Get Out The Vote: How Encouraging Voting Changes Political Outcomes

Economics and Politics

Volumn 24, Issue 3, 2012, Pages 346-373

  Valasek, Justin Mattias ^a,b  

^a EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE   (Italy)

^b DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ELECTION; POLITICAL CHANGE; POLITICAL SYSTEM; VOTING BEHAVIOR;

EID: 84867420638     PISSN: 09541985     EISSN: 14680343     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0343.2012.00404.x     Document Type: Article

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