Promises, policies and pocketbook voting

European Economic Review

Volumn 75, Issue , 2015, Pages 177-194

  Elinder, Mikael ^a,b   Jordahl, Henrik ^b,c   Poutvaara, Panu ^c,d,e,f  

^a UPPSALA UNIVERSITY   (Sweden)

^b RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS IFN   (Sweden)

^c Bonn and IAB   (Germany)

^d UNIVERSITY OF MUNICH   (Germany)

^e IFO INSTITUTE   (Germany)

^f CESIFO   (Germany)

Author keywords

Economic voting; Election promises; Pocketbook voting; Prospective voting; Retrospective voting

Indexed keywords

ECONOMICS; ELECTION; PARTY POLITICS; POLITICAL SYSTEM; VOTING BEHAVIOR;

SWEDEN;

LAMPSILIS OVATA;

EID: 84924985648     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2015.01.010     Document Type: Article

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