An introduction to non-classical logic: From if to is, Second edition

An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic: From if to is

Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages 1-613

  Priest, Graham ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MELBOURNE   (Australia)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ST ANDREWS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84924175350     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511801174     Document Type: Book

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