The psychology of accident investigation: epistemological, preventive, moral and existential meaning-making

Theoretical Issues in Ergonomics Science

Volumn 16, Issue 3, 2015, Pages 202-213

  Dekker, Sidney W A ^a  

^a GRIFFITH UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

Author keywords

accident investigation; complexity; epistemology; eureka part; human error; prevention

Indexed keywords

EID: 84924546082     PISSN: 1463922X     EISSN: 1464536X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/1463922X.2014.955554     Document Type: Article

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