Constitutional implications of electoral assumptions

Constitutional Political Economy

Volumn 12, Issue 4, 2001, Pages 333-349

  Salmon, Pierre ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ DE BOURGOGNE   (France)

Author keywords

Constitutions; Elections; Majority; Probabilistic voting; Proportional representation

Indexed keywords

EID: 52549117317     PISSN: 10434062     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1012581007940     Document Type: Review

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