Constitutional rules and competitive politics: Their effects on secessionism

Rational Foundations of Democratic Politics

Volumn , Issue , 2003, Pages 222-246

  Breton, Albert ^a   Salmon, Pierre ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO   (Canada)

^b UNIVERSITÉ DE BOURGOGNE   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84927000762     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511510519.012     Document Type: Chapter

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