Can we examine safety culture in accident investigations, or should we?

Safety Science

Volumn 77, Issue , 2015, Pages 102-111

  Strauch, Barry ^a  

^a NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD   (United States)

Author keywords

Accident investigation; Organizational accidents; Safety climate; Safety culture; System safety

Indexed keywords

ERRORS; SURVEYS;

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION; ORGANIZATIONAL ACCIDENTS; SAFETY CLIMATE; SAFETY CULTURE; SYSTEM SAFETY;

ACCIDENTS;

ARTICLE; CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT; HUMAN; INDUSTRY; LOGIC; METHODOLOGY; OCCUPATIONAL ACCIDENT; OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY; OPERATIONAL SAFETY; ORGANIZATION; PRIORITY JOURNAL; PROCESS SAFETY; QUESTIONNAIRE; SAFETY; SAFETY CULTURE;

EID: 84926472446     PISSN: 09257535     EISSN: 18791042     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ssci.2015.03.020     Document Type: Article

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