Minimal self-models and the free energy principle

Frontiers in Human Neuroscience

Volumn , Issue SEP, 2013, Pages

  Limanowski, Jakub ^a   Blankenburg, Felix ^a,b,c  

^a HUMBOLDT UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

^b FREIE UNIVERSITÄT BERLIN   (Germany)

^c MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR HUMAN DEVELOPMENT   (Germany)

Author keywords

Active inference; Agency; Free energy principle; Minimal phenomenal selfhood; Ownership; Predictive coding; Self; Self model

Indexed keywords

EID: 84884929736     PISSN: 16625161     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00547     Document Type: Review

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