The recursive approach to time inconsistency

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 131, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 134-156

  Caplin, Andrew ^a   Leahy, John ^a  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Consistent plans; Subgame perfection; Time consistency

Indexed keywords

EID: 33750002528     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2005.05.006     Document Type: Article

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