Prospective autonomy and critical interests: A narrative defense of the moral authority of advance directives

Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics

Volumn 6, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 138-147

  Rich, Ben A ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ALZHEIMER DISEASE; ANALYTICAL APPROACH; DEATH AND EUTHANASIA; EGO; ETHICS; FEMALE; FREEDOM; HUMAN; LEGAL ASPECT; LIVING WILL; MEDICAL ETHICS; MENTAL HEALTH THERAPIES; MORALITY; PATERNALISM; PATIENT PARTICIPATION; PERSONAL AUTONOMY; PERSONHOOD; PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH; PHILOSOPHY; PROFESSIONAL PATIENT RELATIONSHIP; REVIEW; VERBAL COMMUNICATION;

ANALYTICAL APPROACH; DEATH AND EUTHANASIA; MENTAL HEALTH THERAPIES; PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH; PROFESSIONAL PATIENT RELATIONSHIP;

ADVANCE DIRECTIVE ADHERENCE; ADVANCE DIRECTIVES; ALZHEIMER DISEASE; EGO; ETHICS; ETHICS, MEDICAL; FEMALE; FREEDOM; HUMANS; MORALS; NARRATION; PATERNALISM; PATIENT PARTICIPATION; PERSONAL AUTONOMY; PERSONHOOD; PHILOSOPHY;

EID: 0031087480     PISSN: 09631801     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/s0963180100007763     Document Type: Article

References (20)

1. Dresser R. Life, death, and incompetent patients: conceptual infirmities and hidden values in the law. Arizona Law Review 1986;28:373-405.
2. Rhoden N. Litigating life and death. Harvard law Review 1988;102:375-446.
3. Dresser R. Advance directives, self-determination, and personal identity. In Hackler C, Moseley R, Vawter D, eds. Advance Directives in Medicine. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1989.
4. Dresser R. Relitigating life and death. Ohio State Law Journal 1990;51:425-437.
5. Dresser R. Missing persons: legal perceptions of incompetent patients. Rutgers Law Review 1994;46:609-719.
6. Dresser R. Dworkin on dementia: elegant theory, questionable policy. Hastings Center Report 1995;25(6):32-38.
7. Firlik AD. Margo's logo. JAMA 1991;265:201.
8. Parfit D. Reasons and Persons. New York: Oxford University Press, 1984.
9. Rich BA. The values history: a new standard of care. Emory Law Journal 1991;40:1109-81.
10. In the eleven years between Dresser's first and most recent articles, both of which espouse or at least rely upon Parfit's theory of personal identity, the problematic policy implications that it entails have been identified by a number of authors, perhaps most notably Allen Buchanan and Dan Brock, Deciding for Others-The Ethics of Surrogate Decisionmaking. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, pp. 177-78. Her failure or refusal to acknowledge and address these points suggests that she is avoiding the implications of the theory rather than merely overlooking them.
11. Hume D. A Treatise of Human Nature. London: Penguin Books, 1969.
12. Locke J. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed., Nidditch PH. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975,II.xxvii.9.
13. See note 12. Locke 1975:II.xxvii.9.
14. Buchanan A. Advance directives and the personal identity problem. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 1988;17:277-302.
15. Kuczewski M. Whose will is it, anyway? A discussion of advance directives, personal identity, and consensus in medical ethics. Bioethics 1994;8:27-48.
16. Samuel Sheffler expresses a similar sentiment when he states, with regard to Parfit's view of personal identity: "I don't have the faintest idea how I am to conceive of myself if I am not to conceive of myself in the usual way, as an agent existing over time," Ethics, personal identity, and the ideals of the person. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 1982;12:229-46, p. 238.
17. Locke J. Second Treatise of Government. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960, Ch. II., Sect. 4.
18. See note 2. Rhoden 1988:418.
19. See note 7.
20. Buchanan JH. Patient Encounters: The Experience of Disease. Charlottesville, Va.: University of Virginia Press, 1989, p. 40.