What can body ownership illusions tell us about minimal phenomenal selfhood?

Frontiers in Human Neuroscience

Volumn 8, Issue NOV, 2014, Pages

  Limanowski, Jakub ^a,b  

^a HUMBOLDT UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

^b FREIE UNIVERSITÄT BERLIN   (Germany)

Author keywords

Body ownership; Illusion; Lubber hand illusion; Minimal self; Self

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; BODY OWNERSHIP ILLUSION; CONSCIOUSNESS; HUMAN; ILLUSION; PERCEPTION; PERSONAL APPEARANCE; PHYSICAL ATTRACTIVENESS; SELF CONCEPT; SENSORY STIMULATION; STIMULUS RESPONSE;

EID: 84933676926     PISSN: None     EISSN: 16625161     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3389/fnhum.2014.00946     Document Type: Article

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