Bringing home the bacon: An empirical analysis of the extent and effects of pork-barreling in Australian politics

Public Choice

Volumn 137, Issue 1-2, 2008, Pages 279-299

  Leigh, Andrew ^a  

^a AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

Author keywords

Elections; Local expenditure; Pork barreling; Targeted funding; Voting

Indexed keywords

EID: 50249103247     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-008-9327-5     Document Type: Article

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