Human identity and bioethics

Human Identity and Bioethics

Volumn , Issue , 2005, Pages 1-300

  DeGrazia, David ^a  

^a GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 84923991151     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511614484     Document Type: Book

References (342)

1. “On the Question of Person-hood Beyond Homo Sapiens” in Peter Singer (ed.), In Defense of Animals, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, forthcoming).
2. The Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed., vol. XI (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989), pp. 596-7.
3. Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 2nd ed. (1694), Book II, ch. 27, sect. 9.
4. Norman Ford, The Prenatal Person (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), ch. 1.
5. Mary Anne Warren, “On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion,” Monist 57 (1973): 43-61
6. Michael Tooley, Abortion and Infanticide (Oxford: Clarendon, 1983).
7. “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,” Journal of Philosophy 68 (1971): 829-39.
8. Cf. Daniel Dennett, Brainstorms (Hassocks, England: Harvester, 1978), ch. 14.
9. Cf. Daniel Dennett Individuals (London: Methuen, 1959), p. 104.
10. Peter Singer, Practical Ethics, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 110-11.
11. Peter Singer, Taking Animals Seriously: Mental Life and Moral Status (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 129-72.
12. Dorothy Cheney and Robert Seyfarth, How Monkeys See the World (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990).
13. Raymond Martin, Self-Concern: An Experiential Approach to What Matters in Survival (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 3-5.
14. Joseph Butler, “Of Personal Identity” (First Appendix to The Analogy of Religion [1736])
15. Thomas Reid, “Of Memory” (in Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man [1785], chs. 4, 6).
16. Harold Noonan, Personal Identity (London: Routledge, 1989), ch. 3.
17. Sydney Shoemaker, Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity (Ithica, NY: Cornell University Press, 1963)
18. David Wiggins, Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity (Oxford: Blackwell, 1967)
19. Peter Geach, “Identity,” Review of Metaphysics 21 (1967): 3-12
20. Bernard Williams, “The Self and the Future,” Philosophical Review 79 (1970): 161-80.
21. H. P. Grice, “Personal Identity,” Mind 50 (1941): 330-50
22. Sidney Shoemaker, “Persons and Their Pasts,” American Philosophical Quarterly 7 (1970): 269-85
23. John Perry, “Can the Self Divide?” Journal of Philosophy 69 (1972): 463-88
24. David Lewis, “Survival and Identity,” in Amelie Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976): 17-40
25. Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984)
26. Mark Johnston, “Human Beings,” Journal of Philosophy 84 (1987): 59-83
27. Christine Korsgaard, “Personal Identity and the Unity of Agency: A Kantian Response to Par?t,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 18 (1989): 101-32
28. Peter Unger, Identity, Con-sciousness, and Value (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).
29. Shoemaker, Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity, pp. 23-4
30. Marya Schechtman, “The Same and the Same: Two Views of Psychological Continuity,” American Philosophical Quarterly 31 (1994), pp. 200-1.
31. Mark Johnston, “Human Beings,” Journal of Philosophy 84 (1987), p. 60.
32. Kathleen Wilkes, Real People (Oxford: Clarendon, 1988), ch. 2.
33. Jeff McMahan (“The Metaphysics of Brain Death,” Bioethics 9 [1995], p. 110).
34. Johnston notes this possible exception (“Human Beings,” p. 81).
35. Williams, “The Self and the Future,” p. 180.
36. Robert Nozick Philosophical Explanations [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981], ch. 1
37. Rudder Baker, Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 35-9.
38. David Wiggins, Sameness and Substance (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980).
39. Eric Olson, “Was I Ever a Fetus?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LVII (1) (1997): 95-109
40. Eric Olson, The Human Animal: Personal Identity without Psychology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997);
41. W. R. Carter, “Do Zygotes Become Peo-ple,” Mind 91 (1982): 77-95; P. F. Snowdon, “Persons, Animals, and Ourselves,” in Christopher Gill (ed.), The Person and the Human Mind (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990): 83-107
42. Peter van Inwagen, Material Beings (Ithica, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990)
43. David DeGrazia, “Persons, Organisms, and the De?nition of Death: A Philosophical Critique of the Higher-BrainApproach,” Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 (1999): 419-40
44. David DeGrazia, “Advance Directives, Dementia, and ‘the Someone Else Problem’,” Bioethics 13 (1999): 373-91.
45. David DeGrazia, “Advance Directives, Dementia, and ‘the Someone Else Problem’,” pp. 379-82
46. Eric Olson, “Reply to Lynne Rudder Baker,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LIX (1) (1999), pp. 161-2.
47. Eric Olson, Essay on Human Understanding, Bk. II, ch. 27
48. Mark Thornton, “Same Human Being, Same Person?” Philosophy 66 (1991): 115-18.
49. Nozick, Philosophical Explanations, pp. 78-9
50. Eric Olson, “Was I Ever a Fetus?”, esp. pp. 95-7
51. Eric Olson, The Human Animal, pp. 79-81
52. Eric Olson, The Human Animal, pp. 88-9
53. Eric Olson, “Was I Ever a Fetus?”, p. 101
54. Sidney Shoemaker, “Personal Identity: A Materialist's Account,” in Shoemaker and Richard Swinburne, Personal Identity (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984): 30-43.
55. Baker, “What Am I?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LIX (1) (1999): 151-9
56. “Are We Essentially Persons? Olson, Baker, and a Reply,” Philosophical Forum 33 (2002): 101-20.
57. Eric Olson, “Reply to Lynne Rudder Baker,” p. 164;
58. Jeff McMahan, The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 89-92.
59. Persons and Bodies, pp. 115-16.
60. “Advance Directives, Dementia, and ‘the Someone Else Problem’,” pp. 384-5
61. “Persons, Organisms, and the Definition of Death,” p. 424.
62. Joseph Volpe, Neurology of the Newborn, 4th ed. (Philadelphia: Saunders, 2001), ch. 2.
63. Bruce Berg, “Developmental Disorders of the Nervous System,” in Berg (ed.), Principles of Child Neurology (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1996), p. 666.
64. Taking Animals Seriously: Mental Life and Moral Status [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996], ch. 3
65. R. W. Sperry, “Hemisphere Deconnection and Unity in Conscious Awareness,” American Psychologist 23 [1968]: 723-33
66. Cf. Olson, The Human Animal, ch. 6.
67. Cf. Peter French, “Kinds and Persons,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44 (1983): 241-54.
68. Johnston makes this argument (“Human Beings,” pp. 72-3).
69. McMahan, “The Metaphysics of Brain Death,” pp. 102-3.
70. Baker, Persons and Bodies, pp. 206-8
71. “Thinking Animals and the Constitution View,” Symposium of Persons and Bod-ies. A Field Guide to Philosophy of Mind (Spring 2001) [www.uniroma3.it/kant/?eld/bakersymp olson.htm], pp. 3-4.
72. Carter, “Death and Bodily Transformation,” Mind 93 (1984): 412-18
73. “Thinking Animals and the Constitution View,” pp. 4-5.
74. McMahan, The Ethics of Killing, pp. 35-9.
75. American Psychiatric Association, Desk Reference to the Diagnostic Criteria from DSM-IV (Washington, DC: APA, 1994), pp. 230-1.
76. Nicholas Humphrey and Daniel Dennett, “Speaking for Ourselves: An Assess-ment of Multiple Personality Disorder,” Raritan 9 (1) (1989): 68-98
77. Stephen Braude, First Person Plural (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Little?eld, 1995)
78. Jennifer Radden, Divided Minds and Successive Selves (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996).
79. Thomas Nagel, Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), ch. 11.
80. Elsewhere “Identity, Killing, and the Boundaries of Our Existence,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 31 [2003], pp. 424-5
81. Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Cambridge, MA: Har-vard University Press, 1970);
82. Hilary Putnam, “Meaning and Reference,” Journal of Philosophy 70 (1973): 699-711.
83. “Human Beings,” pp. 64-5, note 8.
84. John Searle (The Construction of Social Reality [New York: Free Press, 1995], pp. 5-7).
85. The Ethics of Killing, p. 88.
86. “Personal Identity and the Unity of Agency: A Kantian Response to Parfit,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 18 [1989]: 103-31
87. Self-Concern: An Ex-periential Approach to What Matters in Survival [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998], ch. 3
88. Cf. Marya Schechtman, The Constitution of Selves (Ithica, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 114-19.
89. Alasdair MacIntyre After Virtue, 2nd ed. [Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984], ch. 15
90. The Constitution of Selves, pp. 150-4
91. I: The Philosophy and Psychology of Personal Identity (London: Penguin, 1988), p. 152
92. Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), ch. 5
93. Martha Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
94. Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self (Cam-bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), chs. 1 and 2.
95. Schechtman offers essentially the same solution in an illuminating discussion that in?u-enced this one (The Constitution of Selves, pp. 119-30).
96. Damaged Identities, Narrative Repair (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001), ch. 3
97. Donald Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).
98. “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,” Journal of Philosophy 68 (1971): 5-20.
99. “Autonomous Action and Autonomy-Subverting Psychiatric Conditions,” Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 19 (1994), pp. 284-7.
100. Irving Thalberg, “Hierarchical Analyses of Unfree Action,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 8 (1978), pp. 212-17.
101. Cf. Gary Watson, “Free Agency,” Journal of Philosophy 72 (1975): 205-20.
102. Susan Wolf, “Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility,” in Ferdinand Shoe-man (ed.), Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988): 46-62.
103. Marilyn Friedman, “Autonomy and the Split-Level Self,” Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 (1986), pp. 30-2.
104. John Christman (although he doesn‘t ulti-mately endorse the critique), “Introduction,” in Christman (ed.), The Inner Citadel (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 10-11.
105. Watson, “Free Agency,” p. 218.
106. Cf. Glover, I, pp. 186-7.
107. “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,” p. 16.
108. Christman, too, cites a hypnotist in criticizing Frankfurt's theory (“Introduction,” p. 10).
109. I learned of this ingenious move from Christman, “Introduction,” p. 11.
110. “Acting Freely,” Nous 4 (1970), p. 381.
111. “The Concept of Autonomy,” in Christman, The Inner Citadel, p. 61.
112. “Autonomy: A Defense of the Split-Level Self,” Southern Journal of Philosophy 25 (1987), pp. 290-1.
113. Tom Beauchamp, “The Moral Standing of Animals in Medical Research,” Law, Medicine, and Health Care 20 [1992], p. 12
114. Frankfurt makes essentially the same point (“Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,” p. 20)
115. P. F. Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment” Proceedings of the British Academy 48 [1962]: 1-25
116. Carl Elliott, “The Tyranny of Happiness: Ethics and Cosmetic Psychophar-macology,” in Erik Parens (ed.), Enhancing Human Traits: Ethical and Social Implications (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1998): 177-88
117. Carl Elliott, Better Than Well: American Medicine Meets the American Dream (New York: Norton, 2003).
118. Charles Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992).
119. David Pears, Motivated Irrationality (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984), ch. 3.
120. Ronald Cranford, “Criteria for Death,” in Warren Reich (ed.), Encyclopedia of Bioethics, 2nd ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1995), p. 529.
121. Martin Pernick, “Brain Death in a Cultural Context: The Reconstruction of Death, 1967-1981,” in Stuart Youngner, Robert Arnold, and Renie Schapiro (eds.), The Definition of Death: Contemporary Controversies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999): 3-33.
122. “A Definition of Irreversible Coma,” Journal of the American Medical Association 205 (6) (1968): 337-40.
123. P. Mollaret and M. Goulon, “Le Coma Depasse,” Revue Neurologique 101 (1) (1959): 3-15.
124. Pernick, “Brain Death in a Cultural Context,” p. 8.
125. Morgan Capron, “The Bifurcated Legal Standard for Determining Death,” in Younger et al., The Definition of Death, pp. 120-5.
126. Morgan Capron, Defining Death: Medical, Legal and Ethical Issues in the Determination of Death Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1981
127. Ronald Cranford, “Criteria for Death,” pp. 530-1.
128. Robert Olick, “Brain Death, Religious Freedom, and Public Policy: New Jersey's Land-mark Legislative Initiative,” Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 1 (4) (1991), pp. 275-6
129. President's Commission, Defining Death, pp. 32-3.
130. James Bernat, Charles Culver, and Bernard Gert, “On the Definition and Criterion of Death,” Annals of Internal Medicine 94 (1981): 389-94
131. “Human Being: The Boundaries of the Concept,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 4 [1975], p. 353
132. “Persons, Organisms, and Death: A Philosophical Critique of the Higher-Brain Approach,” Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 [1999], pp. 433-4.
133. Chris Pallis, The ABC of Brain Death London: British Medical Journal Publishers, 1983
134. Chris Pallis, “On the Brainstem Criterion of Death,” in Younger et al., The Definition of Death: 93-100.
135. Eelco Wijdicks, “Brain Death Worldwide: Accepted Fact But No Global Consensus on Diagnostic Criteria,” Neurology 58 [January 2002]: 20-5
136. The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy entitled “Revisiting Brain Death” 26 [5] October 2001
137. D. Alan Shewmon, “The Brain and Somatic Integration: Insights into the Standard Biological Rationale for Equating ‘Brain Death’ with Death,” Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 26 (2001): 457-78
138. Michael Potts, “A Requiem for Whole Brain Death: A Response to D. Alan Shewmon's ‘The Brain and Somatic Integration’,” Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 26 (2001): 479-92.
139. Margaret Lock, “The Problem of Brain Death: Japanese Disputes about Bodies and Modernity,” in Youngner et al., The Definition of Death: 239-56
140. Bettina Schoena-Seifert, “Defining Death in Germany: Brain Death and Its Discontents,” in Youngner et al., The Definition of Death: 257-71.
141. Robert Veatch, “The Whole-Brain-Oriented Concept of Death: An Outmoded Philosophical Formulation,” Journal of Thanatology 3 (1975): 13-30
142. Tristam Engelhardt, “Defining Death: A Philosophical Problem for Medicine and Law,” Annual Review of Res-piratory Disease 112 (1975): 312-24
143. Michael Green and Daniel Wikler, “Brain Death and Personal Identity,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 9 (1980): 105-33
144. Karen Gervais, Redefin-ing Death (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986), ch. 6;
145. Edward Bartlett and Stu-art Youngner, “Human Death and the Destruction of the Neocortex,” in Richard Zaner (ed.), Death: Beyond Whole-Brain Criteria (Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Kluwer, 1988): 199-216
146. Roland Puccetti, “Does Anyone Survive Neocortical Death?” in Zaner, Death: 75-90
147. Richard Zaner, “Brains and Persons: A Critique of Veatch's View,” in Zaner, Death: 187-97
148. Ben Rich, “Postmodern Personhood: A Matter of Consciousness,” Bioethics 11 (1997): 206-16.
149. Ronald Cranford, “Criteria for Death,” pp. 531-3.
150. Pernick, “Brain Death in a Cultural Context,” p. 4.
151. “A No-Brainer: Criticisms of Brain-Based Standards of Death,” Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 26 (2001), p. 547.
152. Charles Culver and Bernard Gert, Philosophy in Medicine (New York: Oxford Uni-versity Press, 1982), ch. 10
153. Persons and Bodies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 5.
154. “Introduction,” in Zaner, Death, p. 7.
155. “Postmodern Personhood,” p. 121.
156. “Human Death and the Destruction of the Neocortex,” pp. 210-11.
157. The Foundations of Bioethics, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 248.
158. “The Impending Collapse of the Whole-Brain Definition of Death,” Hastings Center Report 23 (July-August 1993), p. 21.
159. “Definition and Determination of Death: Philosophical and Theological Perspectives,” in Reich, Encyclopedia of Bioethics, p. 547.
160. Taking Animals Seriously: Mental Life and Moral Status (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), ch. 5.
161. “Brain Death and Personal Identity,” p. 128.
162. The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 423-6.
163. “Does Anyone Survive Neocortical Death?” p. 85.
164. Much of this section draws from a discussion in my “Persons, Organisms, and Death,” pp. 425-9.
165. Perry, “The Problem of Personal Identity,” in Perry [ed.], Personal Identity [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975], p. 15
166. “Brain Death and Personal Identity,” p. 124.
167. Marya Schechtman, (The Constitution of Selves [Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996], pp. 150-2).
168. James Grifn, Well-Being: Its Meaning, Measurement, and Moral Importance (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986), pp. 16-19.
169. Self-Concern: An Experiential Approach to What Matters in Survival (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 18-27.
170. “The Whole-Brain-Oriented Concept of Death,” pp. 15-16.
171. Death, Dying, and the Biological Revolution [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976], p. 25
172. “The Im-pending Collapse of the Whole-Brain Denition of Death,” pp. 21-2
173. Amir Halevy, “Beyond Brain Death?” Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 26 (2001): 493-501
174. Stuart Youngner and Robert Arnold, “Philosophical Debates About the Definition of Death: Who Cares?” Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 26 (2001): 527-37
175. McMahan, The Ethics of Killing, pp. 426-42.
176. Shewmon, “The Brain and Somatic Integration,” pp. 467-71.
177. Veatch, “The Impending Collapse of the Whole-Brain Definition of Death,” p. 21.
178. Shewmon, “The Brain and Somatic Integration,” p. 464.
179. “A Requiem for Whole Brain Death,” p. 484.
180. Veatch, “The Impending Collapse of the Whole-Brain Definition of Death,” p. 18
181. Youngner and Arnold, “Philosophical Debates about the Definition of Death,” pp. 529-30.
182. Brody, “How Much of the Brain Must Be Dead?” p. 73.
183. “A Defense of the Whole-Brain Concept of Death,” Hastings Center Report 28 (March-April 1998): 17.
184. “On the Criterion and Definition of Death,” p. 390.
185. Brody, “How Much of the Brain Must Be Dead?” p. 77.
186. H. J. Gramm et al., “Acute Endocrine Failure After Brain Death,” Transplantation 54 (1992): 851-7.
187. McMahan, The Ethics of Killing, p. 429.
188. “Human Death and the Destruction of the Neocortex,” pp. 205-6.
189. McMahan, The Ethics of Killing, pp. 431-5.
190. Shewmon, “The Brain and Somatic Integration,” p. 473.
191. Potts, “A Requiem for Whole Brain Death,” pp. 487-8.
192. Amir Halevy and Baruch Brody, “Brain Death: Reconciling Defi-nitions, Criteria, and Tests,” Archives of Internal Medicine 119 (1993): 519-25.
193. Amir Halevy, “Beyond Brain Death?” Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 26 (2001), p. 499.
194. Here I draw mainly from Halevy, “Beyond Brain Death?” pp. 499-500.
195. “How Much of the Brain Must Be Dead?” p. 72.
196. Peter Knauer, “The Hermeneutic Function of the Principle of Double Effect,” in Charles Curran and Richard McCormick (eds.), Readings in Moral Theology No. 1: Moral Norms and Catholic Tradition (New York: Paulist Press, 1979): 1-39.
197. Rebecca Dresser and John Robertson, “Quality of Life and Non-Treatment Decisions for Incompetent Patients: A Critique of the Orthodox Approach,” Law, Medicine, and Healthcare 17 (1989), pp. 234-5.
198. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 110 S.Ct. 2841 (1990).
199. Gregory Pence, Classic Cases in Medical Ethics, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1995), pp. 17-20.
200. Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, Deciding to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment (Wash-ington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1983), ch. 4.
201. Allen Buchanan and Dan Brock, Deciding for Others: The Ethics of Surrogate Decision Making (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 115-17.
202. Norman Cantor, Advance Directives and the Pursuit of Death with Dignity (Blooming-ton: Indiana University Press, 1993)
203. Jim Stone, “Advance Directives, Autonomy, and Un-intended Death,” Bioethics 8 (1994): 223-46
204. Joan Teno et al., “Do Formal Advance Direc-tives Affect Resuscitation Decisions and the Use of Resources for Seriously Ill Patients?” Journal of Clinical Ethics 5 (1994): 23-30
205. Thomas May, “Reassessing the Reliability of Advance Directives,” Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 6 (1997): 325-38
206. Thomas Mappes, “Some Reflections on Advance Directives,” APA Newsletters: Newsletter on Philos-ophy and Medicine 98 (Fall 1998): 106-11
207. Robert Olick, Taking Advance Directives Seriously (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2001).
208. American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th ed. (rev. ed.) (Washington, DC: APA, 2000), pp. 154-7.
209. “Advance Directives, Dementia, and ‘the Someone Else Problem’,” Bioethics 13 (1999): 373-91.
210. “Advance Directives and the Personal Identity Problem,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 17 (1988), pp. 285-6.
211. “Advance Directives, Self-Determination, and Personal Identity,” in Chris Hacker, Ray Moseley, and Dorothy Vawter (eds.), Advance Directives in Medicine (New York: Praeger, 1989), p. 157 (emphasis added).
212. “Quality of Life and Non-Treatment Decisions for Incompetent Patients,” p. 236.
213. “Choosing for Others as Continuing a Life Story: The Problem of Personal Identity Revisited,” Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 27 (1999), p. 20.
214. “Some Reflections on the Problem of Advance Directives, Personhood, and Personal Identity,” Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 9 (1999), p. 361.
215. Olick also notes this implication of two deaths (Taking Advance Directives Seriously, p. 143).
216. Cf. Olick, Taking Advance Directives Seriously, p. 143.
217. Mark Kuczewski, “Whose Will Is It Anyway? A Discussion of Advance Directives, Personal Identity, and Consensus in Medical Ethics,” Bioethics 8 (1994): 27-48
218. Ben Rich, “The Values History: Restoring Narrative Identity to Long-Term Care,” Journal of Ethics, Law, and Aging 2 (2) (1996): 75-84
219. Ben Rich, “Prospective Autonomy and Critical Interests: A Narrative Defense of the Moral Authority of Advance Directives,” Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 6 (1997): 138-47
220. Michael Quante, “Precedent Autonomy and Personal Identity,” Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 9 (1999): 365-81
221. Jeffrey Spike, “Narrative Unity and the Unraveling of Personal Identity: Dialysis, Dementia, Stroke, and Advance Directives,” Journal of Clinical Ethics 11 (2000): 367-72.
222. Raymond Martin, Self-Concern: An Experiential Approach to What Matters in Survival (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 96-9
223. “Precedent Autonomy and Personal Identity,” p. 366
224. Helga Kuhse, “only persons can anticipate, and have desires about, their own future. These desires can be thwarted by a person being killed” “Some Reflections on the Problem of Advance Di-rectives, Personhood, and Personal Identity,” p. 359
225. “Are We Essentially Persons? Olson, Baker, and a Reply,” Philosophical Forum 33 (2002), pp. 113-14
226. Taking Animals Seriously: Mental Life and Moral Status (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 129-83.
227. “Autonomy and the Demented Self,” The Milbank Quarterly 64 (suppl. 2) (1986), p. 4.
228. Life's Dominion: An Argument about Abortion, Euthanasia, and Individual Freedom (New York: Knopf, 1993).
229. Rebecca Dresser, “Dworkin on Dementia: Elegant Theory, Questionable Policy,” Hastings Center Report 25 (November-December 1995): 32-8.
230. John Davis, “The Concept of Precedent Autonomy,” Bioethics 16 (2002), pp. 131-2
231. Edmund Pellegrino and David Thomasma, (For the Patient's Good [New York: Oxford University Press, 1988]).
232. Dworkin, “Autonomy and the Demented Self,” p. 13.
233. “Whose Will Is It Anyway?”, p. 42.
234. David Luban, “The Self: Metaphysical Not Political,” Legal Theory 1 (1995): 401-37.
235. “Choosing for Others as Continuing a Life Story,” p. 30.
236. Dresser and Robertson, “Quality of Life and Non-Treatment Decisions for Incom-petent Patients,” p. 236
237. Respecting the Margins of Agency: Alzheimer's Patients and the Capacity to Value,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 28 [2000]: 105-38;
238. Cf. Howard Klepper and Mary Rorty, “Personal Identity, Advance Directives, and Genetic Testing for Alzheimer Disease,” Genetic Testing 3 [1999]: 99-106
239. The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 75.
240. Thomas Mappes and Jane Zembaty, “Patient Choices, Family Interests, and Physician Obligations,” Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 4 (1994): 27-46.
241. LeRoy Walters and Julie Gage Palmer, The Ethics of Human Gene Therapy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 102-6.
242. Eric Juengst, “What Does Enhancement Mean?” in Erik Parens (ed.), Enhancing Human Traits (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1998), p. 29
243. Norman Daniels and James Sabin, “Clarifying the Concept of Medical Necessity,” Proceedings of the Group Health Institute [Washington, DC: Group Health Association of America, 1991]: 693-707
244. Gladys White, “Human Growth Hormone: The Dilemma of Ex-panded Use in Children,” Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 3 (1993): 401-9
245. Gladys White, “FDA Approves Wider Use of Growth Hormone,” The Washington Post (July 26, 2003): A12.
246. Allen Buchanan et al., From Chance to Choice: Genetics and Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), ch. 2.
247. Erik Parens, “Is Better Always Good? The Enhancement Project,” in Enhancing Human Traits, p. 5.
248. Sara Goering, “The Ethics of Making the Body Beautiful: What Cosmetic Genetics Can Learn from Cosmetic Surgery,” Philosophy & Public Policy Quarterly 21 (Winter 2001), p. 21. Goering cites www.plasticsurgery.org.
249. Sara Goering, Listening to Prozac (New York: Viking, 1993)
250. Lawrence Diller, “The Run on Ritalin: Attention Deficit Disorder and Stimu-lant Treatment in the 1990s,” Hastings Center Report 26 (2) (1996): 12-18
251. Claudia Mills, “One Pill Makes You Smarter: An Ethical Appraisal of the Rise of Ritalin,” Report from the Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy 18 (4) (1998): 13-17
252. Peter Whitehouse et al., “En-hancing Cognition in the Cognitively Intact,” Hastings Center Report 27 (3) (1997): 14-22
253. Jacquelyn Slomka, “Playing with Propranolol,” Hastings Center Report 22 (4) (1992): 13-17.
254. American Psychiatric Association, Desk Reference to the Diagnostic Criteria from DSM-IV (Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association, 1994), pp. 273-4.
255. David Healy, “Good Science or Good Business?” Hastings Center Report 30 (2) (2000): 19-22.
256. Elliott, Better Than Well, p. 249
257. Lawrence Diller, Running on Ritalin (New York: Bantam, 1998), pp. 35-6
258. ADHD “Prescription Stimulant Use in Children: Ethi-cal Issues,” December 12, 2002, presentation to the President's Council on Bioethics [www.bioethics.gov], Washington, DC.
259. French Anderson, “Genetics and Human Malleability,” Hastings Center Report 20 (1) (1990): 21-4.
260. Glenn McGee, The Perfect Baby (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997), ch. 7
261. Anita Silvers, “Meliorism at the Millennium: Positive Molecular Eugenics and the Promise of Progress without Excess,” in Lisa Parker and Rachel Ankeny (eds.), Mutating Concepts, Evolving Disciplines: Genetics, Medicine, and Society (Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Kluwer, 2002): 215-34.
262. Nancy King, “Accident and Desire: Inadvertent Germline Effects in Clinical Research,” Hastings Center Report 33 (2) (2003): 23-30.
263. Mark Frankel, “Inheritable Genetic Modification and a Brave New World,” Hastings Center Report 33 (2) (2003), p. 32.
264. Rick Weiss, “Gene Enhancements’ Thorny Ethical Traits,” The Washington Post (October 12, 1997), p. A19.
265. Eric Juengst et al., “Biogerontology, ‘Anti-Aging Medicine,’ and the Challenges of Human Enhancement,” Hastings Center Report 33 (4) (2003): 21-30
266. David Gems, “Is More Life Always Better? The New Biology of Aging and the Meaning of Life,” Hastings Center Report 33 (4) (2003): 31-9
267. Walters and Palmer, The Ethics of Human Gene Therapy, ch. 4
268. “Prozac, Enhancement, and Self-Creation,” Hastings Center Report 30 (2) (2000), pp. 38-9.
269. Margaret Olivia Little, “Cosmetic Surgery, Suspect Norms, and the Ethics of Complicity,” in Parens, Enhancing Human Traits: 162-76
270. Susan Bordo, “Braveheart, Babe, and the Contemporary Body,” in Parens, Enhancing Human Traits: 189-221
271. Margaret Olivia Little, “Why a Feminist Approach to Bioethics?” Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 6 [1996], p. 6
272. Carol Freedman, “Aspirin for the Mind? Some Ethical Worries about Psy-chopharmacology,” in Parens, Enhancing Human Traits: 135-50.
273. Carl Elliott, “The Tyranny of Happiness: Ethics and Cosmetic Psychopharmacology,”
274. Parens, Enhancing Human Traits, p. 180
275. Dan Brock, “Enhancements of Human Function: Some Distinctions for Policymakers,” in Parens, Enhancing Human Traits, p. 60.
276. Diller, “The Run on Ritalin,”
277. Andy Coghlan, “‘Editing’ Fixes Disease Gene,” New Scientist (July 12, 2003): 3.
278. The Beauty Myth (New York: Perennial, 1991), p. 99
279. “The Ethics of Making the Body Beautiful,” p. 23.
280. Kathy Davis, “The Rhetoric of Cosmetic Surgery: Luxury or Welfare?” in Parens, Enhancing Human Traits: 124-34.
281. “Cosmetic Surgery and the Internal Morality of Medicine,” Cambridge Quartely of Healthcare Ethics 9 (July 2000), pp. 360-2
282. American Society of Plastic and Reconstructive Surgeons, Code of Ethics (revised 1992).
283. Tristam Engelhardt, “The Disease of Masturbation: Values and the Concept of Disease,” Bulletin of the History of Medicine 48 (1974): 234-48.
284. Cf. Buchanan et al., From Chance to Choice, p. 122.
285. Joel Feinberg, “The Child's Right to an Open Future,” in William Aiken and Hugh LaFollette (eds.), Whose Child? Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 1980
286. Pres-ident's Council on Bioethics, Beyond Therapy: Biotechnology and the Pursuit of Happiness (Washington, DC: PCB, October 2003), pp. 91-4.
287. “Grounding a Right to Health Care in Self-Respect and Self-Esteem,” Public Affairs Quar-terly 5 (1991): 301-18
288. “Why the United States Should Adopt a Single-Payer System of Health Care Finance,” Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 5 (1996): 145-60.
289. Genes and Future People (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2001), pp. 81-2.
290. MacIntyre, After Virtue, 2nd ed. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), ch. 15
291. Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989)
292. The Ethics of Authenticity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992).
293. Bioethics, Culture and Identity (New York: Routledge, 1999), p. 33.
294. Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia [New York: Basic Books, 1974], pp. 42-5
295. Buchanan et al., From Chance to Choice, p. 160.
296. President's Council on Bioethics, Beyond Therapy, p. 165.
297. N. Knoepf?er,” Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 14 [2004], p. 79
298. Cf. Lee Silver, Remaking Eden (New York: Avon, 1997), ch. 1.
299. Pope John Paul II, “The Unspeakable Crime of Abortion,” in Evangelium Vitae, encyclical letter of John Paul II, March 25, 1995 (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1995).
300. Naming and Necessity, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), p. 112.
301. Claire Ainsworth,“The Stranger Within,” New Scientist (November 15, 2003): 34-7.
302. Gomez-Lobo, “On the Ethical Evaluation of Stem Cell Research,” p. 79.
303. Eric Olson, The Human Animal (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 91.
304. Cf. Silver, Remaking Eden, p. 53.
305. Genes and Future People (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2001), pp. 81-2.
306. “Identity and the Ethics of Gene Therapy,” Bioethics 7 (1993): 27-40.
307. “Identity and Disability,” Journal of Applied Philosophy 17 (2000), p. 263.
308. “Genetic Therapy, Identity, and the Person-Regarding Reasons,” Bioethics 9 (1995), p. 22.
309. “Prospects for ‘Genetic Therapy’-Can a Person Benefit from Being Altered?” Bioethics 5 (1991), p. 275
310. Jeffrey Kahn, “Genetic Harm: Bitten by the Body That Keeps You?” Bioethics 5 (1991), p. 299
311. Lynn Gillam, “Prenatal Screening and Discrimination against the Disabled,” Journal of Medical Ethics 25 (1999): 163-71
312. Adrienne Asch, “Prenatal Diagnosis and Selective Abortion: A Challenge to Practice and Policy,” American Journal of Public Health 89 (1999): 1649-57
313. Allen Buchanan et al., From Chance to Choice: Genetics and Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), ch. 7.
314. Buchanan et al., From Chance to Choice, pp. 232-42
315. Jeff McMahan, “Wrongful Life: Paradoxes in the Morality of Causing People to Exist,” in Jules Coleman and Christopher Morris (eds.), Rational Commitment and Social Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 215-16.
316. Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984), ch. 16.
317. David Wasserman, “Personal Identity and the Moral Appraisal of Prenatal Therapy,” in Lisa Parker and Rachel Ankeny (eds.), Mutating Concepts, Evolving Disciplines (Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Kluwer), pp. 248-58.
318. “The Non-Identity Problem and Genetic Harms-the Case of Wrongful Handicaps,” Bioethics 9 (1995), p. 270.
319. Cf. Kripke, Naming and Necessity, p. 155, n. 77.
320. Ronald Green, “Parental Autonomy and the Obligation Not to Harm One's Child Genetically,” Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 25 (1997), p. 8.
321. David Heyd, Genethics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), ch. 4.
322. F. M. Kamm, “Genes, Justice, and Obligations to Future People,” Social Philosophy and Policy 19 (2002), pp. 373-9
323. Cf. Michael Bayles, “Harm to the Unconceived,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 5 (1976): 292-304.
324. Rahul Kumar, “Who Can Be Wronged?” Philosophy and Public Affairs 31 (2003): 99-118.
325. The Non-Identity Problem, Ethics 96 [1986]: 804-31
326. Cf. Buchanan et al., From Chance to Choice, p. 254
327. “Wrongful Life,” pp. 243-4.
328. David Wasserman, Jerome Bickenbach, and Robert Wachbroit (eds.), “Preventing Genetically Transmitted Disabilities While Respecting Persons with Disabil-ities,” in Quality of Life and Human Difference (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, in press).
329. McMahan,“Wrongful Life,” p. 244.
330. Mary Seller, “The Human Embryo: A Scientist's Point of View,” Bioethics 7 (1992): 135-40
331. J. A. Burgess and S. A. Tawia, “When Did You First Begin to Feel It?-Locating the Beginning of Human Consciousness,” Bioethics 10 (1996): 1-26
332. Julius Korein, “Ontogenesis of the Brain in the Human Organism: Definitions of Life and Death in the Human Being and Person,” Advances in Bioethics 2 (1997), pp. 25-6
333. Vivette Glover and Nicholas Fisk, “Fetal Pain: Implications for Research and Practice,” British Journal of Obstetrics and Gynaecology 106 (1999): 881-6.
334. The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 267-9.
335. “Why Abortion Is Immoral,” Journal of Philosophy 86 (1989): 183-202.
336. Marquis, “Why Abortion Is Immoral,” pp. 195-6.
337. Mary Anne Warren, “On the Moral and Legal Status of Abor-tion,” The Monist 57 (1973): 43-61.
338. “A Defense of Abortion,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (1971): 47-66.
339. A Defense of Abortion Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002
340. Kamm, Creation and Abortion (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).
341. Boonin, A Defense of Abortion, pp. 135-9.
342. McMahan develops this point persuasively (The Ethics of Killing, pp. 344-5)