Rationalizability in large games

Economic Theory

Volumn 55, Issue 2, 2014, Pages 457-479

  Yu, Haomiao ^a  

^a RYERSON UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

Closed under rational behavior (CURB); Large games; Point rationalizability; Rationalizability; Societal response

Indexed keywords

EID: 84893825762     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: 14320479     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-013-0756-0     Document Type: Article

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