Objectivity and the rule of law

Objectivity and the Rule of Law

Volumn 9780521854160, Issue , 2007, Pages 1-247

  Kramer, Matthew H ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84926179162     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511619014     Document Type: Book

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