Kuhn's evolutionary social epistemology

Kuhn's Evolutionary Social Epistemology

Volumn , Issue , 2011, Pages 1-229

  Wray, K Brad ^a  

^a STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK AT OSWEGO   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 84933499733     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511997990     Document Type: Book

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