Voluntary regulation of NGOs and nonprofits: An introduction to the club framework

Voluntary Regulation of NGOs and Nonprofits: An Accountability Club Framework

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 3-38

  Gugerty, Mary Kay ^a   Prakash, Aseem ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84927002239     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511778933.002     Document Type: Chapter

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