How effective is the european security architecture? lessons from bosnia and kosovo

International and Comparative Law Quarterly

Volumn 50, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 540-576

  Wouters, Jan ^a   Naert, Frederik ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LEUVEN   (Belgium)

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EID: 84937345494     PISSN: 00205893     EISSN: 14716895     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/iclq/50.3.540     Document Type: Article

References (237)

1. This article is up to date as at 4 Sept. 2000. For a chronology (from 1989 to May 1994), see Bethlehem and Weller (eds.), The “Yugoslav” Crisis in International Law: General Issues (Cambridge University Press, 1997), xix-lvi
2. hereafter “The Yugoslav Crisis” and UN, The Blue Helmets. A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping (UN, 1996), 487–509, hereafter “The Blue Helmets”.
3. For Kosovo, see BASIC, “Kosovo: The long road to war. A Chronology. 1988–1999”, http://www.basicint.org/eur_kos_chron.htm.
4. The Yugoslav Crisis, xxxiv.
5. General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina with Annexes (hereafter “Dayton Agreement”), Paris, 14 Dec. 1995, (1996) 35 I.L.M. 75 or http://www.ohr.int/gfa/gfa-home.htm.
6. For a commentary, see Sorel, “L”accord de paix sur la Bosnie-Herzégovine du 14 décembre 1995: Un traité sous bénéfice d“inventaire” (1995) A.F.D.I. 65–99.
7. Even though there was a cease-fire from 12 Oct. 1995 (The Blue Helmets, 560) and the formal signing of the Dayton Agreement took place on 14 Dec. 1995.
8. Leurdijk, “Kosovo: A case of “coercive diplomacy” (1999/2002) Helsinki Monitor 8.
9. The first Contact group (infra, n.75) meeting on Kosovo took place on 9 March 1998. The UN Security Council first discussed Kosovo on 31 March 1998.
10. Cologne, 10 June 1999 (hereafter “Stability Pact”), text in (2000) 39 I.L.M. 962. A political agreement was reached on 3 June and a military agreement (Yugoslavia-NATO) on 9 June, texts at UN Docs. S/1999/649 and S/1999/682.
11. A definition from the UN Department of Political Affairs (“UNDPA”), http:// www.un.org/Depts/dpa/docs/peacemak.htm.
12. See also Supplement to An Agenda for Peace (UN Doc. A/50/60-S/1995/1, 3 Jan. 1995, hereafter “Supplement AfP”)), paras 77–80.
13. An Agenda for Peace (UN Doc. A/47/277-S/24111, 17 June 1992, hereafter “An Agenda for Peace”), para. 21.
14. See Supplement AfP, paras 47–49 and 55–56.
15. See the definition of preventive diplomacy in An Agenda for Peace, para. 20. Since prevention consists of more than diplomacy, “preventive action” is more appropriate, as has been recognised by the UN, see http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/docs/peacemak.htm.
16. An Agenda for Peace, paras 21 and 57. Kooijmans, “De Verenigde Naties: van impasse naar preventie en dynamiek”, (1995) 49 Internationale Spectator 366, states that one should “advance peace-building in time, so as to make it an element of preventive action, …” (our translation).
17. An Agenda for Peace, paras 20 and 34.
18. Based on the definition in An Agenda for Peace, para. 20.
19. An Agenda for Peace, para. 20 states “hitherto with the consent of all parties” (emphasis added), possibly anticipating change. The consent and the rule only allowing the use of force in self-defence had been essential for peacekeeping operations, see e.g. Brown, “The role of the United Nations in peacekeeping and truce-monitoring: what are the applicable norms”, (1994) Revue belge de droit international 559–602.
20. Bad experiences with “peacekeeping plus” operations seemed to have promted a return to the traditional consent and use of force requirements (see e.g. Supplement AfP, paras 33–36). However, the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (17 Aug. 2000, A/55/305-S/2000/809, http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations) blames a lack of means and/or an unclear mandate for these failures: it recommends maintaining the traditional requirements for the initiation of a mission, but after a mission has been deployed it recommends that missions be given sufficient means, a clear mandate and robust rules of engagement to deal with “spoilers”, to defend the missions and its mandate and at times also to defend the local civilian population, see paras 48–64 of the report.
21. See Principle VII and the “basket” titled “Co-operation in Humanitarian and Other Fields”. See also the European Security Charter (Istanbul, 19 Nov. 1999, (2000) 39 I.L.M. 255, hereafter “European Security Charter”), para. 9.
22. CSCE, “Towards a Genuine Partnership in a New Era”, Budapest, 6 Dec. 1994. We will hereafter always use “OSCE”, even when reference is made to the CSCE.
23. OSCE, OSCE Handbook (1999), 28–29.
24. By the North-Atlantic Treaty, OSCE Handbook.
25. The Alliance's Strategic Concept, Washington, 23–24 April 1999 (para. 10).
26. See the Basic Document of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (Sintra, 30 May 1997)
27. the Partnership for Peace Framework Document (Brussels, 10–11 Jan. 1994) juncto Towards a Partnership for the 21st Century. The Enhanced and more Operational Partnership (25 April 1999-it includes the Political-Military Framework Document for NATO-led PfP Operations)
28. Woodliffe, “The Evolution of a New NATO for a New Europe” (1998) 93 I.C.L.Q. 176–180.
29. NATO's main decisions on ESDI were taken at the North Atlantic Council meetings in Brussels (17–18 Dec. 1990 and 10–11 Jan. 1994) and Berlin (3 June 1996). On NATO-EU co-operation, see infra, n.35.
30. See article V Brussels Treaty, infra.
31. See Title V TEU, especially art. 11 juncto art. 17, para. 1 (ex articles J.1 and J.7).
32. Earlier, Article 30(6) Single European Act had granted the European Political Co-operation the competence for political and economic aspects of security.
33. Council Dec. 2000/354/CFSP setting up Committee for civilian aspects of crisis management (2000) O.J. L127/1.
34. European Council Conclusions and annexed Presidency reports on “strengthening the common European policy on security and defence” and “non-military crisis management of the European Union”. Meanwhile, interim military and political bodies have been set up (Council Decisions 2000/143/CFSP setting up the Interim Political and Security Committee (2000) O.J. L49/1
35. 2000/144/CFSP setting up the Interim Military Body (2000) O.J. L49/2
36. 2000/145/CFSP on the secondment of national experts in the military field to the General Secretariat of the Council during an interim period (2000) O.J. L49/3).
37. See NATO, The Alliance's Strategic Concept (O.J.), para. 25
38. WEU, European Security: a common concept of the 27 WEU countries, Madrid, 14 Nov. 1995.
39. For the OSCE, see European Security: a common concept of the 27 WEU countries.
40. See e.g. the suspension of trade concessions by the EC by Art. 1 of Council Dec. 91/586/ECCS, EEC (1991) O.J. L315/47.
41. Holbrooke writes that the EC wanted to but was unable whereas the opposite was true for the U.S. (To End a War (The Modern Library, 1998), 27–31).
42. On the U.S. position, see Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe (Random House, 1996), 214–217.
43. After the Brioni declaration (Origins of a Catastrophe), the EC-sponsored Conference on Peace in Yugoslavia started on 7 Sept. 1991: see The Yugoslav Crisis, xxix.
44. See Sica, “The role of the OSCE in the former Yugoslavia after the Dayton Peace Agreement”, in Bothe, Ronzitti and Rosas (eds.), The OSCE in the Maintenance of Peace and Security (Kluwer Law International, 1997), 479.
45. On the EC/EU-OSCE relationship, see Ghebali, “Préface”, in Kalpyris, Vork and Napolitano, Les sanctions des Nations Unies dans le conflit de l'ex-Yougoslavie (Bruylant, 1995), vi.
46. On additional sanctions, see UNSC Resolutions 724, 757, 787 and 820, the latter two authorising enforcement under the Security Council's authority. UNSC Res. 942 ordered an embargo against the Bosnian Serbs. The sanctions were suspended and terminated by UNSC Resolutions 943, 1021, 1022 and 1074 (1 Oct. 1996). For a legal analysis, see Kalpyris, Vork and Napolitano, Les sanctions des Nations Unies dans le conflit de l'ex-Yougoslavie, 3–73.
47. The agreement is reprinted in The Yugoslav Crisis, 472–473.
48. UNSC Resolutions 721 and 724, both para. 2.
49. See UNSC Res 727, paras 2–3. The agreement is reprinted in The Yugoslav Crisis, 486.
50. UNSC Res. 740, paras 1–5.
51. UNSC Res. 743 (21 Feb. 1992), para. 2.
52. UNSC Res. 749 authorised full deployment. The mandate changed (see UNSC Resolutions 769; 770, para. 2 juncto 776, para. 2; 815, paras 3–4 and 836, para. 5), was extended and then terminated by the Dayton Agreement, Annex 1-A, Art. VII
53. UNSC Res. 1031 (15 Dec. 1995), para. 19.
54. See also The Blue Helmets, 488–491, 513–538 and 556–563.
55. UNPROFOR's mandate is contained in UN Doc. S/23280, 11 Dec. 1991, Annex 3 (The Yugoslav Crisis, 478–480).
56. UN Doc. S/23836, 24 April 1992, para. 20 (reprinted in The Yugoslav Crisis, 502–504).
57. UNPROFOR became a Chapter VII operation (UNSC Res. 807, preamble), which is not necessary for a peacekeeping operation (see The Yugoslav Crisis, II.A).
58. In comparison to previous peacekeeping operations the use of force was more liberally authorised: see e.g. UNSC Res. 836, paras 9–10 (on the use of air power).
59. On the nature of UNPROFOR, see the Secretary-General's report of 30 May 1995 (S/1995/444), paras 56–79 and Weller, “Peace-keeping and peace-enforcement in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina” (1996) 56 Z.a.ö.R.V. 70–177.
60. See e.g. The Blue Helmets, 556–560.
61. Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35 (1998), 15 Nov. 1999.
62. Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe, 219–220.
63. UNSC Resolutions 795 and 983.
64. On 18 March 1994 Bosnian Muslims and Croats agreed upon a constitution for their Federation, The Yugoslav Crisis, liv.
65. For the constitution, para. II.B of which deals with the Ombudsmen, see (1994) 33 I.L.M. 740–784. The OSCE mission was set up by a Permanent Committee decision of 2 June 1994 and started in Oct. 1994.
66. See Ghebali, in Les sanctions des Nations Unies dans le conflit de l'ex-Yougoslavie, vii, n.3.
67. See http://www.osce.org/publications/survey/survey01.htm. Having been established by a decision of the Committee of Senior Officials (hereafter “CSO”) of 14 Aug. 1992, this mission deployed on 8 Sept. 1992
68. Rosas and Lahelma, “OSCE Long-Term Missions”, in The OSCE in the Maintenance of Peace and Security, 184.
69. For the HCNM's mandate, see CSCE, “The Challenges of Change”, Helsinki, 10 July 1992, para. 23 juncto the section on the HCNM
70. Estebanez, “The High Commissioner on National Minorities: Development of the Mandate”, in The OSCE in the Maintenance of Peace and Security, 123–166.
71. OSCE Annual reports 1993–1998, all at para. 3.
72. OSCE Annual reports 1993–1996, respectively at paras 2.7, 2.1.5, 2.3 and 2.3.4
73. Kalpyris, Vork and Napolitano, Les sanctions des Nations Unies dans le conflit de l'ex-Yougoslavie, 75–112.
74. See Les sanctions des Nations Unies dans le conflit de l'ex-Yougoslavie.
75. On the mechanism, see UN Docs. S/1994/50 (18 Jan. 1994) and S/1994/159 (11 Feb. 1994), The Yugoslav Crisis, 669–670 and 673–674
76. on its utilisation, Holbrooke, To End a War, 72 and The Yugoslav Crisis, lvi.
77. Holbrooke, To End a War, 70, 72 and 103.
78. In July 1992, the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (“ICFY”), led by an EC and a UN envoy, “replaced” the EC sponsored Conference on Peace in Yugoslavia (To End a War).
79. In May 1994 a Contact Group was established; it was to co-operate with the ICFY and consisted of the U.S., Russia, Germany, France and the U.K. (later also Italy). See Szasz, “Introductory Note”, (1996) 35 I.L.M. 75–77.
80. Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe, vii
81. Holbrooke, To End a War, 86 and 151–168.
82. A process not yet concluded, see WEU, Audit of Assets and Capabilities for European Crisis Management Operations: Recommendations for Strengthening European Capabilities for Crisis Management Operations, 23 Nov. 1999.
83. NATO's Defence Capabilities Initiative (Washington, 25 April 1999) is also aimed at strengthening European capabilities.
84. Rotfield, (1995) 3 ODIHR Bulletin No 3.
85. Szasz (1996) 35 I.L.M. 76
86. Holbrooke, To End a War, 265.
87. On the Contact Group, see To End a War.
88. See Bird, “Bosnian Serb president is sacked by the West”, The Guardian, 6 March 1999 and S/1999/1260, para. 18.
89. Conclusions of the London Conference, 8–9 Dec. 1995. See http://www.ohr.int for most OHR/PIC documents.
90. Dayton Agreement, Annex 6, Art. VII.2 and Annex 4, Art. VI.1.A (appointment of the members of the Bosnian Constitutional Court and Human Rights Chamber)
91. Conclusions of the London Conference, Bosnian Constitutional Court and Human Rights Chamber, para. 32
92. the PIC, Bosnia & Herzegovina 1997: Making Peace Work, 4–5 Dec. 1996, London, title “Human Rights”, paras 4 and 7.
93. Conclusions of the London Conference, “Human Rights”, para. 33.
94. In 1996 ECHO spent 187 million Euros in Bosnia, Croatia and Yugoslavia; in 1997 133 million (ECHO's Annual Report 1997) and in 1998 123 million, of which 88 was for Bosnia (ECHO Rapport annuel 1998 (1999), 28).
95. UNSC Res. 1035 (21 Dec. 1995), paras 2–3. The mandate was extended (most recently by UNSC Res. 1305) and currently runs until 21 June 2001, see http://www.un.org/Depts/ DPKO/Missions/unmibh_p.htm.
96. Dayton Agreement, Annex 11, Art. I, II, III and V.
97. UNSC Res. 1088, para. 27
98. Bosnia & Herzegovina 1997: Making Peace Work (UNSC Res.)
99. “Police Assistance”, paras 3 and 4. The Dayton Agreement only requires the passing on of information about human rights violations (Annex 11, Art. VI).
100. UNSC Res. 1168 (21 May 1998), para. 1.
101. UNSC Res. 1035, para. 2 juncto S/1995/1031, paras 13–35.
102. IFOR was authorised by UNSC Res. 1031 (15 Dec. 1995) and transformed into SFOR by UNSC Res. 1088 (12 Dec. 1996). SFOR's mandate was extended, most recently by UNSC Res. 1305 until 20 June 2001. See also Woodliffe, (1998) 93 I.C.L.Q. 184–187.
103. Dayton Agreement, Art. II juncto Annex 1-A.
104. See the Dayton Agreement, Annex 10, Art. II, paras 2–7 and 9.
105. The EU Administration of Mostar was established by Council Dec. 94/308/CFSP (1994) O.J. L134/1; 94/790/CFSP (1994) O.J. L326/2, repeatedly extended and terminated by Dec. 96/442/CFSP (1996) O.J. L185/1, 96/476/CFSP (1996) O.J. L195/1, 96/508/CFSP (1996) O.J. L212/1 and 96/744/CFSP (1996) O.J. L340/1. See Pagani, “L'administration de Mostar par l'Union européenne”, (1996) 42 A.F.D.I. 234–254
106. Special Report No 2/96 concerning the accounts of the Administrator and the European Union Administration, Mostar (EUAM) accompanied by the replies of the Commission and the Administrator of Mostar, (1996) O J. C287/1. Mostar's status is determined in the Agreement Implementing the Federation of Bosnia and Hercegovina, para. 1 juncto Annex on Mostar, Dayton, 10 Nov. 1995, (1996) 35 I.L.M. 170–183.
107. In late 1995 the Commission adopted a global strategy (see SEC(95) 1597 final; COM(95) 564 final; COM(95) 581 final and COM(95) 582 final), compatible with the Commission/World Bank reconstruction plan (infra, n.110).
108. In Jan. 1996 the “Essential Aid Programme”, financed under the PHARE programme, was adopted. Additional funding was made available through the OBNOVA programme, established by Council Reg. (EC) No 1628/96 (1996) O.J. L204/1, later modified, e.g. by Council Regulations (EC) No 851/98 (1998) O.J. L122/1 and No 2454 (1999) O.J. L299/1. See Special Report No 5/98 on reconstruction in former Yugoslavia (period 1996–1997) with the Commission's replies (1998) O.J. C241/1 (hereafter “Special Report”) for details on the implementation and an assessment.
109. See e.g. their joint “Priority Reconstruction and Recovery Program (1996–1999)”, approved in Dec. 1995 on a first donor conference.
110. Of the estimated cost of 3.388 billion Euro for the reconstruction plan (“Priority Reconstruction and Recovery Program (1996–1999)”)
111. the EU itself pays 1 billion Euro (Special Report, para. 1.1).
112. Sorel, (1995) A.F.D.I. 86
113. Goldston, “The role of the OSCE in Bosnia: Lessons from the first year”, (1997/2003) Helsinki Monitor, 14–16.
114. The first arrest was made in the summer of 1997, Goldston, (1997/1993) Helsinki Monitor, 7, n.7.
115. Initially, IFOR hardly made an effort (Holbrooke, To End a War, 339).
116. For a legal analysis of IFOR's / SFOR's authority to make such arrests, see Gaeta, “Is NATO Authorized or Obliged to Arrest Persons Indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia?”, (1998) 9 E.J.I.L. 174–181.
117. On IPTF's mandate, see E.J.I.L.
118. Holbrooke, To End a War, 336–337.
119. Special Report, para. 2.6, and paras 2.6 and 5.7 of the Commission's replies
120. Sica, in The OSCE in the Maintenance of Peace and Security, 486
121. Bloed, “OSCE Chronicle”, (1996/1991) Helsinki Monitor 75.
122. See Art. 1 Council Dec. 96/406/CFSP (1996) O.J. L168/1, a Memorandum of Understanding (EU-OSCE) dated 21 Dec. 1995 and an Exchange of Letters on 7 April 1997.
123. See e.g. Council decisions 96/406/CFSP (O.J.)
124. 98/302/CFSP (1998) O.J. L138/3.
125. According to the NATO Handbook 1998, SFOR's mandate includes providing “selective support to civilian organisations” and “support to other agencies”, see http:// www.nato.int/ducu/handbook/1998/v087.htm; ~/v085.htm and ~/v090.htm.
126. See also ~/v259.htm and Killham, NATO and OSCE, partners or rivals, NATO research fellowship final report, 12 March 1997, 48.
127. Killham, NATO and OSCE, partners or rivals, 48–49 and Goldston, (1997/1993) Helsinki Monitor, 7, n.7.
128. Hedges, “Leaders in Bosnia are said to steal up to $1 billion”, The New York Times, 17 Aug. 1999. During a press conference on 17 Aug. 1999 a representative of the OHR stated that the overall picture given by this article was correct.
129. OSCE, “Seminar on co-operation among international organisations and institutions, Sofia, 17–19 May 1999, Consolidated Summary, 11 June 1999, SEC.GAL/64/99 (hereafter OSCE Seminar), 6.
130. PIC, Madrid, 10 Dec. 1998, Conclusions, paras 4, 12.2–3 and 15 and OSCE Seminar, 6.
131. Zandee, “Column: Lessons learned from Kosovo”, (1999/1994) Helsinki Monitor 5
132. Caplan, “International diplomacy and the crisis in Kosovo”, (1998) 74 International Affairs 746–754.
133. See the OSCE Annual Report 1997, para. 3.7.
134. UNSC Resolutions 1160 (31 March 1998), 1199 (23 Sept. 1998), 1203 (24 Oct. 1998) and 1239 (14 May 1999).
135. See OSCE, Kosova, As Seen, As Told, Part I (Oct. 1998-June 1999), http://www.osce.org/kosovo/reports/hr/part1/index.htm.
136. In 1998 the Russians even pleaded for a termination of Yugoslavia's suspension from the OSCE (Bloed, “OSCE Chronicle” (1999/1991) Helsinki Monitor 49). Given the OSCE's consensual decision-making (“OSCE Chronicle”, II.B), Russia has a veto right.
137. It had made it clear it would not approve a tougher UN Security Council resolution, see Leurdijk, (1999/1992) Helsinki Monitor 11.
138. See Helsinki Monitor.
139. Established by Permanent Council Decision 263, 25 Oct. 1998. See also the OSCE's Annual Report 1998, para. 2.2.4.
140. Leurdijk, (1999/1992) Helsinki Monitor 14.
141. A WEU proposal (WEU Ministerial Council, Rhodes, 12 May 1998, para. 12) led to a formal EU request (Council Dec. 98/646/CFSP (1998) O.J. L308/1) and then to WEU action (WEU Ministerial Council, Rome, 17 Nov. 1998, para. 5).
142. See the discussion about NATO air strikes in Bosnia during UNPROFOR's deployment there (O.J., III.A.2).
143. Leurdijk, (1999/1992) Helsinki Monitor 14–15.
144. OSCE Annual Report 1999, 1.1.5.1. Permanent Council Decision 296, 8 June 1999 terminated the KVM and established an OSCE Task Force for Kosovo to prepare for a possible new OSCE mission to Kosovo.
145. In that sense Caplan, (1998) 74 International Affairs 753.
146. Leurdijk, (1999/1992) Helsinki Monitor, 9–11.
147. In NATO's new Strategic Concept (Helsinki Monitor, n.23), this issue was not resolved.
148. This “OSCE Presence in Albania” was established by Permanent Council Decision 160 of 27 March 1997 and started its activities on 3 April 1997, see http://www.osce.org/publications/survey/survey13.htm.
149. Permanent Council Decision 218 of 11 March 1998.
150. See e.g. the joint EU/Council of Europe “Albania programmes” mentioned in EU press release 98/93, 1 April 1998.
151. MAPE's establishment was approved by the WEU Ministerial Council Declaration, Paris, 13 May 1997, para. 47. On MAPE, see http://www.weu.int/eng/mape/info.htm. At the EU's request (Council dec. 98/547/CFSP (1998) O.J. L263/1
152. 99/189/CFSP and 99/190/CFSP (1999) O.J. L63/1) WEU completed a study and adopted and started to implement a contingency plan (WEU Ministerial Council Declaration, Rome, 17 Nov. 1998, para. 4 and WEU Permanent Council decision, 2 Feb. 1999).
153. EU Council dec. 2000/388/CFSP (2000) O.J. L145/1 provides additional funding.
154. In 1999 ECHO spent 378 million Euro on humanitarian aid for the Kosovo crisis (“Kosovo-One Year On-The European Contribution”, http://europa.eu.int/comm/ external-relations/see/kosovo/1year_on.htm); in 1998 it was 21.6 million Euro (ECHO Rapport annuel 1998, 13 and 28).
155. “Historique des initiatives françaises”, http://www.diplomatie.fr/actual/ dossiers/kossovo/kossovo14.html.
156. See Clark, “When force is necessary: NATO's military response to the Kosovo crisis”, (1999/1992) NATO Review 17–18
157. Balanzino, “NATO's humanitarian support to the victims of the Kosovo crisis”, NATO Review, 9–13.
158. Leurdijk, (1999/1992) Helsinki Monitor 17
159. Caplan, (1998) 74 International Affairs 746 and 754 (with reservations on Russia).
160. Rambouillet, 6–23 Feb. 1999 and Paris, 15–19 March 1999.
161. For details, see Weller, “The Rambouillet conference on Kosovo”, (1999) 75 International Affairs 211–251 and “Les accords de Rambouillet”, http://www.diplomatie.fr/ actual/dossiers/Kossovo/rambouill.html.
162. Weller, (1999) 75 International Affairs 221–227
163. but see International Affairs, 228–233 and 251.
164. International Affairs, 228–233.
165. But see de la Gorce, “Histoire secrète des négociations de Rambouillet”, (1999) Le Monde Diplomatique, May, 4–5.
166. The Contact Group imposed sanctions on 9 March 1998, followed by the EU and the UN (the latter with an arms embargo, UNSC Res. 1160, 31 March 1998). The EU and the Contact Group adopted additional sanctions, see “Historique des initiatives françaises”, Le Monde Diplomatique.
167. The initial EU sanctions were adopted by Council Dec. 98/240/CFSP (1998) O.J. L95/1
168. 98/326/CFSP (1998) O.J. L143/1
169. 98/374/CFSP (1998) O.J. L165/1
170. 1999/273/CFSP (1999) O.J. L108/1.
171. Zandee, (1999/1994) Helsinki Monitor 5.
172. Norman, “EU heartened by Ahtisaari's success”, The Financial Times, 7 June 1999.
173. UNSC Res. 1244, para. 5 juncto Annex 2, para. 3.
174. UNSC Res. 1244, para. 7; para. 5 juncto Annex 2, para. 3 and para. 7 juncto Annex 2, para. 4.
175. Determined by an agreement concluded on 18 June 1999 in Helsinki: see http://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/a990618a.htm. The Russian troops are under command of their representatives at NATO and, in theatre, under tactical control of the sector commanders. It is roughly the same construction as in IFOR/SFOR (UNSC Res.). For details on KFOR's structure and the Russian participation, see http://www.nato.int/ kosovo/ docu/a990618c.htm.
176. UNSC Res. 1244, para. 9. NATO and the UCK concluded a separate agreement on the UCK's disarmament (text at http://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/a990620a.htm). The disarmament and demilitarisation have been completed: see the UN Secretary-General's report of 23 Dec. 1999 (S/1999/1250).
177. Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, 12 July 1999, paras 43–44 (hereafter S/1999/779). The most recent report at the time of writing is S/2000/538, 6 June 2000.
178. For an overview of UNMIK's first year, see http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/unmik12.html. See also Garcia, “La Mission d”Ad-ministration Intérimaire des Nations Unies au Kosovo (MINUK)”, (2000) R.G.D.I.P., 61–71.
179. R.G.D.I.P., paras 60–65. On 1 March 2000, 2361 regular UN police personnel were deployed in Kosovo, well short of the requested 3618 (S/2000/177, para. 37). Several classes of KPS cadets have graduated so far, among them a significant number of women and cadets from minorities, see http://www.osce.org/kosovo/publications/police school/police english.pdf.
180. Permanent Council Decision 305, 1 July 1999, which also terminates the Task Force for Kosovo (R.G.D.I.P.).
181. S/1999/779, para. 101–109. See Joint Action of 29 July 1999 concerning the installation of the structures of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (Unmik): Council Dec. 1999/522/CFSP (1999) O.J. L201/1
182. Council regulation (EC) No 1080/2000 (2000) O.J. L122/27.
183. Established by Council Reg. (EC) No 2454/1999 (1999) O.J. L299/1. New changes to this regulation have been proposed by COM(2000) 281 final (10 May 2000).
184. World Bank & European Commission, “Toward Stability and Prosperity: A Program For Reconstruction and Recovery in Kosovo”, 3 Nov. 1999 (costing 2.3 billion USD over 4–5 years). One billion USD has been pledged on a second donor conference (Commission/World Bank joint press release, 17 Nov. 1999). On the reconstruction in Kosovo see also http://www.seerecon.org.
185. UNMIK Regulations Nos 16, 17, 20 and 27 of 1999.
186. UNMIK Regulations, especially paras 24–30.
187. “Unearthing the facts”, TIME (International), 28 June 1999, 30
188. Cohen, “K-FOR troops arrest war crimes suspects”, The Guardian, 21 Aug. 1999.
189. UNSC Res. 1244, para. 14 demands that the security presence co-operate with the Tribunal.
190. OSCE, Kosova, As Seen, As Told, Part II, http://www.osce.org/kosovo/reports/hr/ part2/index.htm (14 June 1999–31 Oct. 1999). See http://www.osce.org/kosovo/publications/ ethnic_minorities/index.htm for more recent reports.
191. Fortunately, the Task Force (Kosova, As Seen, As Told) bridged the gap.
192. The Council and Parliament still disagree on funding for Kosovo: see Taylor, “MEPs set for new battle with governments over Kosovo aid”, The European Voice, 10 Jan. 2000.
193. See The European Voice.
194. The European Voice. On 27 May 1999 a Conference on South-Eastern Europe took place in Bonn to prepare the ground.
195. Set out in the EU Council Conclusions of 26–27 Feb. 1996 and Annex III thereto. At the heart was the “Process of stability and good-neighbourly relations in South-Eastern Europe” (the “Royaumont Process”), which has been terminated because its objectives are now part of the Stability Pact (Council Dec. 2000/387/CFSP (2000) O.J. L 144/35).
196. Stability Pact, paras 12–14 and EU Council Dec. 1999/523/CFSP (1999) O.J. L201/2.
197. Brussels, 19 Sept. 1999, hereafter “Work Plan”. See http://www.stabilitypact.org for the text and for more details.
198. Stability Pact, para. 23 juncto Annex, para. C.i and OSCE press release 62/99. For more details on this Working Table, see the Work Plan (“Work Plan”).
199. Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, “Stability Programme for Southeast Europe. A Council of Europe contribution” (CM(99)79), 6–7 May 1999, para. III.1.b-III.4 (complementing the Stability Pact) and Recommendation 1414 (1999) of the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly, paras 11 and 16.b.iv (“Work Plan”). The Council of Europe and the OSCE consult on their co-operation, e.g. regarding the Stability Pact: OSCE press release, 4 Oct. 1999.
200. Stability Pact, para. 25 juncto Annex, para. C.ii and Council of Europe, CM(99)79 (“Work Plan”), para. III.1.a.
201. The Stabilisation and Association Process will, in time, lead to EU membership for these countries if all conditions are met: see COM (99)235 and http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/sap/index.htm. The conditions are based upon the conditions set out in the Annex to Annex III to the EU Council Conclusions of 29–30 April 1997, which were part of the EU's existing regional approach (“Work Plan”).
202. Stability Pact, para. 41. For more details on this Working Table, see the Work Plan (“Work Plan”).
203. The Road to Stability and Prosperity in South Eastern Europe. A Regional Strategy Paper, 13 March 2000.
204. Stability Pact, Annex, para. C, i-iii. For more details on this Working Table, see the Work Plan (A Regional Strategy Paper).
205. See Recommendation 1414 (1999) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (A Regional Strategy Paper), para. 16.b.iv.
206. Kooijmans, (1995) 49 Internationale Spectator 367, equates preventive peace-building with structural help.
207. Priorities in the Feira European Council Conclusions (Internationale Spectator) include strengthening the rule of law and civil administration.
208. Kooijmans, (1995) 49 Internationale Spectator 366–367, writes the following on the UN: “preventive action failed because the possibility of enforcement was not credible” (our translation).
209. An Agenda for Peace, paras 28–32
210. S/PRST/1999/34 (An Agenda for Peace).
211. “An Agenda for Preventive Diplomacy: Theory and Practice”, speech held in Skopje on 16–19 Oct. 1996.
212. S/PRST/1999/34 (“An Agenda for Preventive Diplomacy: Theory and Practice”) and OSCE Seminar, 9, 15 and 18.
213. The European Security Charter clearly illustrates this, see paras 1, 36–43 and 46. See also Cohen, Conflict prevention in the OSCE. An assessment of capacities (Clingendael Institute, 1999).
214. Zandee, (1999/1994) Helsinki Monitor 6.
215. For a few opinions on this issue, see Simma, “NATO, the UN and the use of force: legal aspects”, (1999) 10 E.J.I.L. 1–22
216. Cassese, “Ex iniuria ius oritur: are we moving towards international legitimation of forcible humanitarian countermeasures in the world community?” (1999) 10 E.J.I.L. 23–30
217. the editorial comments by Henkin e.a. in (1999) 93 A.J.I.L. 824–862.
218. Leurdijk, (1999/1992) Helsinki Monitor 18 (“like preventive diplomacy, coercive diplomacy should be executed in a credible way”)
219. Holbrooke, To End a War, 152 (“they respected only force or an unambiguous and credible threat to use it.”).
220. OSCE Seminar, 6 and 13.
221. See Zandee, (1999/1994) Helsinki Monitor 6
222. Caplan, (1998) 74 International Affairs 751.
223. Holbrooke (To End a War, 146 and 88) regarded the threat with air strikes and the sanctions as his key bargaining chips.
224. According to Rosas and Lahelma, in The OSCE in the Maintenance of Peace and Security, 188, this is equally valid for OSCE Long Term Missions, which are also based on the parties” consent.
225. See e.g. E. Derycke (then Belgian Minister of foreign affairs) during the parliamentary debate on NATO's expansion in the Chamber of Representatives, see summary report of the plenary meeting of 16 July 1998.
226. Belgian Minister of foreign affairs
227. Burci, “Division of Labour between the UN and the OSCE”, in The OSCE in the Maintenance of Peace and Security, 303 and 307.
228. Van Mierlo, “The significance of the OSCE in the European security architecture”, (1995/1994) Helsinki Monitor 8, also identifies the OSCE's focus on the phases before and after an actual conflict.
229. See the scope of the measures mentioned in the statement of the President of the Security Council on behalf of the Security Council, on An Agenda for Peace, 30 April 1993 (S/25696).
230. OSCE Seminar, 6 and 15. See also the European Security Charter, para. 43.
231. Sorel, (1995) A.F.D.I. 94.
232. OSCE Seminar, 10, 18 and 20.
233. OSCE Handbook, 1999, 152–153.
234. OSCE Handbook, 1999, 154
235. E. L. Killham, NATO and OSCE, partners or rivals, 49–51.
236. See NATO and OSCE, partners or rivals and 191.
237. See respectively the Istanbul Summit Declaration, 19 Nov. 1999, para. 35 juncto the European Security Charter, paras 1 and 42 and The Panel's Report (NATO and OSCE, partners or rivals), paras 86–101 and 118–145.