Drifting into failure: theorising the dynamics of disaster incubation

Theoretical Issues in Ergonomics Science

Volumn 15, Issue 6, 2014, Pages 534-544

  Dekker, Sidney ^a,b   Pruchnicki, Shawn ^c  

^a GRIFFITH UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

^b UNIVERSITY OF QUEENSLAND   (Australia)

^c The Ohio State University   (United States)

Author keywords

Accidents; Control theory; Disasters; Drift into failure; Incubation; Resilience

Indexed keywords

EID: 84918811689     PISSN: 1463922X     EISSN: 1464536X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/1463922X.2013.856495     Document Type: Article

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