Strategic experimentation with private payoffs

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 159, Issue , 2015, Pages 531-551

  Heidhues, Paul ^a   Rady, Sven ^b   Strack, Philipp ^c  

^a EUROPEAN SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT AND TECHNOLOGY   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BONN   (Germany)

^c UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Bayesian learning; Cheap talk; Information externality; Mediated communication; Strategic experimentation; Two armed bandit

Indexed keywords

EID: 84938922857     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.07.017     Document Type: Article

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