Influence and the Administrative Process: Lobbying the U.S. President's Office of Management and Budget

American Political Science Review

Volumn 109, Issue 3, 2015, Pages 507-522

  Haeder, Simon F ^a   Yackee, Susan Webb ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84938975522     PISSN: 00030554     EISSN: 15375943     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0003055415000246     Document Type: Article

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