The complexity of failure: Implications of complexity theory for safety investigations

Safety Science

Volumn 49, Issue 6, 2011, Pages 939-945

  Dekker, Sidney ^a   Cilliers, Paul ^b   Hofmeyr, Jan Hendrik ^b  

^a GRIFFITH UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

^b STELLENBOSCH UNIVERSITY   (South Africa)

Author keywords

Cause; Complexity theory; Human error; Investigation; Newtonian; Systems thinking

Indexed keywords

CAUSE; COMPLEXITY THEORY; HUMAN ERRORS; INVESTIGATION; NEWTONIANS; SYSTEMS THINKING;

ACCIDENTS; COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY; ERRORS; FAILURE ANALYSIS; SYSTEM THEORY;

QUALITY ASSURANCE;

ACCIDENT; ANALYTIC METHOD; ARTICLE; COMPLEXITY THEORY; ERROR; INFORMATION SCIENCE; KNOWLEDGE BASE; NEWTONIAN ANALYSIS; PREDICTION; PRIORITY JOURNAL; PROBABILITY; SAFETY; THEORETICAL MODEL; TIME; UNCERTAINTY;

EID: 79955675090     PISSN: 09257535     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ssci.2011.01.008     Document Type: Article

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