Demand for fixed-price multi-year contracts: Experimental evidence from insurance decisions

Journal of Risk and Uncertainty

Volumn 51, Issue 2, 2015, Pages 171-194

  Kunreuther, Howard ^a   Michel Kerjan, Erwann ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Choice under uncertainty; Disaster; Individual decision making; Multi year insurance

Indexed keywords

EID: 84948717300     PISSN: 08955646     EISSN: 15730476     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11166-015-9225-4     Document Type: Article

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