Differential information in large games with strategic complementarities

Economic Theory

Volumn 59, Issue 1, 2015, Pages 201-243

  Balbus, Łukasz ^a   Dziewulski, Paweł ^b   Reffett, Kevin ^c   Woźny, Łukasz ^d  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ZIELONA GÓRA   (Poland)

^b UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD   (United Kingdom)

^c ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^d WARSAW SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (Poland)

Author keywords

Aggregating the single crossing property; Computation; Differential information; Distributional equilibria; Large games; Supermodular games

Indexed keywords

EID: 84939598947     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: 14320479     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-014-0827-x     Document Type: Article

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