Time consistent Markov policies in dynamic economies with quasi-hyperbolic consumers

International Journal of Game Theory

Volumn 44, Issue 1, 2015, Pages 83-112

  Balbus, Łukasz ^a   Reffett, Kevin ^b   Wozny, Lukasz ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ZIELONA GÓRA   (Poland)

^b ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c WARSAW SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (Poland)

Author keywords

Constructive methods; Markov equilibria; Stochastic games; Time consistency

Indexed keywords

EID: 84927519664     PISSN: 00207276     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-014-0420-3     Document Type: Article

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