Asset accumulation and labor force participation of disability insurance applicants

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 129, Issue , 2015, Pages 26-40

  Shu, Pian ^a  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Asset accumulation; Disability insurance; Health and retirement studies (HRS); Labor force participation

Indexed keywords

EID: 84936970759     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.06.002     Document Type: Article

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