Evolutionary dynamics of collective action in spatially structured populations

Journal of Theoretical Biology

Volumn 382, Issue , 2015, Pages 122-136

  Peña, Jorge ^a   Nöldeke, Georg ^b   Lehmann, Laurent ^c  

^a MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BASEL   (Switzerland)

^c UNIVERSITY OF LAUSANNE   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

Games between relatives; Inclusive fitness; N player games; Relatedness

Indexed keywords

COLLECTIVE ACTION; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; ECONOMY OF SCALE; EVOLUTION; MODEL TEST; RELATEDNESS; THEORETICAL STUDY;

ALTRUISM; ARTICLE; BINOCULAR CONVERGENCE; CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK; COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS; EVOLUTION; MATHEMATICAL MODEL; POPULATION STRUCTURE; PRIORITY JOURNAL; SOCIAL EVOLUTION; SOCIAL INTERACTION; SOCIAL PARTICIPATION; SOCIAL WELFARE; COOPERATION; FAMILY; HUMAN; HUMAN RELATION; POPULATION DYNAMICS; THEORETICAL MODEL;

BIOLOGICAL EVOLUTION; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; FAMILY; HUMANS; INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS; MODELS, THEORETICAL; POPULATION DYNAMICS;

EID: 84937239468     PISSN: 00225193     EISSN: 10958541     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2015.06.039     Document Type: Article

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