26) (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
110. Fiorina, Americans Not More Polarized, supra note 81.
111. Pew, Polarization in the Public, supra note 70, at 32–33
112. Shanto Iyengar, Gaurav Sood and Yphtach Lelkes, Affect Not Ideology: A Social Identity Perspective on Polarization, 76 Pub. Opinion Q. 405, 412-15, 420-21 (2012);
113. see also Daron Shaw, If Everyone Votes Their Party, Why Do Presidential Election Outcomes Vary So Much? 10 Forum, no. 3, art. 1, 2012, at 12 (discussing this animosity within electorate).
114. See Iyengar, Sood and Lelkes, supra note 93, at 415–18
115. see also Pew A, Polarization in the Public, supra note 70, at 48 (noting 15% of Democrats and 17% of Republicans feel this way).
116. See Pew A, Polarization in the Public, supra note 70, at 42–44
117. see also Wendy K. Tam Cho, James G. Gimpel and Iris S. Hui, Voter Migration and the Geographic Sorting of the American Electorate, 103 Annals Ass’n Am. Geographers 856, 859–60, 866 (2013) (finding partisans relocate based on racial composition, income, and population density but also prefer areas populated with copartisans).
118. See Pew A, Polarization in the Public, supra note 70, at 32–33, 44, 48
119. Iyengar, Sood and Lelkes, supra note 93, at 418.
120. See Pew, Polarization in the Public, supra note 70, at 72–73
121. see also Abramowitz, Disappearing Center, supra note 22, 86–89 (noting greater voter turnout among strong partisans); supra Table 1 (showing greater political engagement among “partisan anchors” than “less partisan” groups).
122. Hetherington, supra note 17, at 431.
123. Abramowitz, Disappearing Center, supra note 22, at 34–61, 169–72
124. Gary C. Jacobson, Partisan Polarization in American Politics: A Background Paper, 43 Presidential Stud. Q. 688, 691–700 (2013) [hereinafter Jacobson, Partisan Polarization].
125. Morris P. Fiorina et al., Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America, at 8, 15 (3d ed. 2010) [hereinafter Fiorina et al., Culture War?].
126. See infra section III.B.3.a.
127. See infra section III.B.3.b.
128. See infra section III.B.3.c.
129. E.g., Pew, Beyond Red vs. Blue, supra note 77, at 15
130. Morris P. Fiorina and Samuel Abrams, Americans Are Not Polarized, Just Better Sorted, in Political Polarization in American Politics, supra note 34, at 41, 42 [hereinafter Fiorina and Abrams, Americans Not Polarized]
131. Andrew Kohut, The Political Middle Still Matters, Pew Research Ctr.: FactTank (Aug. 1, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/08/01/the-political-middlestill-matters/ [http://perma.cc/ZM3S-R4YW].
132. See infra notes 130–133 and accompanying text.
133. See supra Table 1 (showing less political engagement among “less partisan” groups than partisan groups).
134. Fiorina, Closet Partisans, supra note 80.
135. See id.
136. From 1972 to 2012, they totaled from 31% to 41% of voters; the subset of pure independents ranged from 7% to 18%. Party Identification 7-Point Scale (Revised in 2008) 1952–2008, Am. Nat’l Election Studies (Aug. 5, 2010), http://electionstudies.org/nesguide/toptable/tab2a_1.htm [http://perma.cc/2UBY-UWW4].
137. Jeffrey M. Jones, In U.S., New Record 43% Are Political Independents, Gallup (Jan. 7, 2015), http://www.gallup.com/poll/180440/new-record-political-independents.aspx (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
138. Bruce E. Keith et al., The Myth of the Independent Voter 70 (1992) (emphasisomitted).
139. E.g., Alan Abramowitz, The Partisans in the Closet: Political Independents Are (Mostly) a Figment of Your Imagination, Politico (Jan. 8, 2014), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/01/independent-voters-partisans-in-the-closet-101931.html#.VRv8LPzFs [http://perma.cc/8MLY-CNR3]
140. John Sides, Three Myths About Political Independents, Wash. Post: Monkey Cage (Dec. 17, 2009), http://themonkeycage.org/2009/12/17/three_myths_about_political_in/ [http://perma.cc/ZR8B-NQLL].
141. E.g., Fiorina, Closet Partisans, supra note 80.
142. Alan A. Abramowitz and Morris P. Fiorina, Polarized or Sorted? Just What’s Wrong with Our Politics Anyway?, Am. Int. (Mar. 11, 2013), http://www.the-americaninterest.com/2013/03/11/polarized-or-sorted-just-whats-wrong-with-our-politics-anyway/[http://perma.cc/6LXM-9ZYC].
143. See, e.g., Fiorina and Abrams, Americans Not Polarized, supra note 104, at 44 (describing results of 2008 Comparative Study of Electoral Systems poll)
144. Sarah Dutton et al., Americans’ Views of Obama, Congress, Political Parties: Gloomy, CBS News (Aug. 6, 2014, 6:30 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/americans-views-of-obama-congress-gloomy/ [http://perma.cc/6DAW-22EM] (describing results of 2014 CBS poll)
145. Frank Newport, Americans LessInterested in Two Major Political Parties, Gallup (Jan. 12, 2015), http://www.gallup.com/opinion/polling-matters/180917/americans-less-interested-two-major-political-parties.aspx (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing results of 2014 Gallup poll).
146. See generally Lilliana Mason, “I Disrespectfully Agree”: The Differential Effects of Partisan Sorting on Social and Issue Polarization, 59 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 128, 141–42 (2015) (finding individual’s identification with party powerfully drives “political thought, behavior, and emotion”).
147. Philip E. Converse, The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics, in Ideology and Its Discontents (David E. Apter ed., 1964), reprinted in 18 Crit. Rev. 1, 47 (2006).
148. See Abramowitz, Disappearing Center, supra note 22, at 120–27
149. see also Alan Abramowitz, The Polarized Public?: Why American Government Is So Dysfunctional, at 11–12 (2012) (rejecting argument voters are “innocent victims” because “fundamental fact underlying the deep partisan divide in Washington” is that “rank-and-file Democrats and Republicans are themselves deeply divided”)
150. See Abramowitz, Disappearing Center, supra note 22, at 120–27.
151. See id. at x; cf. Broockman, supra note 92 (manuscript at 23–26) (using different analytical method to show greater ideological coherence of more educated and engaged voters does not mean their opinions are more extreme).
152. See, e.g., Barber and McCarty, Causes and Consequences, supra note 5, at 23–26 (concluding most voters do not share extreme policy positions)
153. Hetherington, supra note 17, at 422, 431, 446–48 (same)
154. Seth J. Hill and Chris Tausanovitch, A Disconnect in Representation? Comparison of Trends in Congressional and Public Polarization, 77 J. Pol. 1058, 1067–69 (2015) (same).
155. Pope, supra note 85, at 6–8.
156. Id. at 3; see also Hillygus and Shields, supra note 80, at 59–68 (presenting data on party identifiers disagreeing with issues in party platform)
157. Delia Baldassarri and Andrew Gelman, Partisans Without Constraint: Political Polarization and Trends in American Public Opinion, 114 Am. J. Soc. 408, 441, 443 (2008) (same)
158. See Fiorina and Abrams, Americans Not Polarized, supra note 104, at 44
159. Jeffrey M. Jones, In U.S., Perceived Need for Third Party Reaches New High, Gallup (Oct. 11, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/165392/perceived-need-third-party-reaches-new-high.aspx (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
160. See Hill and Tausanovitch, supra note 121, at 1059 (acknowledging results may depend on choice of survey question)
161. cf. Todd Eberly, The Difference Between Polarization and Party Sorting, Free Stater Blog (Jan. 30, 2014, 12:04 PM), http://freestaterblog.blogspot.com/2014/01/the-difference-between-polarization-and.html [http://perma.cc/N9XZ-PMH4] (showing how data about public opinion on abortion over time can be interpreted as either increasingly divergent or not).
162. See supra notes 90–92 and accompanying text.
163. Fiorina A, Americans Not More Polarized, supra note 81. Conceptual chauvinism is embedded in the way “ideological coherence” is deployed in this area. As these examples suggest, there are coherent political philosophies that transcend the liberal/conservative boundaries defined by current party platforms. Libertarianism is probably the most thoroughly conceptualized, but it is not the only one. Moreover, the issue positions that characterize various clusters of mass opinion in the Pew analysis (discussed next) have a discernible rationality, even if they do not map onto a fully conceptualized political philosophy.
164. Hill and Tausanovitch, supra note 121, at 17.
165. Fiorina, Closet Partisans, supra note 80.
166. Hillygus and Shields, supra note 80, at 79
167. see also Douglas J. Ahler and David E. Broockman, Does Polarization Imply Poor Representation? A New Perspective on the “Disconnect” Between Politicians and Voters 26–29 (July 26, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://stanford.edu/~dbroock/papers/ahler_broockman_ideological_innocence.pdf [http://perma.cc/2SSV-WKCZ] (finding some of these issue preferences more extreme than positions of either party).
168. Hillygus and Shields, supra note 80, at 52.
169. See Broockman, supra note 92 (manuscript at 11–15).
170. See supra Table 1.
171. Pew, Beyond Red vs. Blue, supra note 77, at 2, 8–9, 17, 109–10.
172. Id. at 2, 10–11, 18, 105–06.
173. Id. at 2, 10–11, 18–19, 103–04.
174. Id. at 2, 8–9, 17–18, 107–08.
175. Broockman, supra note 92, at 15.
176. See supra Table 1.
177. Pew, Beyond Red vs. Blue, supra note 77, at 24.
178. See id. (finding 71% of Next Generation Left and 57% of Young Outsiders prefer compromise).
179. See Pew, Polarization in the Public, supra note 70, at 98, 109–10, 123 (finding over 70% of respondents say living among people with shared political views and having family members marry within political party is unimportant and only 35% claim most close friends share their political views).
180. Fiorina et al., Culture War?, supra note 100, at 209.
181. “Gerrymander” is derived from Elbridge Gerry (Madison’s Vice President) and salamander (the shape of an electoral district he created while Governor of Massachusetts). Kenneth C. Martis, The Original Gerrymander, 27 Pol. Geography 833, 833–35 (2008).
182. See William A. Galston and Pietro S. Nivola, Delineating the Problem, in Red and Blue Nation? Characteristics and Causes of American’s Polarized Politics: Volume One 1,supra note 5, at 25.
183. See, e.g, Barber and McCarty, Causes and Consequences, supra note 5, at 27–28
184. Gary C. Jacobson, Eroding the Electoral Foundations of Partisan Polarization, in Solutions to Political Polarization in America, supra note 16, at 83, 86.
185. See Bafumi and Herron, supra note 89, at 529–30. Since the enactment of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913, both senators from each state are directly elected at large. U.S. Const. amend. XVII.
186. Nolan McCarty, Reducing Polarization: Some Facts for Reformers, U. Chi. Legal Forum (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 3) [hereinafter McCarty, Reducing Polarization] (on file with the Columbia Law Review). Currently, seven states—Alaska, Delaware, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming—have a single representative. Directory of Representatives, U.S. House of Representatives, http://www.house.gov/representatives/[http://perma.cc/RQ5Y-T9HS] (last visited Aug. 12, 2015).
187. See Barber and McCarty, Causes and Consequences, supra note 5, at 27–28
188. McCarty, Reducing Polarization, supra note 148 (manuscript at 14–26).
189. See Nolan McCarty, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal, Does Gerrymandering Cause Polarization?, 53 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 666, 674–75, 679 (2009).
190. See McCarty, Reducing Polarization, supra note 148 (manuscript at 22–26) (collecting studies).
191. Id.
192. See id. at 25.
193. See David W. Brady, Hahrie Han and Jeremy C. Pope, Primary Elections and Candidate Ideology: Out of Step with the Primary Electorate?, 32 Legis. Stud. Q. 79, 84–92, 98–99 (2007).
194. See infra section IV.B (discussing history of parties’ role in campaigns).
195. See, e.g., Mann and Ornstein, Even Worse than It Looks, supra note 63, at 147–49. Open primaries allow any registered voter to vote in any one party-specific primary. Top-two primaries involve all candidates of all parties with the top two vote getters, regardless of party, moving on to the general election. Congressional and Presidential Primaries: Open, Closed, Semi-Closed and “Top Two,” Ctr. for Voting and Democracy, http://www.fairvote.org/researchand-analysis/presidential-elections/congressional-and-presidential-primaries-open-closedsemi-closed-and-top-two/ [http://perma.cc/AE5S-2A9T] (last updated July 2015).
196. See, e.g., Mann and Ornstein, Even Worse than It Looks, supra note 63, at 149–52
197. Arend Lijphart, Polarization and Democratization, in Solutions to Political Polarization in America, supra note 16, at 73, 74–75. In instant runoff systems, voters rank all candidates in order of preference; votes are tabulated using preference rankings to simulate a series of runoffs. How Instant Runoff Voting Works, Ctr. for Voting and Democracy, http://www.fairvote.org/reforms/instant-runoff-voting/how-instant-runoff-voting-works/ [http://perma.cc/UDU4-3TDE] (last visited Aug. 12, 2015).
198. See, e.g., Elisabeth R. Gerber and Rebecca B. Morton, Primary Election Systems and Representation, 14 J.L. Econ. and Org. 304, 321 (1998) (comparing extremeness of legislators elected through open versus closed primaries, based on ideology ranking of Americans for Democratic Action)
199. Karen M. Kaufmann, James G. Gimpel and Adam H. Hoffman, A Promise Fulfilled? Open Primaries and Representation, 65 J. Pol. 457, 471 (2003) (comparing characteristics of open versus closed primary voters vis-à-vis characteristics of general election voters).
200. See McCarty A, Reducing Polarization, supra note 148 (manuscript at 3–4)
201. Eric McGhee et al, A Primary Cause of Partisanship? Nomination Systems and Legislator Ideology, 58 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 337, 338–39 (2014).
202. See, e.g., Mann and Ornstein, Even Worse than It Looks, supra note 63, at 140–43
203. Lijphart, supra note 157, at 78–79.
204. See, e.g., Justin Mattias Valasek, Get Out the Vote: How Encouraging Voting Changes Political Outcomes, 24 Econ. and Pol. 346, 360 (2012)
205. Steven Callander and Catherine H. Wilson, Turnout, Polarization, and Duverger’s Law, 69 J. Pol. 1047, 1055 (2007) (discussing correlation between reduced turnout and increased polarization).
206. See, e.g., Jason Brennan and Lisa Hill, Compulsory Voting: For and Against 83–107 (2014)
207. John Sides, Even More on the Potential Impact of Mandatory Voting, Wash. Post: Monkey Cage (Mar. 25, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/03/25/even-more-on-the-potential-impact-of-mandatory-voting/ [http://perma.cc /NE55-PBT7]
208. see also Shane P. Singh, Compulsory Voting and Dissatisfaction with Democracy 3 (Mar. 11, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2429002 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (finding, based on evidence from Latin American countries, mandatory voting increases dissatisfaction and encourages citizens experiencing alienation to question political legitimacy).
209. See supra notes 151–153 and accompanying text.
210. See infra notes 166–172 and accompanying text.
211. See infra section IV.B (discussing history of parties’ role in campaigns).
212. See Andrew B. Hall, How the Public Funding of Elections Increases Candidate Polarization, Ctr. for Competitive Pol. 22–23 (2014), http://www.campaignfreedom.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Hall-2014-Tax-Financing-And-Polarization.pdf [http://perma.cc/KJ3U-M8MX] (analyzing data from Connecticut before and after public funding).
213. See Alexander Fouirnaies and Andrew B. Hall, The Financial Incumbency Advantage: Causes and Consequences, 76 J. Pol. 711, 717 (2014).
214. Hall, supra note 166, at 23–24. Recall the polarization evidence that new members replacing incumbents account for more movement to the extremes than existing members shifting their positions. See supra section I.B.
215. See Seth E. Masket and Michael G. Miller, Does Public Election Funding Create More Extreme Legislators? Evidence from Arizona and Maine, 15 St. Pol. and Pol’y Q. 24, 25 (2015).
216. See Michael Barber, Ideological Donors, Contribution Limits, and the Polarization of American Legislatures 2 (Jan. 30, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/51841c73e4b04fc5ce6e8f15/t/54d24adae4b092c13f8d35c6/1423067866936/Limits_Revised.pdf [https://perma.cc/D4BJ-XT42] (collecting literature)
217. see also Adam Bonica, Ideology and Interests in the Political Marketplace, 57 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 294, 308 (2013) (quantifying average loss of PAC contributions as candidate moves from centrist positions to either ideological extreme).
218. Barber, supra note 170, at 6.
219. See id. at 28–29.
220. See Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy 115–17 (1957).
221. Nolan McCarty, Reducing Polarization by Making Parties Stronger, in Solutions to Political Polarization in America, supra note 16, at 136 [hereinafter McCarty, Making Parties Stronger]
222. Nathaniel Persily, Stronger Parties as a Solution to Polarization, in Solutions to Political Polarization in America, supra note 16, at 123 [hereinafter Persily, Stronger Parties]
223. Richard H. Pildes, Focus on Political Fragmentation, Not Polarization, in Solutions to Political Polarization in America, supra note 16, at 146 [hereinafter Pildes, Political Fragmentation].
224. See David Mayhew, Placing Parties in American Politics 19–20, 203–37 (1986) [hereinafter Mayhew, Placing Parties].
225. See id. at 308–32 (describing “detailed regulation of internal party processes” and “independent legislators”)
226. Persily, Stronger Parties, supra note 174, at 124 (giving examples of increased use of primaries and opening up participation in nominating conventions).
227. See, e.g., McCarty, Making Parties Stronger, supra note 174, at 137–38
228. Richard H. Pildes, Romanticizing Democracy, Political Fragmentation, and the Decline of American Government, 124 Yale L.J. 804, 828–30 (2014).
229. E.g., McCarty, Making Parties Stronger, supra note 174, at 140–43.
230. E.g., id. at 144; Pildes, Political Fragmentation, supra note 174, at 152–54.
231. E.g., Persily, Stronger Parties, supra note 174, at 128–29.
232. E.g., McCarty, Making Parties Stronger, supra note 174, at 143–44
233. Persily, Stronger Parties, supra note 174, at 129–30.
234. E.g., Persily, Stronger Parties, supra note 174, at 130–31.
235. E.g., Pildes, Political Fragmentation, supra note 174, at 154–55.
236. See supra section IV.A.
237. See, e.g., Persily, Stronger Parties, supra note 174, at 124–25.
238. See Jamie L. Carson, Erik J. Engstrom and Jason M. Roberts, Candidate Quality, the Personal Vote, and the Incumbency Advantage in Congress, 101 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 289, 291 (2007).
239. See David W. Brady and Phillip Althoff, Party Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1890–1910: Elements of a Responsible Party System, 36 J. Pol. 753, 760–64 (1974)
240. see also Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein, The Broken Branch: How Congress Is Failing America and How to Get It Back on Track 7 (2006) [hereinafter Mann and Ornstein, Broken Branch] (noting similarities between recent congressional behavior and late nineteenth-century Gilded Age)
241. Brady and Han, Then and Now, supra note 11, at 131 (noting strength of “party cohesion” in 1890 to 1910 period such that “level of party voting was relatively high and party discipline was high even on bipartisan votes”). Speakers Thomas Brackett Reed and Joseph Cannon presided over the House for much of this period.
242. See Hetherington, supra note 17, at 427. Cannon, in particular, wielded dictatorial control over agenda and committee assignments, and accounts of congressional history frequently use the word “revolt” to describe the changes eventually forced by m mbers to reduce the power of Cannon and subsequent speakers.
243. See, e.g., Christopher J. Deering and Steven S. Smith, Committees in Congress 30 (3d ed. 1997).
244. See Robert G. Boatright, Congressional Primary Elections 30–31 (2014)
245. Mayhew, Placing Parties, supra note 175, at 224–25, 308–12.
246. See Deering and Smith, supra note 187, at 26–30
247. Jeffrey A. Jenkins and Nathan W. Monroe, Negative Agenda Control and the Conservative Coalition in the U.S. House, 76 J. Pol. 1116, 1117 (2014).
248. E.g., Hetherington, supra note 17, at 427
249. see also Brady and Althoff, supra note 187, at 774 (observing that during 1890 to 1910 period, Congress centralized leadership and empowered it “to prevent obstructionist tactics of the minority”)
250. Sara Chatfield, Jeffrey A. Jenkins and Charles Stewart, III, Polarization Lost: Exploring the Decline of Ideological Voting After the Gilded Age 22–25, 29 (2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://faculty.virginia.edu/jajenkins/pol_lost.pdf [http://perma.cc/8BZR-D3SB] (suggesting loss of agenda control over floor by party leadership contributed to decline of polarization after 1890 to 1910 period).
251. See Deering and Smith, supra note 187, at 48–52
252. Hetherington, supra note 17, at 424–25, 427
253. Russell Muirhead, Finding the Center, in Solutions to Political Polarization in America, supra note 16, at 230, 233–34 (Nathaniel Persily ed., 2015) (arguing House leadership’s power to prevent floor votes on bills that would split majority caucus has obscured presence of “latent majority” of Democratic members plus minority of Republican Members).
254. See Harbridge, supra note 40, at 54–55, 62–73
255. Mann and Ornstein, Even Worse than It Looks, supra note 63, at 7–9, 171–72
256. Joshua Huder, 113th Congress: Arguably the Least Democratic in American History, Rule 22 (Nov. 22, 2014), https://rule22.wordpress.com/2014/11/20/113th-congress-arguably-the-least-democraticin-american-history/ [http://perma.cc/7VF7-2FXZ]
257. see also Barber and McCarty, Causes and Consequences, supra note 5, at 34 (reviewing anti-party arguments).
258. Mann and Ornstein, Broken Branch, supra note 187, at 173–74
259. Hetherington, supra note 17, at 425.
260. See Sean Theriault, Party Polarization in Congress 156–70 (2008)
261. Hetherington, supra note 17, at 424–25.
262. See supra section IV.A.
263. See, e.g., Mann and Ornstein, Even Worse than It Looks, supra note 63, at 143-59 (arguing for campaign finance, redistricting, and primary reform)
264. Steven S. Smith, Partisan Polarization and the Senate Syndrome, in Solutions to Political Polarization in America, supra note 16, at 218, 227–28 (advocating for primary reform and instant-runoff voting).
265. See, e.g., Mann and Ornstein, Even Worse than It Looks, supra note 63, at 166–72
266. Muirhead, supra note 191, at 235–36
267. Smith, supra note 196, at 225–27.
268. See, e.g., Mann and Ornstein, Even Worse than It Looks, supra note 63, at 184–91.
269. Muirhead, supra note 191, at 233–35
270. see also supra note 40 and accompanying text (describing Laurel Harbridge’s empirically based finding of “latent but remarkably persistent” bipartisanship in the House).
271. See Emma Dumain and Matt Fuller, Conservatives Fume over Leadership’s Crackdown on Rebels, Roll Call 218 (June 22, 2015), http://blogs.rollcall.com/218/conservatives-fumeover-gop-retribution/?dcz= [http://perma.cc/TCN2-PUZT]
272. Matt Fuller, Rule Vote Retribution Continues Chaffetz Takes Away Subcommittee Gavel, Roll Call 218 (June 20, 2015), http://blogs.rollcall.com/218/rule-vote-retribution-continues-chaffetz-takes-away-subcommittee-gavel/[http://perma.cc/T4B7-Z8XZ]
273. Sophia Tesfaye, Boehner Exacts His Revenge: TPP Opponents Get Sacked in House GOP Leadership Purge, Salon (June 16, 2015, 6:07 PM), http://www.salon.com/2015/06/16/boehner_exacts_his_revenge_tpp_opponents_get_sacked_in_house_gop_leadership_purge/ [http://perma.cc/3JMN-MYNZ].
274. Some pro-party theorists themselves acknowledge that the party-empowerment strategy carries the risk that the party will be captured by extremists. E.g., Persily Stronger Parties, supra note 174, at 132.
275. See supra section I.A.
276. See Richard F. Fenno, Jr, Learning To Govern: An Institutional View of the 104th Congress 19–36 (1997).
277. See id. at 37–51; William F. Connelly, Jr. and John J. Pitney, Jr., The House Republicans: Lessons for Political Science, in New Majority or Old Minority? The Impact of Republicans on Congress 173, 186–89 (Nicol C. Rae and Colton C. Campbell eds., 1999).
278. See, e.g., Learning to Govern. Again?, Cong. and the Politics of Problem Solving (Dec. 14, 2013), https://congressandthepoliticsofproblemsolving.wordpress.com/2013/12/14/learning-to-governagain/ [https://perma.cc/W7HZ-8XQQ].
279. Mann and Ornstein, Even Worse than It Looks, supra note 63, at 185
280. Ronald M. Peters, Jr., Institutional Context and Leadership Style: The Case of Newt Gingrich, in New Majority or Old Minority? The Impact of Republicans on Congress, supra note 204, at 43, 53–55 (arguing the two parties have fundamentally different cultures, with Republicans less likely to value and engage in compromise and coalition-building to move government forward).
281. Mike Lofgren, Goodbye to All That: Reflections of a GOP Operative Who Left the Cult, Truthout (Sept. 3, 2011), http://www.truth-out.org/index.php?option=com_k2andview=itemandid=3079:goodbye-to-all-that-reflections-of-a-gop-operative-who-left-the-cult [http://perma.cc/HZS4-X72U].
282. See Mann and Ornstein, Broken Branch, supra note 187, at 146–49
283. Mann and Ornstein, Even Worse than It Looks, supra note 63, at 40.
284. See Mann and Ornstein, Broken Branch, supra note 187, at 146–49
285. Jonathan Haidt and Sam Abrams, The Top Ten Reasons American Politics Are So Broken, Wash. Post: Wonkblog (Jan. 7, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonkblog/wp/2015/01/07/the-top-10-reasons-american-politics-are-worse-than-ever/ [http://perma.cc/85MN-U9MR].
286. See generally Matt Grossmann, Artists of the Possible: Governing Networks and American Policy Change Since 1945, at 180–90 (2014) (examining sixty years of policymaking and concluding amount of policy and its liberal or conservative content emerge from coalition building and compromise among political elites).
287. See Galston and Nivola, supra note 145, at 21.
288. See Gary C. Jacobson, Explaining Divided Government: Why Can’t the Republicans Win the House?, 24 Pol. Sci. and Pol. 640, 640–41 (1991) [hereinafter Jacobson, Explaining Divided Government].
289. See Frances E. Lee, Presidents and Party Teams: The Politics of Debt Limits and Executive Oversight, 2001–2013, 43 Pres. Stud. Q. 775, 777 (2013) (noting margins of party control in House and Senate since 1980 have been half the size on average of margins between 1933 and 1980).
290. Id. “Since 1980. control of the Senate shifted six times, with Democrats in the majority for nine Congresses and Republicans for eight. Control of the House of Representatives shifted three times, also with Democrats in the majority for nine Congresses and Republicans for eight. Between 1981 and 2017, Republicans held the presidency for 20 years and Democrats for 16 years.”
291. Lee, Beyond Ideology, supra note 35, at 48.
292. Sean Theriault, Partisan Warfare Is the Problem, in Political Polarization in American Politics, supra note 34, at 11, 11–12 (Daniel J. Hopkins and John Sides eds., 2015) [hereinafter Theriault, Partisan Warfare]. Theriault does regard Republicans as more guilty of such tactics
293. see Sean Theriault, The Gingrich Senators: The Roots of Partisan Warfare in Congress 88, 112, 127–29, 150–51 (2013), but the electoral parity explanation itself does not require this.
294. See Theriault, Partisan Warfare, supra note 216, at 12–13
295. Thomas E. Mann, Admit It, Political Scientists: Politics Really Is More Broken than Ever, Atlantic (May 26, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/05/dysfunction/371544/ [http://perma.cc/RZ8J-3BSC].
296. See Brady and Han, Then and Now, supra note 11, at 134.
297. See supra section I.C.
298. See Lofgren, supra note 207.
299. Pew, Beyond Red vs. Blue, supra note 77, at 24.
300. See Matthew Levendusky and Neil Malhoutra, Does Media Coverage of Partisan Polarization Affect Political Attitudes?, 32 Pol. Comm. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 5, 9–10) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
301. Andrew B. Hall, What Happens When Extremists Win Primaries?, 109 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 18, 32 (2015) (finding average electoral penalty so large it causes observable ideological shift in district’s roll-call voting toward opposing party).
302. See Fiorina, Missing Moderates, supra note 59, at 58–60, 64 (recounting Republican and Democratic predictions of generation-long realignment when unified government was first achieved).
303. Confirmation bias—the tendency to gather or interpret information in the way that confirms one’s existing beliefs—is a problem, particularly in the case of emotional or deeply entrenched beliefs. See Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2 Rev. Gen. Psychol. 175, 175–77 (1998) (reviewing literature on phenomenon)
304. Thomas Gilovich, Biased Evaluation and Persistence in Gambling, 44 J. Personality and Soc. Psychol. 1110, 1122–24 (1983) (examining why people continue to gamble despite losses).
305. See Brady and Han, Then and Now, supra note 11, at 149.
306. Id. (tracing same dynamic in Irish and British politics).
307. See supra sections III.B–III.C.
308. See Nolan McCarty, Keith T. Poole and Harold Rosenthal, Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches 1–2 (2006)
309. Adam Bonica et al., Why Hasn’t Democracy Slowed Rising Inequality?, 27 J. Econ. Persp. 103, 108 fig.2 (2013).
310. See, e.g, McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal, supra note 229, at 2–3, 184–86.
311. See id. at 106–07.
312. See id. at 185–86 (discussing Temporary Assistance for Needy Families)
313. Bonica et al., supra note 229, at 120–21 (discussing minimum wage).
314. See McCarty A, Poole and Rosenthal, supra note 229, at 136–38.
315. Id. at 188.
316. Bill Bishop with Robert G. Cushing, The Big Sort: Why the Clustering of Like-Minded America Is Tearing Us Apart (2008).
317. Id. at 227–28.
318. See The Big Sort, http://www.thebigsort.com/home.php [http://perma.cc/UN4NMZUZ] (last visited Aug. 12, 2015).
319. See, e.g., Samuel J. Abrams and Morris P. Fiorina, The Big Sort” that Wasn’t: A Skeptical Reexamination, 45 Pol. Sci. and Pol. 203, 208 (2012)
320. Philip A. Klinkner, Counter Response from Klinkner to Bishop and Cushing, 2 Forum, no. 2, art. 9, 2004, at 1–3
321. Philip A. Klinkner, Red and Blue Scare: The Continuing Diversity of the American Electoral Landscape, 2 Forum, no. 2, art. 2, 2004, at 9
322. Eric McGhee and Daniel Krimm, Party Registration and the Geography of Party Polarization, 41 Polity 345, 365–67 (2009). States, 1972–2012: New Evidence from a Dynamic Analysis, Pol. Geography, Sept. 2015, at 119, 121–25.
323. See id. at 9–10. That is, the failure of older white Southern Democrats to change their registered party affiliation created a false appearance of political heterogeneity that was gradually corrected, as these voters were replaced by younger conservative voters who properly sorted themselves by registering Republican. See id. at 2 (considering theory of Green, Palmquist, and Schickler).
324. See id. at 10.
325. Pew, Polarization in the Public, supra note 70, at 45.
326. Jonathan Rodden, Geography and Gridlock in the United States, in Solutions to Political Polarization in America, supra note 16, at 104, 112.
327. See, e.g., Abramowitz, Disappearing Center, supra note 22, at 120–27
328. Avi Tuschman, Our Political Nature: The Evolutionary Origins of What Divides Us 123, 425–26 (2013) [hereinafter Tuschman, Our Political Nature]
329. Avi Tuschman, Why Americans Are So Polarized: Education and Evolution, Atlantic (Feb. 28, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/02/why-americans-are-so-polarized-education-and-evolution/284098/ [http://perma.cc/W84G-7NFT].
330. See Tuschman, Our Political Nature, supra note 244, at 168–69
331. Casey A. Klofstad, Rose McDermott and Peter K. Hakim, The Dating Preferences of Liberals and Conservatives, 35 Pol. Behav. 519, 531–32 (2013).
332. See, e.g., Christine Ma-Kellams et al., Not All Education Is Equally Liberal: The Effects of Science Education on Political Attitudes, 2 J. Soc. and Pol. Psychol. 143, 143–46 (2014) (reviewing this literature)
333. Heiner Rindermann, Carmen Flores-Mendoza and Michael A. Woodley, Political Orientations, Intelligence and Education, 40 Intelligence 217, 217–20 (2012) (same)
334. see also Kyle Dodson, The Effect of College on Social and Political Attitudes and Civic Participation, in Professors and Their Politics 135, 150–56 (Neil Gross and Solon Simmons eds., 2014) (arguing effect of education is complex and depends on students’ incoming characteristics: academic aspects moderate opinion among those who come in less politically engaged while social aspects make politically engaged incoming students more extreme via echo-chamber effect of self-selected social networks).
335. See, e.g., Baldassarri and Gelman, supra note 123, at 436
336. George F. Bishop, The Effect of Education on Ideological Consistency, 40 Pub. Opinion Q. 337, 344 (1976)
337. see also Rindermann, Flores-Mendoza and Woodley, supra note 246, at 7 (discussing Brazilian data).
338. Jaclyn Kaslovsky, The Effect of Education on Ideological Polarization in the U.S. Congress: An Instrument Variable Analysis 6 (2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.politics.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/5628/Kaslovsky.pdf [http://perma.cc/X5LS-TH8K]. This thesis is a rare effort to test the polarizing effect of education directly on members of Congress.
339. For more on the problem of confusing measures of consistency with extremism, see supra section III.B.3.c.
340. See Council of Econ. Advisers, 15 Economic Facts About Millennials 3 (2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/millennials_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/A5UN-5B85] (citing census data).
341. See Drew DeSilver, The Politics of American Generations: How Age Affects Attitudes and Voting Behavior, Pew Research Ctr.: FactTank (July 9, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/07/09/the-politics-of-american-generations-howage-affects-attitudes-and-voting-behavior/ [http://perma.cc/QU6Y-P3GH]. An earlier report had similarly detailed cross cutting liberal and conservative preferences among the preceding cohort Generation X voters.
342. See Pew Research Ctr., The Generation Gap and the 2012 Election 75–81 (2011), http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/11-3-11%20Generations%20Release.pdf [http://perma.cc/YQ8H-46UV].
343. See supra text accompanying note 136.
344. See supra text accompanying note 137.
345. See supra text accompanying notes 134–135
346. see also DeSilver, supra note 251 (discussing generational differences in preferences within “Faith and Family Left” and “Hard-Pressed Skeptics” clusters). Seventeen percent of this age group belongs to the cluster of uninvolved bystanders, defined as unregistered voters that do not actively follow politics, id., so the proportion of cross-pressured individuals among young adult voters is actually considerably higher than the percentages in the text.
347. See, e.g., Robert Y. Shapiro, Can Young Voters Break the Cycle of Polarization?, Wash. Post: Monkey Cage (Jan. 20, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/01/20/can-young-voters-break-the-cycle-of-polarization/ [http://perma.cc/C3HVLXFH] (arguing young people are “voters the parties will be chasing in the years to come”).
348. Jacobson, Partisan Polarization, supra note 99, at 704;
349. accord Pew Research Ctr., A Deep Dive into Party Affiliation: Sharp Differences by Race, Gender, Generation, Education 1–3 (2015), http://www.people-press.org/files/2015/04/4-7-2015-Party-IDrelease.pdf [http://perma.cc/742H-DFH5] [hereinafter Pew, Deep Dive].
350. See Alan I. Abramowitz, How Race and Religion Have Polarized American Voters, Wash. Post: Monkey Cage (Jan. 20, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkeycage/wp/2014/01/20/how-race-and-religion-have-polarized-american-voters/ [http://perma.cc/2CAL-5U6H].
351. See, e.g., Pew, Deep Dive, supra note 256, at 1.
352. See Paul Taylor et al., When Labels Don’t Fit: Hispanics and Their Views of Identity, Pew Research Ctr. (Apr. 4, 2012), http://www.pewhispanic.org/2012/04/04/vpolitics-values-and-religion/ [http://perma.cc/N5AC-A2VS].
353. Council of Econ. Advisers, supra note 250, at 5–6.
354. See Pew, Beyond Red vs. Blue, supra note 77, at 9; cf. Millennials in Adulthood: Detached from Institutions, Networked with Friends, Pew Research Ctr. (Mar. 7, 2014), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2014/03/07/millennials-in-adulthood/[http://perma.cc/89SY-CC8N] (describing Millenials’ concerns about future of Social Security).
355. Mayhew, Partisan Balance, supra note 46, at 190 (emphasis omitted).
356. Cf. John R. Hibbing, Kevin B. Smith and John R. Alford, Differences in Negativity Bias Underlie Variations in Political Ideology, 37 Behav. and Brain Sci. 297, 303–04 (2014) arguing physiological neurological basis for observed variations in levels of negativity bias is “the principal that negative events are more salient, potent, dominant in combinations, and generally efficacious than positive events”(internal quotation marks omitted).
357. See Am. Political Sci. Ass’n Comm. on Political Parties, Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System, 44 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1, 1–14 (1950).
358. See id. at 1–2, 6–9.
359. For a prescient response that this would be disastrous, see Evron M. Kirkpatrick, “Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System”: Political Science, Policy Science, or Pseudo Science?, 65 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 965, 969–71 (1971).
360. See supra notes 186–190 and accompanying text.
361. See, e.g., George B. Galloway, The Legislative Process in Congress 289–90 (1953)
362. Galston and Nivola, supra note 145, at 34
363. Hetherington, supra note 17, at 424.
364. See Deering and Smith, supra note 187, 47–53 (describing reforms that substantially increased power of “corporate party leadership, and the Speaker in particular. at the expense of committees and committee chairs”).
365. See supra section IV.B.
366. See, e.g., David R. Mayhew, Congressional Elections: The Case of the Vanishing Marginals, 6 Polity 295, 304 (1974)
367. John A. Ferejohn, On the Decline of Competition in Congressional Elections, 71 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 166, 167 (1977) (critiquing various explanations offered for phenomenon).
368. Although Professor Mayhew himself did not use the phrase “electoral stagnation,” it is now the standard terminology for lack of competitiveness in House elections. See, e.g., James E. Campbell, The Stagnation of Congressional Elections, in Life After Reform: When the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act Meets Politics 141, 142 (Michael J. Malbin ed., 2003) (crediting Professor Mayhew with initial work on this problem).
369. See John David Rausch, Jr., When a Popular Idea Meets Congress: The History of the Term Limit Debate in Congress, 1 Pol. Bureaucracy and Just. 34, 38 (2009) (describing efforts of Foundation for Study of Presidential and Congressional Terms in approaching “subject of congressional term limits from a scholarly perspective” throughout 1970s).
370. See supra section I.B.
371. See Richard J. Ellis, The Development of the American Presidency 333-36 (2012).
372. See, e.g., Jacobson, Explaining Divided Government, supra note 212, at 640
373. Steven Taylor, Whatever Happened to the Republican ‘Lock’ on the Electoral College?, 7 N. Eng. J. Pol. Sci. 25, 26 (2013).
374. See Jacobson, Partisan Polarization, supra note 99, at 702–03 (discussing Republican hold on House)
375. Aaron Blake, The GOP’s Major 2016 Problem—in 3 Maps, Wash. Post: Fix (Jan. 6, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2015/01/06/the-gops-2016-problem-in-3-maps/ [http://perma.cc/UWK2-TS5F] (predicting consistent Democratic success in Electoral College).
376. See Mayhew, Partisan Balance, supra note 46, at 190.
377. See Paul Kane and Mike DeBonis, Senate Approves Bill on Reviewing a Proposed Nuclear Deal with Iran, Wash. Post (May 7, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/mcconnell-on-verge-of-clearing-big-hurdle-on-iran-review-legislation/2015/05/07/a27455be-f42c-11e4-b2f3-af5479e6bbdd_story.html?wpisrc=al_alert [http://perma.cc/5QXA-KRGV].
378. See Sarah Binder, Bipartisan Doc-Fix Passes the House: How Did Polarized Parties Do It?, Wash. Post: Monkey Cage (Mar. 26, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/03/26/bipartisan-doc-fix-passes-the-house-how-did-polarizedparties-do-it/ [http://perma.cc/3BS6-JTVN].
379. See, e.g., Ben Sasse, House Should Reject Medicare Change: My GOP Colleagues Are Doing More Harm Than Good, Politico (Mar. 26, 2015), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/03/medicare-change-gop-116416.html#.VUu5qI5VhBd [http://perma.cc/7PUL-V6D6].
380. See Ted Barrett, Senate Passes ‘Fast Track’ Trade Promotion Bill, CNN (May 22, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/05/22/politics/senate-trade-promotion-authority/ [http://perma.cc/FAP3-8TTL].
381. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
382. See Mike DeBonis and Ellen Nakashima, House Approves Measure Ending NSA Bulk Phone Data Collection Program, Wash. Post (May 13, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/the-house-will-vote-to-reform-nsa-phone-spying-what-will-the-senate-do/2015/05/13/31be97aa-f97f-11e4-9030-b4732caefe81_story.html [http://perma.cc/5RWWE8LM].
383. See Paul Kane, House Passes Iran Review Bill, Sending It to Obama’s Desk for Signature, Wash. Post (May 14, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/housepasses-iran-review-bill-sending-it-to-obamas-desk-for-signature/2015/05/14/fcb7567e-fa6d-11e4-9030-b4732caefe81_story.html [http://perma.cc/9JMH-MG72]
384. Erin Kelly, Senate Approves USA Freedom Act, USA Today (June 2, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2015/06/02/patriot-act-usa-freedom-act-senate-vote/28345747/ [http://perma.cc/GQ7K-2CHU]
385. Erin Kelly, Senate Passes Bipartisan ‘Doc Fix’ Medicare Bill, USA Today (Apr. 14, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2015/04/14/medicare-doc-fix-senate-vote/25776861/ [http://perma.cc/D9PX-7W4N].
386. Harbridge, supra note 40, at 7.
387. Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches, Voteview, http://voteview.com/Polarized_America.htm [http://perma.cc/G3PB-ZPDV] (last visited Aug. 17, 2015).