Price-based information certificates for minimal-revelation combinatorial auctions

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 2531, Issue , 2002, Pages 103-122

  Parkes, David C ^a  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ELECTRONIC COMMERCE; LINEAR PROGRAMMING; MACHINE DESIGN;

COMBINATORIAL AUCTION; COMPLETE INFORMATION; DOMINANT STRATEGY; EFFICIENT ALLOCATIONS; LINEAR PROGRAMMING DUALITY; MECHANISM DESIGN; MINIMAL INFORMATION; PREFERENCE INFORMATION;

INTELLIGENT AGENTS;

EID: 84942576208     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/3-540-36378-5_7     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (37)

1. A. Andersson, M. Tenhunen, and F. Ygge. Integer programming for auctions with bids for combinations. In Proc. 4th International Conference on Multi-Agent Systems (ICMAS-00), 2000
2. L. M. Ausubel and P. R. Milgrom. Ascending auctions with package bidding. Frontiers of Theoretical Economics, 1:1-42, 2002
3. J. S. Banks, J. O. Ledyard, and D. Porter. Allocating uncertain and unresponsive resources: An experimental approach. The Rand Journal of Economics, 20:1-25, 1989
4. S. Bikchandani, S. de Vries, J. Schummer, and R. V. Vohra. Linear programming and Vickrey auctions. Technical report, Anderson Graduate School of Management, U.C.L.A., 2001
5. S. Bikchandani and J. M. Ostroy. The package assignment model. Journal of Economic Theory, 2002. forthcoming
6. C. Boutilier and H. Hoos. Bidding languages for combinatorial auctions. In Proc. 17th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-01), 2001
7. E. H. Clarke. Multipart pricing of public goods. Public Choice, 11:17-33, 1971
8. O. Compte and P. Jehiel. On the virtues of the ascending price auction: New insights in the private value setting. Technical report, UCL, 2000
9. W. Conen and T. Sandholm. Preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions. In Proc. 3rd ACM Conf. on Electronic Commerce (EC-01). ACM Press, New York, 2001
10. W. Conen and T. Sandholm. Differential-revelation VCG mechanisms for combinatorial auctions. In Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce IV: Designing Mechanisms and Systems, volume 2531 of Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence 2002. This volume
11. W. Conen and T. Sandholm. Partial-revelation VCG mechanism for combinatorial auctions. In Proc. 18th Nat. Conf. on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI’02), 2002. to appear
12. S. de Vries and R. V. Vohra. Combinatorial auctions: A survey. Informs Journal on Computing, 2002. forthcoming
13. C. DeMartini, A. M. Kwasnica, J. O. Ledyard, and D. Porter. A new and improved design for multi-object iterative auctions. Technical Report SSWP 1054, California Institute of Technology, 1998. Revised March 1999
14. J. Green and Jean JacquesLaffont. Characterization of satisfactory mechanisms for the revelation of preferences for public goods. Econometrica, 45:427-438, 1977
15. T. Groves. Incentives in teams. Econometrica, 41:617-631, 1973
16. R. Holzman, N. Kfir-Dahav, D. Monderer, and M. Tennenholtz. Bundling equilibrium in combinatorial auctions. Technical report, Technion and Stanford, 2001
17. B. Hudson and T. Sandholm. Effectiveness of preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions. In Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce IV: Designing Mechanisms and Systems, volume 2531 of Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence 2002. This volume
18. M. O. Jackson. Mechanism theory. In The Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems. EOLSS Publishers, 2000
19. V. Krishna and M. Perry. Efficient mechanism design. Technical report, Pennsylvania State University, 1998. Available at: http://econ.la.psu.edu/˜vkrishna/vcg18.ps
20. D. Lehmann, L. O’Callaghan, and Y. Shoham. Truth revelation in rapid, approximately efficient combinatorial auctions. In Proc. 1st ACM Conf. on Electronic Commerce (EC-99), pages 96-102, 1999
21. P. Milgrom. Putting auction theory to work: The simultaneous ascending auction. Journal of Political Economy, 108:245-272, 2000
22. N. Nisan. Bidding and allocation in combinatorial auctions. In Proc. 2nd ACM Conf. on Electronic Commerce (EC-00), pages 1-12, 2000
23. N. Nisan and A. Ronen. Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms. In Proc. 2nd ACM Conf. on Electronic Commerce (EC-00), pages 242-252, 2000
24. N. Nisan and I. Segal. The communication complexity of efficient allocation problems. Technical report, Hebrew University and Stanford University, 2002
25. D. C. Parkes. iBundle: An efficient ascending price bundle auction. In Proc. 1st ACM Conf. on Electronic Commerce (EC-99), pages 148-157, 1999
26. D. C. Parkes. Optimal auction design for agents with hard valuation problems. In Proc. IJCAI-99 Workshop on Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce, pages 206-219, July 1999. Stockholm
27. D. C. Parkes. Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Achieving Economic and Computational Efficiency. PhD thesis, Department of Computer and Information Science, University of Pennsylvania, May 2001. http://www.cis.upenn.edu/˜dparkes/diss.html
28. D. C. Parkes. An iterative generalized Vickrey auction: Strategy-proofness without complete revelation. In Proc. AAAI Spring Symposium on Game Theoretic and Decision Theoretic Agents. AAAI Press, March 2001
29. D. C. Parkes and L. H. Ungar. Iterative combinatorial auctions: Theory and practice. In Proc. 17th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-00), pages 74-81, 2000
30. D. C. Parkes and L. H. Ungar. Preventing strategic manipulation in iterative auctions: Proxy agents and price-adjustment. In Proc. 17th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-00), pages 82-89, 2000
31. D. C. Parkes and L. H. Ungar. An ascending-price generalized Vickrey auction. Technical report, Harvard University, 2002
32. A. Ronen. Mechanism design with incomplete languages. In Proc. 3rd ACM Conf. on Electronic Commerce (EC’01), 2001
33. M. H. Rothkopf, A. Pekeˇc, and R. M. Harstad. Computationally manageable combinatorial auctions. Management Science, 44(8):1131-1147, 1998
34. T. W. Sandholm. An implementation of the Contract Net Protocol based on marginal-cost calculations. In Proc. 11th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-93), pages 256-262, July 1993
35. T. W. Sandholm, S. Suri, A. Gilpin, and D. Levine. CABOB: A fast optimal algorithm for combinatorial auctions. In Proc. 17th Int. Joint Conf. on Artificial Intelligence, 2001
36. W. Vickrey. Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders. Journal of Finance, 16:8-37, 1961
37. P. R. Wurman and M. P. Wellman. AkBA: A progressive, anonymous-price combinatorial auction. In Second ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, pages 21-29, 2000