Locked-in syndrome: a challenge for embodied cognitive science

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences

Volumn 14, Issue 3, 2015, Pages 517-542

  Kyselo, Miriam ^a   Di Paolo, Ezequiel ^a,b,c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF THE BASQUE COUNTRY UPV EHU   (Spain)

^b BASQUE FOUNDATION FOR SCIENCE   (Spain)

^c UNIVERSITY OF SUSSEX   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Body; Embodiment; Enactivism; Extended cognition; Locked in syndrome; Sensorimotor approach

Indexed keywords

EID: 84941875969     PISSN: 15687759     EISSN: 15728676     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11097-013-9344-9     Document Type: Article

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