Observations on OIRA's thirtieth anniversary

Administrative Law Review

Volumn 63, Issue SPECIAL, 2011, Pages 113-130

  Dudley, Susan E ^a  

^a GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 84866261631     PISSN: 00018368     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (67)

1. Pub. L. No. 96-511, §§ 3501, 3503 94. Stat. 2812, 2812, 2814-15
2. (codified as amended at 44 U. S. C. §§ 3501, 3503 (2006)).
3. Exec. Order No. 12, 291, 3 C. F. R. 127 (1982)
4. revoked by Exec. Order No. 12, 866, 3 C. F. R. 638 (1994).
5. Exec. Order No. 12, 866, 3 C. F. R. 638 (1994)
6. reprinted in 5 U. S. C. § 601 app. at 745 (2006).
7. Id. at 3 C. F. R. 641-42, 645-46.
8. See id. at 3 C. F. R. 638-40 (stating the regulatory philosophy and principles that federal agencies should keep in mind when promulgating regulations).
9. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13, 258, 3 C. F. R. 204 (2003) (substituting the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Director and Chief of Staff for the Vice President as the lead official responsible for advising the President and resolving disputes on regulatory matters)
10. revoked by Exec. Order No. 13, 497, 3 C. F. R. 218 (2010);
11. Exec. Order No. 13, 422, 3 C. F. R. 191 (2008)
12. President Obama rescinded these orders with E. O. 13, 497. 3 C. F. R. 218 (2009).
13. Exec. Order No. 13, 563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 Jan. 21, 2011). In July 2011, President Obama encouraged independent regulatory agencies to follow the spirit of E. O. 13, 563.
14. See George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 3 (1971) (explaining that regulation is primarily "designed and operated" for the benefit of the industry).
15. See generally JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962) (developing a theory of collective action in which individual behavior is central);
16. ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957) (proposing a theory of democratic government decisionmaking);
17. WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY & REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1971) (constructing a theory of the behavior of bureaus and offering suggestions for improvements in public services);
18. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965) (arguing that "rational, self-interested individuals" will not work in a group to achieve common group interests unless the group is small or unless there is coercion or independent incentives);
19. WILLIAM H. RIKER, THE THEORY OF POLITICAL COALITIONS (1962) (using game theory to formulate a theory of political interactions).
20. STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 11 (1993).
21. Memorandum on Regulatory Review, 2009 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 287 (Jan. 30, 2009).
22. See, e.g., Executive Office of the President, WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop (last visited Sept. 29, 2011)
23. See generally Richard B. Belzer, Regulatory Program Manager, Ctr. for the Study of Am. Bus., Presentation to the American Farm Bureau Federation 2 (Jan. 12, 1997), in CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF AM. BUS., INDEPENDENT REGULATORY OVERSIGHT: A NEW PATH TO REGULATORY REFORM (Feb. 1999), available at http://wc.wustl.edu/ files/wc/independent%20regulatory%20oversight.pdf (explaining that the "bountiful platter of procedures" available fail to protect from "overzealous regulators" and proposing a new path toward regulatory reform).
24. See Stuart Shapiro, Presidents and Process: A Comparison of the Regulatory Process Under the Clinton and Bush (43) Administrations, 23 J. L. & POL. 393, 393-94 (2007) (arguing that despite different regulatory preferences, the Clinton and Bush Administrations exhibited "remarkably similar" regulatory processes).
25. See Susan E. Dudley, Primer on Regulation, MERCATUS Pol'Y SERIES: POL'Y RES. No. 1, Nov. 2005, at 21, available at http://mercatus.org/sites/default/ files/publication/Primer%20on%20R.egulation.pdf (illustrating, in Table 4.1, a list of the procedures and oversight structure established by Presidents Nixon through Bush).
26. See generally MICHAEL G. MUNGER, ANALYZING POUCY: CHOICES, CONFLICTS, AND PRACTICES (Stephen Dunn ed., 2000) (describing the steps involved in policy analysis);
27. OFFICE OF ASSET MGMT., FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., U. S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., FHWA IF-03-032, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS PRLMER (2003), http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ infrastructure/asstmgmt/primer.pdf (describing the "major principles, concepts, and methods for doing economic analysis of highway projects");
28. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR A-4 ON REGULATORY ANALYSIS (2003), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ omb/assets/omb/circulars/a004/a-4.pdf (providing guidance to federal agencies on how to conduct good regulatory analysis as required by E. O. 12, 866).
29. Exec. Order No. 12, 866, 3 C. F. R. 638, 638-39 (1994)
30. reprinted in 5 U. S. C. § 601 app. at 745, 745 (2006).
31. See, e.g., FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 11 (2004) (arguing that cost-benefit analyses trivialize values underlying health and environmental policies and advocating for a more holistic approach).
32. See CPR's Eye on OIRA: Public Scrutiny for an Unnoticed Regulatory Powerhouse, CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, http://www.progressivereform.org/ eyeonoira.cfm (last visited Sept. 28, 2011) (asserting that OIRA "wields extraordinary power" and "subject[s] proposed regulations to systematically flawed cost-benefit analysis");
33. White House Subverting Health, Safety & Environmental Protection, OMB WATCH (Sept. 4, 2002), http://www.ombwatch.org/node/1008 (arguing that OIRA creates barriers to health, safety, and environmental protections even though the Office has no statutory authority to shape regulation).
34. See generally MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS (2006) (justifying cost-benefit analysis as a decision procedure to the "extent that it advances overall well-being");
35. RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY: HOW COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH (2008) (arguing that OIRA and the courts should change how cost-benefit analysis is used in reviewing regulations because the implementation of the analysis is biased against regulation, despite the fact that the methodology of cost-benefit analysis is not);
36. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT (2002) (proposing an improved system of regulations).
37. See European Commission, Impact Assessment Guidelines, at 6, SEC (2009) 92 final (Jan. 15, 2009), http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/commission- guidelines/docs/iag-2009-en.pdf (explaining that the Impact Assessment Board (IAB) will evaluate the quality of impact assessments and provide assistance with the report prior to finalization).
38. See Susan E. Dudley, Prospects for Regulatory Reform in 2011, 12 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC'Y PRAC. GRPS., June 2011, at 7, 9, available at http://www.fedsoc.org/doclib/20110603-Dudley Engage 12.1.pdf.
39. See Susan E. Dudley, Lessons Learned, Challenges Ahead, REGULATION, Summer 2009, at 6, 9, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv32n2/ v32n2-l.pdf.
40. See DAVID SCHOENBROD, SAVING OUR ENVIRONMENT FROM WASHINGTON: HOW CONGRESS GRABS POWER, SHIRKS RESPONSIBILITY, AND SHORTCHANGES THE PEOPLE 8-9 (2005) (arguing that Congress profits from passing environmental laws while blaming any negative consequences on Environmental Protection Agency implementation).
41. See Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q. J. ECON. 371, 372 (1983) (asserting that competition among pressure groups for political influence explains various government expenditures);
42. Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 335, 335-36 (1974) (discussing several theories of government regulation and arguing that the most promising theory is the economists' view that regulation is supplied in response to the demands of interest groups);.
43. See Bruce Yandle, Bootleggers and Baptists-The Education of a Regulatory Economist, REGULATION, May/June 1983, at 13, 14, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv7n3/v7n3-3.pdf (noting that special interests often justify their requests for regulatory favors from politicians with public interest arguments).
44. See Jay Cochran, III, The Cinderella Constraint: Why Regulations Increase Significantly During Post-Election Quarters 3 (George Mason Univ. Mercatus Ctr., Working Paper, 2001) http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/publication/ The-Cinderella-Constraint (1).pdf.
45. See Susan E. Dudley, Reversing Midnight Regulations, REGULATION, Spring 2001, at 9, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv24nl/dudley.pdf ("Clinton officials' sharp increase in regulatory output is not an anomaly;... sudden bursts of regulatory activity at the end of a presidential administration are systematic, significant, and cut across party lines.").
46. Susan E. Dudley, Regulatory Activity in the Bush Administration at the Stroke of Midnight, ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC'Y PRAC. GRPS., July 2009, at 27, 27, available at http://www.fed-soc.org/docUb/20090720-Engage 102.pdf.
47. See, e.g., Memorandum for the Heads and Acting Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 66 Fed. Reg. 7702 (Jan. 24, 2001);
48. Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 4435 Jan. 26, 2009).
49. See generally Susan E. Dudley & Richard D. Otis, Jr., eRulemaking: A Case Example of eGov Transformation, (Belfer Ctr. for Sci. & Int'l Affairs, Working Paper), http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/otis.pdf (presenting government efforts to improve public participation in the federal regulation process);
50. Rick Otis, eRulemaking Challenges in the United States, (Nov. 2010) (unpublished draft summary), http://www.regulatorystudies.gwu.edu/images/pdf/us- erulemaking-challenges.pdf (summarizing the challenges and application of information technology to the process of developing regulations in the United States).
51. See OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, 2008 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES 70-72(2008), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ornb/assets/informarion-ani. regulatory-af fairs/2008-cb-final.pdf.
52. Michael Greenstone, Toward a Culture of Persistent Regulatory Experimentation and Evaluation, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON REGULATION 113, 113-14 (David Moss & John Cisternino eds., 2009).
53. Michael R. See, Will/ul Blindness: Federal Agencies' Failure to Comply with the Regulatory Flexibility Act's Periodic Review Requirement-And Current Proposals to Invigorate the Act, 33 FORDHAMURB. LJ. 1199, 1200 (2006).
54. E. O. 13, 563 called for retrospective analysis of significant regulations. Exec. Order No. 13, 563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 Jan. 21, 2011).
55. See Arthur Fraas & Randall Lutter, Can Greater Use of Economic Analysis Improve Regulatory Policy at Independent Regulatory Commissions?, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. (SPECIAL EDITION) 213, 235-36 (2011) (concluding that a better economic analysis of IRC regulations could improve IRC decisionmaking).
56. U. S. GOV. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/GGD-99-59, REGULATORY ACCOUNTING: ANALYSIS OF OMB'S REPORTS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATION 56(1999), http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/gg99059.pdf.
57. For example, the mission of The George Washington University Regulatory Studies Center is to "raise [] awareness of regulations' effects and improve fj regulatory policy through research, education, and outreach." GEO. WASH. UNIV. REG. STUDIES CTR., http://www.regulatorystudies.gwu.edu (last visited Sept. 27, 2011).
58. Pub. L. No. 106-312, 114 Stat. 1248 (2000)
59. (amended by Pub. L. No. 108-271, § 8 (b), 118 Stat. 814 (2004)).
60. See Congressional Office of Regulatory Analysis Creation and Sunset and Review Act of 2011, H. R. 213, 112th Cong. (2011) (proposing "[t]o establish a Congressional Office of Regulatory Analysis [and] to require the periodic review and automatic termination of Federal regulations").
61. See Regulatory Right-to-Know Act of 1999 and Congressional Office of Regulatory Analysis Legislation: Hearing on S. 59 Before the S. Comtn. on Governmental Affairs, 106th Cong. 101-02 (1999) (statement of Robert W. Hahn & Robert E. Litan, Directors, AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies).
62. Federal Regulation: A Review of Legislative Proposals, Part 11: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov't Affairs, 112th Cong. 16 (2011)
63. (statement of Susan E. Dudley, Director, The George Washington University Regulatory Studies Center), (amiable at http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/index. cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore-id=3eff76ea-77fD-4a6a-ba3b-6b89e47263e0 (discussing the benefits of an independent congressional office).
64. See Susan E. Dudley, Alfred Kahn, 1917-2010, REGULATION, Spring 2011, at 8, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv34nl/regv34nl-2.pdf (honoring Alfred Kahn, the "father of airline deregulation", and discussing his contributions).
65. President Carter's E. O. 12, 044 required agency heads to determine the need for a regulation, evaluate direct and indirect effects of alternatives, and choose the least burdensome. 3 C. F. R. 152 (1979)
66. revokedby Exec. Order No. 12, 291, 3 C. F. R. 127 (1982).
67. See generally Wendy L. Gramm, Regulatory Review Issues, October 1985-February 1988, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 27, 33-35 (2011).