Quine and davidson on language, thought and reality

Quine and Davidson on Language, Thought and Reality

Volumn , Issue , 2003, Pages 1-311

  Glock, Hans Johann ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF READING   (United Kingdom)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 84928053630     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511487514     Document Type: Book

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