Political Islam at the crossroads: From hegemony to co-existence

Contemporary Politics

Volumn 7, Issue 4, 2001, Pages 281-298

  Öniş, Ziya ^a  

^a KOÇ UNIVERSITY   (Turkey)

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EID: 84937335395     PISSN: 13569775     EISSN: 14693631     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13569770120106435     Document Type: Article

References (26)

1. This article is based on a paper presented at the Annual Conference of the Middle East Association held at Orlando, Florida, USA, 17-19 November 2000.
2. Islamist movements in the Middle East tend to differ significantly depending on the nature of the domestic political and constitutional environment as well as the specific international context in which they operate. On political Islam in the Middle East, see J. Esposito (ed.), Political Islam: Revolution, Radicalism or Reform? Boulder andLondon, 1997; The Islamist Dilemma, The Political Role of the Islamist Movements in theContemporaty Arab World, Ithaca, 1995; M. A. Faksh, Yhje Future of Islam in theMidddle East, Fundamentalism in Egypt, Algeria and Saudi Arabia, New York, 1997. The relationship between Islamism and democracy is a highly controversial and hotly debated issue. Some scholars see Islamism in benign terms as a challenge to authoritarian regimes and avenue for greater political participation on the part of the excluded whilst others tend to view it as a fundamental obstacle to further political liberalization in the Middle East. For a valuable collection of articles illustrating this diverse set of perspectives, see M. Kramer (ed.), The Islamism Debate, Tel Aviv, 1997.
3. Whilst Turkey constitutes an unusual case of liberal democracy in the Middle East or the Islamic world, its democratic credentials fall considerably short of the standards of western democracies. Turkey's democratic deficits, in turn, continue to pose serious obstacles to her possible membership of the EU. For a discussion of these issues, see Z. Önis, 'Luxembourg, Helsinki and Beyond: Towards an Interpretation of Recent Turkey-EU Relations', Government and Opposition, Vol. 35, No. 4, Autumn 2000, pp. 463-83.
4. See Z. Önis, 'The Political Economy of Islamic Resurgence in Turkey: The Rise of the Welfare Party in Perspective', Third World Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 4, September 1997, pp. 743-66. For other studies on the rise and fall of the Welfare Party, see M. H. Yavuz, 'Political Islam and the Welfare (Refah) Party in Turkey', Comparative Politics, Vol. 30, No. 1, October 1997, pp. 63-82; H. Gulalp, 'Political Islam in Turkey: The Rise and Fall of the Welfare Party', The Muslim World, Vol. 89, No. 1, January 1999, pp. 2241; and I. Dai, Kimlik, Söylem ve Siyaset: Dou-Bati Ayriminda Refah Partisi Gelenei, Ankara,1998.
5. For a penetrating discussion of neo-liberal globalization and its negative implications and 'reactions from below', see J. Mittelman, The Globalization Syndrome: Transformationand Resistance, Princeton, 2000. On the relationship between globalization, the rise of identity politics and the emergence of various fundamentalist movements in the process, see Jean-Marie Guehenno, 'Globalization and the International System', Journal of Democracy, Vol. 10, No. 1, January 1999, pp. 22-35. Specifically on the relationship between globalization and the rise of political Islam, see B. Tibi, The Challenge of Fundamentalism. Political Islamd and the New World Disorder, California, 1998.
6. See A. Przeworski, 'Democracy as a Contingent Outcome of Conflicts', in J. Elster and R. Slagstad (eds), Constitutionalism and Democracy, Cambridge, 1998, pp. 55-80.
7. See D. Brumberg, 'Rhetoric and Strategy: Islamic Movements in the Middle East', in M. Kramer (ed.), The Islamism Debate, Tel Aviv, 1997.
8. On the RP's 'just order' programme, see N. Erbakan, Adil Ekonomik Düzen, RefahPartisi, 1991.
9. Survey information suggests that only about half of the RP voters seemed to follow the party line on most ideological issues. See E. Özbudun, Turkish Politics, Challenges to Democratic Consolidation, Boulder and London, 2000, pp. 90-1.
10. The RP's moderate posture in the early steps of the Refahyol government and its subsequent recourse to radicalism is discussed by R. Cakir, 'The Second Return to Religion', Private View, No. 8, Spring 2000.
11. On the impact of globalization on Turkey, with special reference to its income distributional implications and ramifications in the political sphere, see U. CizreSakallioglu and E. Yeldan, 'Politics, Society and Financial Liberalization: Turkey in the 1990s', Development and Change, Vol. 31, No. 1, Spring 2000, pp. 481-508.
12. See in this context R. Çakir, 'The Second Return to Religion', Private View, No. 8, Spring 2000, pp. 62-7. Also relevant in documenting other assaults on secularism during the period is G. Özlan (ed.), Onbir Aylik Saltanat:Ekonomi ve DisPolitikada Refahyol Dönemi, Ankara, 1998.
13. On the performance of the Islamist municipalities, see U. Akinci, 'The Welfare Party's Municipal Track Record: Evaluating Islamist Municipal Activism in Turkey', Middle East Journal, Vol. 53, No. 1, Winter 1999, pp. 75-94.
14. On the role of the military as the 'guardian of the state' in Turkey, see M. Heper and A. Guney, 'The Military and Democracy in the Third Turkish Republic', Armed forces and Society, Vol. 22, Summer 1996, pp. 619-42.
15. Rusen Çakir identifies seven separate constituencies in the RP's broad social coalition of political support. These include 'the youth', 'women', 'Kurdish nationalists', 'Turkish nationalists', 'conservative entrepreneurs', 'urban poor' and 'intellectuals'. See R. Çakir, 'The Second Return to Religion', Private View, No. 8, Spring 2000, pp. 427. On the socio-economic bases of the electoral success of religious and nationalist parties in Turkey during the course of the nineties, see T. Demirel, 'Turkey's Troubled Democracy: Bringing the Socio-economic Factors Back In', New Perspectives on Turkey, No. 24, Spring 2001, pp. 105-40. Demirel draws particular attention to socio-economic factors such as poverty, migration and unemployment in explaining the rise of support for the Islamist as well as ultra-nationalist parties.
16. On 'Anatolian tigers', see A. Bugra, 'The Claws of the Tigers', Private View, No. 4, Autumn 1997, pp. 50-5. For a valuable discussion trying to locate the relative significance of the large diversified holding-company model forming the backbone of TUSlAD and the 'Anatolian tigers' phenomenon in the Turkish economy, see I. Atiyas and H. Ersel, 'Some Observations on the Role of the Private Sector in Turkey', Mimeograph, Department of Economics, Sabanci University and Yapi Kredi Bank, 2000.
17. MUSlAD members fully participated in Erbakan's visit to a number of Muslim countries and the organization had reached the peak of its influence during the Refahyol government. The following MÜSÍAD reports are quite illuminating in terms of illustrating this organic link with the RP. MÜSÍAD, Basbakan Necmettin Erbakan inDo Asya Gezisi ve Bosna-Hersek Gezisi Raporu, Istanbul, 1997; and MÜSÍAD, MÜSÍA-D'in Afrka ve Ingilete Is Gezileri Raporu, Istanbul, 1997.
18. For a useful comparison of MÜSÍAD and TÜSIAD, see A. Bugra, 'Class, Culture and the State: An Analysis of Interest Representation by Two Turkish Business Associations', International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 30, No. 4, November 1998, pp. 521-39.
19. MUSIAD's emphasis on the need to provide priority to the development of small and medium-sized firms is clearly apparent from its principal publications. See MÜSìAD, Türkiye Ekonomisi, Istanbul, 2000. One should also emphasize that the emphasis on the development of small and medium-sized firms has been one area where there has been full agreement between the two parties, with highly dissimilar ideological orientations, the RP and DYP, the two partners in the Refahyol coalition government.
20. ASKON refers to Organization of the Businessmen from Anatolian Lions. Its membership is substantially lower than MÒSíAD. In fact, some MÜSÍAD members are also members of this organization. The organization also tends to emphasize economic issues, again with a focus on the needs of small and medium-sized enterprises. See ASKON, Türkiye Ekonomisi, Istanbul, 2000.
21. Particularly relevant in this context is M. Bilici, 'Islam'in Bronzlasan Yüzü: Caprice Hotel Ömek Olayi', in N. GoIe (ed.), Islam in, Yeni Kamusal Yüzleri, Istanbul, 2000, pp. 216-36. Other articles in the same volume also illustrates the different faces of the Islamic presence in the public sphere.
22. See MÜSÍAD, Anayasa Reformu ve Yonetimin Demokratiklestirilmesi, Istanbul, 2000. MÜSÍAD's report on democratization may in part be interpreted as a reaction to a report published by its arch rival TÜSIAD in 1997 pointing towards Turkey's democratic deficits and outlining an agenda for reform. The democratization agendas outlined by the two organizations naturally differ in a number of critical respects.
23. One ought to emphasize, however, that the excessive powers enjoyed by the party leader is a phenomenon which is unique to the RP but is a more general syndrome which is applicable to almost all the major political parties in Turkey and which constitutes one of Turkey's key democratic deficits. See E. Özbudun, ContemporaryTurkish Politics, Challenges to Democratic Consolidation, Boulder and London, 2000. Following this line of thought, for an interesting piece of analysis which tries to relate Refah's failures to Turkey's weak democratic culture, in general, see H. Gulalp, The Poverty of Democracy in Turkey: The Refah Party Episode', New Perspectives on Turkey, No. 21, Fall 1999, pp. 35-59.
24. For evidence that the FP may split into two separate parties, see 'FP'de Parti Tartismasi', Cumhuriyet, 8 August 2000.
25. On the imposition of diplomatic sanctions on Austria by the EU in response to the participation in government of the far-right Freedom Party under Haider, see K. Richter, 'Austrian Response to EU Sanctions is more Muted than Mutinuous', Wall Street Journal Europe, 7 April 2000. On the negative reception of lslamism in the west, see F. Halliday, Islam and the Myth of Confrontation. Religion and Politics in the Middle East, London, 1995.
26. For a major piece of analysis which traces the transition of European Christian Democracy from its authoritarian foundations to a systemic party, see S. N. Kalyvas, Christian Democracy in Western Europe, Chicago, 1996.