Probabilistic voting and equilibrium: An impossibility result

Public Choice

Volumn 103, Issue 1-2, 2000, Pages 35-48

  Kirchgässner, Gebhard ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ST GALLEN   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034372692     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/a:1005033011215     Document Type: Article

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