The Global Spread of Constitutional Review

The Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics

Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages

  Ginsburg, Tom ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

Author keywords

Constitutional courts; Constitutional review; Federalism; Ideas; Institutions; Judicial review; Rights; United States

Indexed keywords

EID: 84923531928     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199208425.003.0006     Document Type: Chapter

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