Mechanism design with incomplete languages

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn , Issue , 2001, Pages 105-114

  Ronen, Amir ^a  

^a Stanford University   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMBINATORIAL MATHEMATICS; COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY; COMPUTER PROGRAMMING LANGUAGES; INTELLIGENT AGENTS; POLYNOMIAL APPROXIMATION; TIME SERIES ANALYSIS;

INTERMEDIATE LANGUAGE; POLYNOMIAL COMPUTATIONAL TIME;

ALGORITHMS;

EID: 0242624760     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/501158.501170     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (21)

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