The trouble with Tarski

Philosophical Quarterly

Volumn 48, Issue 190, 1998, Pages 1-22

  Harrison, Jonathan ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 60949282680     PISSN: 00318094     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9213.00078     Document Type: Article

References (13)

1. In 'The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages', Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics (Oxford UP, 1956), pp. 152-278, especially p. 157
2. Peter Strawson and William Kneale are notable exceptions. Timothy Smiley has pointed out to me that in the sentence 'I know three things about the horse' one cannot substitute 'sentence' for 'thing'. I think one substitutes 'truth' for 'thing' in this sentence, and I think a truth is a true proposition. 'I know three sentences about the horse' does not make sense. Gilbert Ryle can be regarded as making the same point in a subtle way in 'Use, Usage and Meaning', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 35 (1961), pp. 223-30
3. This view has been attributed to Frege, but in 'Thoughts', in Logical Investigations, tr. P.T. Geach and Bob Stoothoff (Oxford: Blackwell, 1977), he clearly distinguishes between thoughts and sentences
4. It has been held by Peter Geach, in 'Assertion', Logic Matters (Oxford: Blackwell, 1972), pp. 166-7
5. In 'Philosophers Caught by Catch 22, with Special Reference to Some Arguments against Utilitarianism', in my Essays in Metaphysics and the Theory of Knowledge, Vol. II (Aldershot: Avebury, 1995). I have there given a long list of pragmatic contradictions
6. In Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (Oxford: Blackwell, 1982), passim
7. See Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980), p. 54
8. In my 'The Confusions of Kripke', Erkenntnis, 27 (1987), pp. 283-90
9. In 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', in From a Logical Point of View (Harvard UP, 1953), pp. 20-46
10. I have discussed Lewis' 'proofs' of these paradoxes in 'More Deviant Logic', Philosophy, 53 (1978), pp. 21-32
11. repr. in Vol. I of my Essays on Metaphysics and the Theory of Knowledge
12. These remarks are intended to have some bearing upon what Davidson says about truth and meaning in 'Truth and Meaning', in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford UP, 1984), pp. 17-36, but quite what bearing they have I am not sure; I find his remarks on the subject obscure
13. The point is made in more detail in my critical notice of Bernard Williams' Descartes: the Project of Pure Enquiry (Brighton: Harvester, 1978), in Mind, 90 (1981), pp. 122-35