-
1
-
-
0004273196
-
-
(New Haven: Yale UP, revised edn) at and
-
L. Fuller, The Morality of Law (New Haven: Yale UP, revised edn, 1969) at 46 and 96.
-
(1969)
The Morality of Law
, vol.46
, pp. 96
-
-
Fuller, L.1
-
2
-
-
0003084474
-
'Forms and Limits of Adjudication'
-
On the links between law and adjudication, see his at 372-9
-
On the links between law and adjudication, see his 'Forms and Limits of Adjudication' (1978) 92 Harvard L R 353-409 at 372-9.
-
(1978)
Harvard L. R.
, vol.92
, pp. 353-409
-
-
-
3
-
-
0003084474
-
'Forms and Limits'
-
See On the links between law and adjudication, see his at 372-9
-
See Fuller, 'Forms and Limits', ibid.
-
(1978)
Harvard L. R.
, vol.92
, pp. 354-409
-
-
Fuller, L.1
-
4
-
-
0037609084
-
-
(Harmondsworth: Penguin) at and chs 9 and 10 provides a thoughtful and elegant statement of the various methods of dispute resolution found in 'simple' societies
-
S. Roberts, Order and Dispute (Harmondsworth: Penguin 1979) at 53-79 and chs 9 and 10 provides a thoughtful and elegant statement of the various methods of dispute resolution found in 'simple' societies.
-
(1979)
Order and Dispute
, pp. 53-79
-
-
Roberts, S.1
-
5
-
-
0004166519
-
-
(Oxford: Hart Publishing) at and 400-01 correctly states a common but questionable assumption of contemporary jurisprudence, namely, that law and adjudication are an inseparable package
-
R. Dworkin, Law's Empire (Oxford: Hart Publishing 1998) at 11-15 and 400-01 correctly states a common but questionable assumption of contemporary jurisprudence, namely, that law and adjudication are an inseparable package.
-
(1998)
Law's Empire
, pp. 11-15
-
-
Dworkin, R.1
-
6
-
-
0003566257
-
-
By 'orthodox' I refer to jurists whose work shares a belief that law and adjudication are, or are near to becoming, good means of both subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules and of resolving disputes about those rules. Three classic orthodox Anglo-American contributions to the first topic are: (Oxford: Clarendon Press)
-
By 'orthodox' I refer to jurists whose work shares a belief that law and adjudication are, or are near to becoming, good means of both subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules and of resolving disputes about those rules. Three classic orthodox Anglo-American contributions to the first topic are: N. MacCormick, Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1978);
-
(1978)
Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory
-
-
MacCormick, N.1
-
7
-
-
0004213898
-
-
(London: Duckworth) at chs 2-5 and his Law's Empire, above, chs 2, 6 and 7
-
R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London: Duckworth, 1978) at chs 2-5 and his Law's Empire, above, chs 2, 6 and 7.
-
(1978)
Taking Rights Seriously
-
-
Dworkin, R.1
-
8
-
-
27644536161
-
-
On the second topic, three contemporary classics are: (Oxford: Clarendon Press)
-
On the second topic, three contemporary classics are: J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), part I;
-
(1986)
The Morality of Freedom
, Issue.PART I
-
-
Raz, J.1
-
9
-
-
84936068266
-
-
above, ch 6
-
Law's Empire, above, ch 6
-
Law's Empire
-
-
-
11
-
-
0004201515
-
-
'Heretical' jurists are those who think either that law and adjudication are undesirable means of regulating human conduct tout court, or undesirable in their current form and in current social, cultural and economic conditions. Some principal heretical monographs are: (London: Routledge, Chapman and Hall)
-
'Heretical' jurists are those who think either that law and adjudication are undesirable means of regulating human conduct tout court, or undesirable in their current form and in current social, cultural and economic conditions. Some principal heretical monographs are: D. Cornell, The Philosophy of the Limit (London: Routledge, Chapman and Hall, 1992);
-
(1992)
The Philosophy of the Limit
-
-
Cornell, D.1
-
15
-
-
0003944642
-
-
and (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 1986) and What Should Legal Analysis Become? (London: Verso)
-
and R. Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 1986) and What Should Legal Analysis Become? (London: Verso, 1996).
-
(1996)
The Critical Legal Studies Movement
-
-
Unger, R.1
-
16
-
-
27644438268
-
-
note
-
Impartiality is notable by its absence in these heretical works: See, for example, Kennedy's Critique; it features only fleetingly, and then only in a discussion of value neutrality, in Kelman's Guide.
-
-
-
-
17
-
-
27644566644
-
-
note
-
Orthodox jurists are equally sparing in their treatment: Impartiality hardly figures at all in Dworkin's Law's Empire, above, and appears briefly (at 17-18 and 234) in MacCormick's Legal Reasoning, above.
-
-
-
-
18
-
-
0035623454
-
'The Possibilities and Desirability of Mediator Neutrality - Towards an Ethic of Partiality?'
-
Two recent fairly dismissive treatments are: 504-27 at
-
Two recent fairly dismissive treatments are: L. Mulcahy, 'The Possibilities and Desirability of Mediator Neutrality - Towards an Ethic of Partiality?' (2001) 10 Social and Legal Studies 504-27 at 511-14
-
(2001)
Social and Legal Studies
, vol.10
, pp. 511-514
-
-
Mulcahy, L.1
-
19
-
-
27644483934
-
'Representations of the (Woman) Judge: Hercules, the Little Mermaid and the Vain and Naked Emperor'
-
and E. Rackley, 'Representations of the (Woman) Judge: Hercules, the Little Mermaid and the Vain and Naked Emperor' 22 (2002) Legal Studies 602-24.
-
(2002)
Legal Studies
, vol.22
, pp. 602-624
-
-
Rackley, E.1
-
20
-
-
84884062670
-
-
True to its hyperbolic tone, the latter essay claims impartiality is 'either a lie or a failed and discarded ideal' (622). Equally dismissive, but this time of the idea of impartiality as articulated in some areas of moral and political philosophy, is (Princeton: Princeton UP) at
-
True to its hyperbolic tone, the latter essay claims impartiality is 'either a lie or a failed and discarded ideal' (622). Equally dismissive, but this time of the idea of impartiality as articulated in some areas of moral and political philosophy, is I.M. Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1990) at 103:
-
(1990)
Justice and the Politics of Difference
, pp. 103
-
-
Young, I.M.1
-
21
-
-
0004127459
-
-
'[t]he idea of impartiality expresses an impossibility, a fiction'. Altogether more measured yet critical is (Oxford: Hart Publishing) at ch 7
-
'[t]he idea of impartiality expresses an impossibility, a fiction'. Altogether more measured yet critical is N. Lacey, Unspeakable Subjects (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1998) at ch 7.
-
(1998)
Unspeakable Subjects
-
-
Lacey, N.1
-
22
-
-
27644509161
-
-
For an important and early statement (1798) see of (Oxford: Clarendon Press), abridged and edited by K. Codell Carter
-
For an important and early statement (1798) see pp. 69-73 of W. Godwin's Enquiry Concerning Political Justice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), abridged and edited by K. Codell Carter.
-
(1971)
Enquiry Concerning Political Justice
, pp. 69-73
-
-
Godwin's, W.1
-
23
-
-
0003555163
-
-
A key contemporary text on impartiality in political philosophy is (Oxford: Clarendon Press)
-
A key contemporary text on impartiality in political philosophy is B. Barry, Justice as Impartiality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995);
-
(1995)
Justice As Impartiality
-
-
Barry, B.1
-
24
-
-
27644522752
-
-
a good starting point on impartiality in moral philosophy is the symposium in
-
a good starting point on impartiality in moral philosophy is the symposium in (1991) 101 Ethics 698-864.
-
(1991)
101 Ethics
, pp. 698-864
-
-
-
26
-
-
27644510817
-
-
note
-
Nothing should be read into my use of 'rules' here; it is but a shorthand way of referring to legal rules and non-rule standards. I am taking no position on the constituents of a legal system or how they are best characterized.
-
-
-
-
27
-
-
27644483934
-
'Representations of the (Woman) Judge: Hercules, the Little Mermaid and the Vain and Naked Emperor'
-
Some do, however, ascribe this implausible view to others. See, for example, at
-
Some do, however, ascribe this implausible view to others. See, for example, Rackley, above n 5, at 613
-
(2002)
Legal Studies
, vol.22
, pp. 613
-
-
Rackley, E.1
-
28
-
-
84884062670
-
-
(admittedly most often ascribed to a mythical judge) and ch 4 (ascribed to some moral and political philosophers). While Young's ascription is in some instances correct, much of its critical power derives from an alleged disjunction between philosophical accounts of the structure of moral reason and the way we live actual moral lives: 102-03. This disjunction is only surprising if we make the questionable assumption that the former are attempts to 'explain' the latter. True to its hyperbolic tone, the latter essay claims impartiality is 'either a lie or a failed and discarded ideal' (622). Equally dismissive, but this time of the idea of impartiality as articulated in some areas of moral and political philosophy, is (Princeton: Princeton UP) at
-
(admittedly most often ascribed to a mythical judge) and Young, above n 5, ch 4 (ascribed to some moral and political philosophers). While Young's ascription is in some instances correct, much of its critical power derives from an alleged disjunction between philosophical accounts of the structure of moral reason and the way we live actual moral lives: 102-03. This disjunction is only surprising if we make the questionable assumption that the former are attempts to 'explain' the latter.
-
(1990)
Justice and the Politics of Difference
, vol.103
-
-
Young, I.M.1
-
29
-
-
0035623454
-
'The Possibilities and Desirability of Mediator Neutrality - Towards an Ethic of Partiality?'
-
For some eccentric refereeing see www.basildonref.co.uk/articles/2001; for a view of the role of mediators based on a confused treatment of impartiality/neutrality, see Two recent fairly dismissive treatments are: 504-27 at
-
For some eccentric refereeing see www.basildonref.co.uk/articles/2001; for a view of the role of mediators based on a confused treatment of impartiality/neutrality, see Mulcahy, above n 5.
-
(2001)
Social and Legal Studies
, vol.10
, pp. 511-514
-
-
Mulcahy, L.1
-
30
-
-
0344098347
-
-
The distinction is latent in most of the essays in the best treatment of impartiality and neutrality to date: (ed.), (Cambridge: CUP)
-
The distinction is latent in most of the essays in the best treatment of impartiality and neutrality to date: A. Montefiore (ed.), Neutrality and Impartiality (Cambridge: CUP, 1975).
-
(1975)
Neutrality and Impartiality
-
-
Montefiore, A.1
-
31
-
-
27644464755
-
-
See, in particular, C. Taylor's discussion at 128-32 and Montefiore's at 222-227
-
See, in particular, C. Taylor's discussion at 128-32 and Montefiore's at 222-27.
-
-
-
-
32
-
-
0008598077
-
-
Applied to the legal context, the distinction highlights issues elided in the brief discussion of 'party' and 'issue' impartiality in (Aldershot: Ashgate) at
-
Applied to the legal context, the distinction highlights issues elided in the brief discussion of 'party' and 'issue' impartiality in K. Malleson, The New Judiciary (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999) at 64-65.
-
(1999)
The New Judiciary
, pp. 64-65
-
-
Malleson, K.1
-
33
-
-
0346663252
-
-
The distinction is missed, however, in (Dordrecht: Kluwer) at where it is assumed that impartiality is only a property of procedures and not outcomes
-
The distinction is missed, however, in M. D. Bayles, Procedural Justice (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1990) at 22-23, where it is assumed that impartiality is only a property of procedures and not outcomes.
-
(1990)
Procedural Justice
, pp. 22-23
-
-
Bayles, M.D.1
-
34
-
-
27644493212
-
-
For an interesting discussion of genuine and non-genuine randomness see (Oxford: Clarendon Press) at
-
For an interesting discussion of genuine and non-genuine randomness see N. Duxbury, Random Justice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999) at 63-70.
-
(1999)
Random Justice
, pp. 63-70
-
-
Duxbury, N.1
-
35
-
-
27644578915
-
-
While an obvious example to any sports fan, it was probably first introduced to academic discussions of impartiality and neutrality by
-
While an obvious example to any sports fan, it was probably first introduced to academic discussions of impartiality and neutrality by Montefiore, above n 10, at 8.
-
(1975)
Neutrality and Impartiality
, pp. 8
-
-
Montefiore, A.1
-
36
-
-
27644502695
-
-
While an obvious example to any sports fan, it was probably first introduced to academic discussions of impartiality and neutrality by
-
Ibid at 15.
-
(1975)
Neutrality and Impartiality
, pp. 15
-
-
Montefiore, A.1
-
37
-
-
0004223708
-
-
My use of this phrase has little to do with the usage in (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP)
-
My use of this phrase has little to do with the usage in R. Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 2000) at 191-94.
-
(2000)
Sovereign Virtue
, pp. 191-194
-
-
Dworkin, R.1
-
38
-
-
27644595644
-
-
The phrase is from the translator's preface to To his Constituents... (London: John Stockdale)
-
The phrase is from the translator's preface to J. P. Brissot, To his Constituents... (London: John Stockdale, 1794) at iv.
-
(1794)
-
-
Brissot, J.P.1
-
39
-
-
27644480750
-
-
note
-
While usually attributed to Edmund Burke, there is some suggestion that the translator - and therefore presumably the author of the preface - was William Burke. On the point of substance,
-
-
-
-
40
-
-
0344098347
-
-
see also C. Taylor at 128-29 and at of above n 10, where Montefiore notes that Taylor's movements between neutrality and impartiality is 'somewhat easy-going' but not in any meaningful sense wrong
-
see also C. Taylor at 128-29 and Montefiore at 223-26 of Neutrality and Impartiality, above n 10, where Montefiore notes that Taylor's movements between neutrality and impartiality is 'somewhat easy-going' but not in any meaningful sense wrong.
-
Neutrality and Impartiality
, pp. 223-226
-
-
Montefiore, A.1
-
42
-
-
27644476219
-
-
The distinction is latent in most of the essays in the best treatment of impartiality and neutrality to date: (ed.), (Cambridge: CUP)
-
Above n 10 at 200-201.
-
(1975)
Neutrality and Impartiality
, pp. 200-201
-
-
Montefiore, A.1
-
43
-
-
0003529325
-
-
To this end, it might be argued that the preferred sense is the central case or focal meaning of the concept in question: see (Oxford: Clarendon Press)
-
To this end, it might be argued that the preferred sense is the central case or focal meaning of the concept in question: See J. Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1980) at 6-11
-
(1980)
Natural Law and Natural Rights
, pp. 6-11
-
-
Finnis, J.1
-
44
-
-
27644463882
-
-
and his (Oxford: Clarendon Press)
-
and his Aquinas (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1998) at 29-51.
-
(1998)
Aquinas
, pp. 29-51
-
-
-
45
-
-
9444296904
-
'Stripped Down Like a Runner or Enriched by Experience: Bias and Impartiality of Judges and Jurors'
-
The point belongs to 1201-18 at
-
The point belongs to M. Minow, 'Stripped Down Like a Runner or Enriched by Experience: Bias and Impartiality of Judges and Jurors' (1992) 33 William and Mary L R 1201-18 at 1214-17.
-
(1992)
William and Mary L R
, vol.33
, pp. 1214-1217
-
-
Minow, M.1
-
46
-
-
0003566257
-
-
See above n 3 at for an example. By 'orthodox' I refer to jurists whose work shares a belief that law and adjudication are, or are near to becoming, good means of both subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules and of resolving disputes about those rules. Three classic orthodox Anglo-American contributions to the first topic are: (Oxford: Clarendon Press)
-
See MacCormick, above n 3 at 21, for an example.
-
(1978)
Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory
, pp. 21
-
-
MacCormick, N.1
-
47
-
-
0043233605
-
'Will Women Judges really make a Difference?'
-
Nor are such calls made only by academics. See
-
Nor are such calls made only by academics. See B. Wilson, 'Will Women Judges really make a Difference?' (1990) 28 Osgoode Hall L J 507-20
-
(1990)
Osgoode Hall L J
, vol.28
, pp. 507-520
-
-
Wilson, B.1
-
48
-
-
27644565167
-
'Equality and the Judiciary: Why Should We Want More Women Judges?'
-
and B. Hale, 'Equality and the Judiciary: Why Should We Want More Women Judges?' (2001) Public Law 489-504.
-
(2001)
Public Law
, pp. 489-504
-
-
Hale, B.1
-
49
-
-
0346853789
-
'The Gender of Judgements: An Introduction'
-
See also ch 12 of M. Thornton (ed.), (Melbourne: OUP)
-
See also R. Greycar, 'The Gender of Judgements: An Introduction', ch 12 of M. Thornton (ed.), Public and Private - Feminist Legal Debates (Melbourne: OUP, 1995).
-
(1995)
Public and Private - Feminist Legal Debates
-
-
Greycar, R.1
-
50
-
-
27644466891
-
-
The benchbook can be viewed on the Board's website: The website is a good introduction to the Board's work and concerns
-
The benchbook can be viewed on the Board's website: http://www.jsboard.co.uk. The website is a good introduction to the Board's work and concerns.
-
-
-
-
51
-
-
27644502693
-
-
note
-
A vivid illustration is the contrast between the early marital rape exemption cases in criminal law and the decision of the House of Lords in R. v R [1991] 4 All ER 481.
-
-
-
-
52
-
-
0038751705
-
-
The points about the historical and bilateral nature of adjudication constitute a compelling criticism of some aspects of neo-classical law and economics: see (Oxford: Clarendon Press)
-
The points about the historical and bilateral nature of adjudication constitute a compelling criticism of some aspects of neo-classical law and economics: See J. Coleman, The Practice of Principle (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001) at 13-24.
-
(2001)
The Practice of Principle
, pp. 13-24
-
-
Coleman, J.1
-
53
-
-
0004220262
-
-
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2nd edn) That Hart thought the operators of a system of legal rules must regard the rules in this light and that they sometimes must, when interpreting or applying such rules, have recourse to the aims or purposes of the rules, is plain from p. 117 and p. 127. A still unsurpassed discussion, admirably clear and succinct, is N. MacCormick, H.L.A. Hart (London: Edward Arnold, 1981) at ch 3
-
H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2nd edn, 1994) at 57. That Hart thought the operators of a system of legal rules must regard the rules in this light and that they sometimes must, when interpreting or applying such rules, have recourse to the aims or purposes of the rules, is plain from p. 117 and p. 127. A still unsurpassed discussion, admirably clear and succinct, is N. MacCormick, H.L.A. Hart (London: Edward Arnold, 1981) at ch 3.
-
(1994)
The Concept of Law
, pp. 57
-
-
Hart, H.L.A.1
-
54
-
-
27644463023
-
-
note
-
The scare quotes are necessary simply because there must be real doubt as to the possibility of habitual rule interpreting and applying.
-
-
-
-
55
-
-
27644500440
-
-
It is often assumed that impartiality (and neutrality) must be a matter of equality of impact. See, for example, the essays by Montefiore at 6-7 and Kolakowski at 72-73 in Neutrality and Impartiality, above n 10
-
It is often assumed that impartiality (and neutrality) must be a matter of equality of impact. See, for example, the essays by Montefiore at 6-7 and Kolakowski at 72-73 in Neutrality and Impartiality, above n 10
-
-
-
-
56
-
-
0003956640
-
-
(Oxford: Clarendon Press)
-
and J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986) at 113.
-
(1986)
The Morality of Freedom
, pp. 113
-
-
Raz, J.1
-
57
-
-
0004106103
-
-
This, of course, is an echo of the sophisticated account of legal formalism in private law defended by (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP) chs 1-4
-
This, of course, is an echo of the sophisticated account of legal formalism in private law defended by E. Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 1995) chs 1-4.
-
(1995)
The Idea of Private Law
-
-
Weinrib, E.1
-
58
-
-
27644566643
-
-
For Fuller this participation dimension of adjudication also has significant epistemic pay-offs: (New Haven: Yale UP, revised edn) at and 96
-
For Fuller this participation dimension of adjudication also has significant epistemic pay-offs: See Forms and Limits, above n 1 at 353-72.
-
(1969)
Forms and Limits
, pp. 353-372
-
-
Fuller, L.1
-
59
-
-
0006798554
-
-
Also, for a similar refrain, see (Oxford: Clarendon Press) at ch 4
-
Also, for a similar refrain, see D. Galligan, Due Process and Fair Procedures (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996) at ch 4.
-
(1996)
Due Process and Fair Procedures
-
-
Galligan, D.1
-
60
-
-
0345063318
-
-
This is a clumsy echo of an altogether more subtle argument offered in (New York: Oxford UP) at chs 2 and 3
-
This is a clumsy echo of an altogether more subtle argument offered in R.A. Duff, Punishment, Communication, and Community (New York: Oxford UP, 2001) at chs 2 and 3.
-
(2001)
Punishment, Communication, and Community
-
-
Duff, R.A.1
-
61
-
-
27644548955
-
-
The standard treatment of the rules of natural justice is (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 8th edn)
-
The standard treatment of the rules of natural justice is H.W.R. Wade and C.F. Forsyth, Administrative Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 8th edn, 2000) Pt VI.
-
(2000)
Administrative Law
, Issue.PART VI
-
-
Wade, H.W.R.1
Forsyth, C.F.2
-
62
-
-
0006798554
-
-
Also interesting is above n 29, chs 11-14 (ch 14 also contains some brief but interesting thoughts on impartiality)
-
Also interesting is Galligan, above n 29, chs 11-14 (ch 14 also contains some brief but interesting thoughts on impartiality).
-
(1996)
Due Process and Fair Procedures
-
-
Galligan, D.1
-
64
-
-
0346663252
-
-
ch 3. The distinction is missed, however, in (Dordrecht: Kluwer) at where it is assumed that impartiality is only a property of procedures and not outcomes
-
and Bayles, above n 10 at ch 3.
-
(1990)
Procedural Justice
, pp. 22-23
-
-
Bayles, M.D.1
-
67
-
-
0006798554
-
-
On 'the hearing principle' at ch 12 Also, for a similar refrain, see (Oxford: Clarendon Press) at ch 4
-
On 'the hearing principle' see Galligan, above n 29 at ch 12
-
(1996)
Due Process and Fair Procedures
-
-
Galligan, D.1
-
68
-
-
27644437602
-
-
at ch 15. The standard treatment of the rules of natural justice is (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 8th edn)
-
and Wade and Forsyth, above n 31 at ch 15.
-
(2000)
Administrative Law
, Issue.PART VI
-
-
Wade, H.W.R.1
Forsyth, C.F.2
-
71
-
-
27644543574
-
-
(ed.), (Oxford: Clarendon Press)
-
and P. Murphy (ed.), Blackstone's Criminal Practice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002) at 1039-43.
-
(2002)
Blackstone's Criminal Practice
, pp. 1039-1043
-
-
Murphy, P.1
-
72
-
-
27644438267
-
'Safeguarding Judicial Impartiality'
-
A helpful discussion of post-Pinochet cases is
-
A helpful discussion of post-Pinochet cases is K. Malleson, 'Safeguarding Judicial Impartiality' (2002) 22 Legal Studies 53-70.
-
(2002)
Legal Studies
, vol.22
, pp. 53-70
-
-
Malleson, K.1
-
73
-
-
0042341237
-
-
One such perspective is that of 'public reason'. Philosophers have raised a family of conceptions of public reason, two of the most interesting belonging to (Oxford: Clarendon Press)
-
One such perspective is that of 'public reason'. Philosophers have raised a family of conceptions of public reason, two of the most interesting belonging to G. Gaus, Justificatory Liberalism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996)
-
(1996)
Justificatory Liberalism
-
-
Gaus, G.1
-
74
-
-
0003624191
-
-
and (New York: Columbia UP, rev. edn)
-
and J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia UP, rev. edn, 1996)
-
(1996)
Political Liberalism
-
-
Rawls, J.1
-
75
-
-
0007310158
-
'The Idea of Public Reason Revisited'
-
in his (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP). The conceptions are similar in that they tell us which considerations public decision-making bodies like courts and legislatures should and should not use
-
and 'The Idea of Public Reason Revisited' in his The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 1999). The conceptions are similar in that they tell us which considerations public decision-making bodies like courts and legislatures should and should not use.
-
(1999)
The Law of Peoples
-
-
-
76
-
-
0038794432
-
'Critique of the Gotha Programme'
-
(London: Lawrence and Wishart) at
-
K. Marx, 'Critique of the Gotha Programme' in Vol. 24 Marx-Engels Collected Works, 1874-1883 (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1989) at 86-87.
-
(1989)
Marx-Engels Collected Works, 1874-1883
, vol.24
, pp. 86-87
-
-
Marx, K.1
-
77
-
-
0038413612
-
-
'All concrete peculiarities which distinguish one representative of the genus homo sapiens from another dissolve into the abstraction of man in general, man as legal subject': (London: Pluto Press)
-
'All concrete peculiarities which distinguish one representative of the genus homo sapiens from another dissolve into the abstraction of man in general, man as legal subject': E. Pashukanis, Law and Marxism: A General Theory (London: Pluto Press, 1983) at 113.
-
(1983)
Law and Marxism: A General Theory
, pp. 113
-
-
Pashukanis, E.1
-
78
-
-
27644542267
-
'Who are Law's Persons? From Cheshire Cats to Responsible Subjects'
-
For an interesting recent discussion of legal personality see N. Naffine, As will be obvious from what follows in the text, my view of the abstract legal person is that it is a combination of what Naffine distinguishes as conceptions 'P2' and 'P3'
-
For an interesting recent discussion of legal personality see N. Naffine, 'Who are Law's Persons? From Cheshire Cats to Responsible Subjects' (2003) 66 Modern L R 346-67. As will be obvious from what follows in the text, my view of the abstract legal person is that it is a combination of what Naffine distinguishes as conceptions 'P2' and 'P3'.
-
(2003)
Modern L R
, vol.66
, pp. 346-367
-
-
-
79
-
-
27644548079
-
-
See, for example, 1 WLR (tort of negligence)
-
See, for example, Mullin v Richards [1998] 1 WLR 1304 (tort of negligence);
-
(1998)
Mullin V Richards
, pp. 1304
-
-
-
80
-
-
27644483933
-
-
2 All ER
-
D.P.P. v Camplin [1978] 2 All ER 168
-
(1978)
D.P.P. V Camplin
, pp. 168
-
-
-
81
-
-
27644457048
-
-
and 3 All ER (provocation defence in murder)
-
and R. v Morhall [1995] 3 All ER 658 (provocation defence in murder).
-
(1995)
R. V Morhall
, pp. 658
-
-
-
82
-
-
0004307789
-
-
(London: Butterworths, 2nd edn), ch 2
-
N. Walker and N. Padfield, Sentencing: Theory, Law and Practice (London: Butterworths, 2nd edn, 1996), ch 2.
-
(1996)
Sentencing: Theory, Law and Practice
-
-
Walker, N.1
Padfield, N.2
-
83
-
-
0035623454
-
'The Possibilities and Desirability of Mediator Neutrality - Towards an Ethic of Partiality?'
-
An excellent introduction to and review of the literature is Lacey, ch 1 and chs 5-7. Two recent fairly dismissive treatments are: 504-27 at
-
An excellent introduction to and review of the literature is Lacey, above n 5, ch 1 and chs 5-7.
-
(2001)
Social and Legal Studies
, vol.10
, pp. 511-514
-
-
Mulcahy, L.1
-
84
-
-
27644529743
-
-
See also (eds.), (Oxford: Hart Publishing), chs 2, 3 and 5
-
See also S. James and S. Palmer (eds.), Visible Women (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2002), chs 2, 3 and 5
-
(2002)
Visible Women
-
-
James, S.1
Palmer, S.2
-
86
-
-
0003473443
-
-
A broader discussion is provided by (Ithaca: Cornell UP)
-
A broader discussion is provided by M. Minow, Making All the Difference (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1990).
-
(1990)
Making All the Difference
-
-
Minow, M.1
-
87
-
-
27644483934
-
'Representations of the (Woman) Judge: Hercules, the Little Mermaid and the Vain and Naked Emperor'
-
See Rackley, above n 5 at 602-05.
-
(2002)
Legal Studies
, vol.22
, pp. 602-605
-
-
Rackley, E.1
-
88
-
-
0004148706
-
-
See the sources in n 42, above, and, for example, Philosophy of the Limit above n 4. Cornell's views and her sources of inspiration have not remained static: compare the above text with (Princeton: Princeton UP)
-
See the sources in n 42, above, and, for example, Cornell, Philosophy of the Limit, above n 4. Cornell's views and her sources of inspiration have not remained static: Compare the above text with At the Heart of Freedom (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1998).
-
(1998)
At the Heart of Freedom
-
-
Cornell, D.1
-
89
-
-
0004201515
-
-
'Heretical' jurists are those who think either that law and adjudication are undesirable means of regulating human conduct tout court, or undesirable in their current form and in current social, cultural and economic conditions. Some principal heretical monographs are: (London: Routledge, Chapman and Hall)
-
Philosophy of the Limit, above n 4 at 62.
-
(1992)
Philosophy of the Limit
, pp. 62
-
-
Cornell, D.1
-
90
-
-
27644469450
-
-
For an altogether more subtle account of some of the difficulties, see the essay by Lacey in James and Palmer (eds.), particularly at '[t]he idea of impartiality expresses an impossibility, a fiction'. Altogether more measured yet critical is (Oxford: Hart Publishing) at ch 7
-
For an altogether more subtle account of some of the difficulties, see the essay by Lacey in James and Palmer (eds.), above n 42, particularly at 129-33.
-
(1998)
Visible Women
, pp. 129-133
-
-
James, S.1
Palmer, S.2
-
91
-
-
27644487902
-
-
It is not only some strands of difference feminism that hint at this 'reinvention' of law. Some of the most interesting British critical legal theorists, like also lean in this direction. See my book review in
-
It is not only some strands of difference feminism that hint at this 'reinvention' of law. Some of the most interesting British critical legal theorists, like A. Norrie, also lean in this direction. See my book review in 19 (1999) Legal Studies 425-29
-
(1999)
Legal Studies
, vol.19
, pp. 425-429
-
-
Norrie, A.1
|