Logic and how it gets that way

Logic and How it Gets That Way

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 1-306

  Jacquette, Dale ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BERN   (Switzerland)

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EID: 84940838780     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/UPO9781844654147     Document Type: Book

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