The new dynamic public finance

The New Dynamic Public Finance

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages

  Kocherlakota, Narayana R ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 78649825372     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Book

References (88)

1. Albanesi, S., and C. Sleet. 2006. Dynamic optimal taxation with private information. Review of Economic Studies 73:1-30.
2. Atkeson, A., and R. E. Lucas, Jr. 1992. On efficient distribution with private information. Review of Economic Studies 59:427-53.
3. Atkeson, A. 1995. Efficiency and equality in a simple model of efficient unemployment insurance. Journal of Economic Theory 66:64-88.
4. Bassetto, M., and N. Kocherlakota. 2004. On the irrelevance of government debt when taxes are distortionary. Journal of Monetary Economics 51:299-304.
5. Chamley, C. 1986. Optimal taxation of capital income in general equilibrium with infinite lives. Econometrica 54: 607-22.
6. Diamond, P., and J. A. Mirrlees. 1978. A model of social insurance with variable retirement. Journal of Public Economics 10:295-336.
7. Eaton, J., and H. Rosen. 1980. Taxation, human capital, and uncertainty. American Economic Review 70:705-15.
8. Farhi, E., and I. Werning. 2007. Inequality and social discounting. Journal of Political Economy 115:365-402.
9. Golosov, M., and A. Tsyvinski. 2006. Designing optimal disability insurance: a case for asset testing. Journal of Political Economy 114:257-79.
10. Golosov, M., N. Kocherlakota, and A. Tsyvinski. 2003. Optimal indirect and capital taxation. Review of Economic Studies 70:569-87.
11. Golosov, M., A. Tsyvinski, and I. Werning. 2006. New dynamic public finance: a user's guide. In NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2006, Volume 21 (ed. D. Acemoglu, K. Rogoff, and M. Woodford).
12. Green, E. 1987. Lending and the smoothing of uninsurable income. In Contractual Arrangements for Intertemporal Trade (ed. E. C. Prescott and N. Wallace). University of Minnesota Press.
13. Grochulski, B., and N. Kocherlakota. 2008. Nonseparable preferences and optimal social security systems. Working Paper, University of Minnesota.
14. Kocherlakota, N. 2005. Zero expected wealth taxes: a Mirrlees approach to dynamic optimal taxation. Econometrica 73:1587-621.
15. Kocherlakota, N. 2006. Advances in dynamic optimal taxation. In Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications, Ninth World Congress, Volume I (ed. R. Blundell, W. K. Newey, and T. Persson). Cambridge University Press.
16. Mirrlees, J. 1971. An exploration in the theory of optimum income taxation. Review of Economic Studies 38:175-208.
17. Rogerson, W. 1985. Repeated moral hazard. Econometrica 53:69-76.
18. Spear, S., and S. Srivastava. 1987. On repeated moral hazard with discounting. Review of Economic Studies 54: 599-617.
19. Chamley, C. 1986. Optimal taxation of capital income in general equilibrium with infinite lives. Econometrica 54:607-22.
20. Chari, V. V., and P. Kehoe. 1999. Optimal fiscal and monetary policy. In Handbook of Macroeconomics (ed. J. Taylor and M. Woodford). New York: Elsevier.
21. Correia, I., J.-P. Nicolini, and P. Teles. 2008. Optimal fiscal and monetary policy: equivalence results. Journal of Political Economy 168:141-70.
22. Erosa, A., and M. Gervais. 2002. Optimal taxation in lifecycle economies. Journal of Economic Theory 105:338-69.
23. Garriga, C. 2003. Optimal fiscal policy in overlappinggenerations economies. Working Paper, Florida State University.
24. Mirrlees, J. 1971. An exploration in the theory of optimum income taxation. Review of Economic Studies 38:175-208.
25. Schmitt-Grohe, S., and M. Uribe. 2004. Optimal fiscal and monetary policy under sticky prices. Journal of Economic Theory 114:198-230.
26. Albanesi, S., and R. Armenter. 2007. Intertemporal distortions in the second-best. Working Paper, Columbia University.
27. Ales, L., and P. Maziero. 2009. Non-exclusive dynamic contracts, competition, and the limits of insurance. Working Paper, University of Minnesota.
28. Atkeson, A., and R. E. Lucas, Jr. 1992. On efficient distribution with private information. Review of Economic Studies 59:427-53.
29. Billingsley, P. 1986. Probability and Measure, 2nd edn. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
30. Chamley, C. 2003. Rational Herds: Economic Models of Social Learning. Cambridge University Press.
31. Diamond, P., and J. A. Mirrlees. 1978. A model of social insurance with variable retirement. Journal of Public Economics 10:295-336.
32. Farhi, E., and I. Werning. 2007. Inequality and social discounting. Journal of Political Economy 115:365-402.
33. Farhi, E. 2008. Optimal savings distortions with recursive preferences. Journal of Monetary Economics 55:21-42.
34. Golosov, M., N. Kocherlakota, and A. Tsyvinski. 2003. Optimal indirect and capital taxation. Review of Economic Studies 70:569-87.
35. Green, E. 1987. Lending and the smoothing of uninsurable income. In Contractual Arrangements for Intertemporal Trade (ed. E. C. Prescott and N. Wallace). University of Minnesota Press.
36. Grochulski, B., and N. Kocherlakota. 2008. Nonseparable preferences and optimal social security systems. Working Paper, University of Minnesota.
37. Luenberger, D. 1969. Optimization by Vector Space Methods. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
38. Mirrlees, J. A. 1971. An exploration in the theory of optimum income taxation. Review of Economic Studies 38: 175-208.
39. Rogerson, W. 1985. Repeated moral hazard. Econometrica 53:69-76.
40. Segal, I. 2006. Communication in economic mechanisms. In Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Application, Ninth World Congress (ed. R. Blundell, W. K. Newey, and T. Persson). Cambridge University Press.
41. Sun, Y. 2006. The exact law of large numbers via Fubini extension and characterization of insurable risks. Journal of Economic Theory 126:31-69.
42. Townsend, R. 1982. Optimal multiperiod contracts and the gain from enduring relationships under private information. Journal of Political Economy 90:1166-86.
43. Aiyagari, S. R. 1995. Optimal capital income taxation with incomplete markets, borrowing constraints, and constant discounting. Journal of Political Economy 103: 1158-75.
44. Albanesi, S. 2006. Optimal taxation of entrepreneurial capital with private information. Working Paper, Columbia University.
45. Albanesi, S., and C. Sleet. 2006. Dynamic optimal taxation with private information. Review of Economic Studies 73:1-30.
46. Bassetto, M., and N. Kocherlakota. 2004. On the irrelevance of government debt when taxes are distortionary. Journal of Monetary Economics 51:299-304.
47. Chetty, R., and E. Saez. 2008. Optimal taxation and social insurance with endogenous private insurance. NBER Working Paper 14403.
48. Conesa, J.-C., S. Kitao, and D. Krueger. 2009. Taxing capital? Not a bad idea after all! American Economic Review 90:25-48.
49. Correia, I., J.-P. Nicolini, and P. Teles. 2008. Optimal fiscal and monetary policy: equivalence results. Journal of Political Economy 116:141-70.
50. da Costa, C., and I. Werning. 2008. On the optimality of the Friedman rule with heterogeneous agents and nonlinear income taxation. Journal of Political Economy 116:82-112.
51. Golosov, M., and A. Tsyvinski. 2007. Optimal taxation with endogenous insurance markets. Quarterly Journal of Economics 122:487-534.
52. Gorry, C. A., and E. Oberfield. 2008. Optimal taxation over the life cycle. Working Paper, University of Chicago.
53. Grochulski, B., and N. Kocherlakota. 2008. Nonseparable preferences and optimal social security systems. Working Paper, University of Minnesota.
54. Guiso, L., L. Pistaferri, and F. Schivardi. 2005. Insurance within the firm. Journal of Political Economy 113:1054-87.
55. Kocherlakota, N. 2005. Zero expected wealth taxes: a Mirrlees approach to dynamic optimal taxation. Econometrica 73:1587-621.
56. Lucas, R. E., Jr., and N. L. Stokey. 1987. Money and interest in a cash-in-advance economy. Econometrica 55:491-513.
57. Mankiw, N. G., and M. Weinzierl. 2008. The optimal taxation of height: a case study of utilitarian income redistribution. Working Paper, Harvard University.
58. Prescott, E., and R. Townsend. 1984. Pareto optima and competitive equilibria with adverse selection and moral hazard. Econometrica 52:21-46.
59. Saez, E. 2002. Optimal progressive capital income taxes in the infinite horizon model. NBER Working Paper 9046.
60. Townsend, R. 1988. Information constrained insurance: the revelation principle extended. Journal of Monetary Economics 21:411-50.
61. Weinzierl, M. 2008. The surprising power of age-dependent taxes. Working Paper, Harvard University.
62. Werning, I. 2007. Optimal fiscal policy with redistribution. Quarterly Journal of Economics 122:955-67.
63. Amador, M., G.-M. Angeletos, and I. Werning. 2006. Commitment vs. flexibility. Econometrica 74:365-96.
64. Farhi, E., and I. Werning. 2007. Inequality and social discounting. Journal of Political Economy 115:365-402.
65. Farhi, E. Forthcoming. Progressive estate taxation. Quarterly Journal of Economics.
66. Sleet, C., and S. Yeltekin. 2006. Credibility and endogenous social discounting. Review of Economic Dynamics 9:410-37.
67. Albanesi, S., and C. Sleet. 2006. Dynamic optimal taxation with private information. Review of Economic Studies 73:1-30.
68. Battaglini, M., and S. Coate. 2008. Pareto efficient income taxation with stochastic abilities. Journal of Public Economics 92:844-68.
69. Fernandes, A., and C. Phelan. 2000. A recursive formulation for repeated agency with history dependence. Journal of Economic Theory 91:223-47.
70. Heathcote, J., K. Storesletten, and G. Violante. 2007. Consumption and labor supply with partial insurance: an analytical framework. Working Paper, University of Oslo.
71. Huggett, M., and J. Parra. 2009. How well does the U.S. social insurance system provide social insurance? Working Paper, Georgetown University.
72. Low, H. 2005. Self-insurance in a life-cycle model of labour supply and savings. Review of Economic Dynamics 8: 945-73.
73. Ordover, K., and E. Phelps. 1979. The concept of optimal taxation in the overlapping-generations model of capital and wealth. Journal of Public Economics 12:1-24.
74. Phelan, C. 2006. Opportunity and social mobility. Review of Economic Studies 73:487-505.
75. Spear, S., and S. Srivastava. 1987. On repeated moral hazard with discounting. Review of Economic Studies 54: 599-617.
76. Zhang, Y. 2009. Dynamiccontractingwith persistentshocks. Journal of Economic Theory 144:635-675.
77. Aguiar, M., and E. Hurst. 2005. Consumption vs expenditure. Journal of Political Economy 113:919-48.
78. Fernandes, A., and C. Phelan. 2000. A recursive formulation for repeated agency with history dependence. Journal of Economic Theory 91:223-47.
79. Fukushima, K., and Y. Waki. 2009. Computing dynamic optimal mechanisms when private shocks are persistent. Working Paper, University of Minnesota.
80. Grochulski, B., and N. Kocherlakota. 2008. Nonseparable preferences and optimal social security systems. Working Paper, University of Minnesota.
81. Grochulski, B., and T. Piskorski. 2006. Risky human capital and deferred capital income taxation. Working Paper, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
82. Kapicka, M. 2006. Optimal income taxation with human capital accumulation and limited record keeping. Review of Economic Dynamics 9:612-39.
83. Kapicka, M. 2008. Efficient allocations in dynamic private information economies with persistent shocks: a first-order approach. Working Paper, University of California-Santa Barbara.
84. Mirrlees, J. 1971. An exploration in the theory of optimum income taxation. Review of Economic Studies 38:175-208.
85. Pavan, A., I. Segal, and J. Toikka. 2008. Dynamic mechanism design: incentive compatibility, profit maximization and information disclosure. Working Paper, Northwestern University.
86. Saez, E. 2001. Using elasticities to derive optimal income tax rates. Review of Economic Studies 68:205-29.
87. Werning, I. 2009. Nonlinear capital taxation. Working Paper, MIT.
88. Yazici, H. 2009. Efficient investment in children and implications for policy. Working Paper, University of Minnesota.