Political legitimacy and European monetary union: contracts, constitutionalism and the normative logic of two-level games

Journal of European Public Policy

Volumn 22, Issue 2, 2015, Pages 257-274

  Bellamy, Richard ^a   Weale, Albert ^b  

^a EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE   (Italy)

^b UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Democracy; euro crisis; legitimacy; political constitutionalism; social contract theory

Indexed keywords

EID: 84924542528     PISSN: 13501763     EISSN: 14664429     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2014.995118     Document Type: Article

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